


THE STATE OF GOVERNANCE in Bangladesh 2012

Regions
Representation
Disparity



Institute of Governance Studies
BRAC University

The State of Governance

in BANGLADESH 2012

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Regions, Representation, Disparity

Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University

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Acknowledgements, Report team and Contributors

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List of Acronyms

AGI	Actionable Governance Indicator
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AL	Awami League
ASC	Annual School Census
ASPR	Annual School Performance Report
BBS	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BEC	Bangladesh Election Commission
BJP	Bangladesh Jatiya Party
BMMS	Bangladesh Maternal Mortality Survey
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
CAO	Chief Accounts Officer
CDI	Composite Deprivation Index
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CPP	Concentration of Political Power
CPR	Contraceptive Prevalence Rate
CTG	Caretaker Government
DAO	District Accounts Officer
DFID	Department for International Development
DGHS	Directorate General of Health Services
DPE	Directorate of Primary Education
ECG	Electrocardiography
EDI	Education Development Index
EFA	Education for All
EPI	Education Performance Index
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Profit
GEI	Gender-specific EFA Index
GER	Gender-specific EFA Ratio
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
GPA	Grade Point Average
GPS	Government Primary School
HDI	Human Development Index
HIES	Household Income Expenditure Survey
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPNSDP	Health, Population and Nutrition Development Program
HQ	Headquarter

IGS	Institute of Governance Studies
IOJ	Islamiya Islami Oikya Jote
LGED	Local Government Engineering Department
LHB	Local Health Bulletin
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MOHFW	Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
MP	Member of Parliament
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NHP	National Health Policy
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPD	Outpatient Department
PEDP	Primary Education Development Program
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	Primary School Completion
PSQL	Primary School Quality Level
PTA	Parent-teacher Association
RNGPS	Registered Non-government Primary School
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SCR	Student-classroom Ratio
SGI	School Governance Index
SMC	School Management Committee
SOG	State of Governance
STR	Student-teacher Ratio
SVRS	Sample Vital Registration System
TB	Tuberculosis
TIB	Transparency International Bangladesh
USA	United States of America
UAO	Upazila Accounts Officer
UEO	Upazila Education Officer
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators
WHO	World Health Organization

Glossary

Upazila	Sub-district
Madrasa	Traditional Muslim religious school/college
Haor	Large landbound water body
Char	Naturally reclaimed land
Parishad	Council
Sadar	Central district towns
Jatiyo Sangsad	National Parliament

Preface

Since 2006 the Institute of Governance Studies (IGS), BRAC University has been annually publishing *The State of Governance in Bangladesh (SOG)* report. It is the flagship research publication of the Institute and attempts to examine the nature and various forms of governance in Bangladesh. So far, five SOG reports have been released and this is the sixth issue in the series.

The first three reports of SOG (2006, 2007, and 2008) focused on the institutions and politics of Bangladesh from a governance perspective while the fourth Report (2009) undertook a sectoral analysis of food security, energy, digital Bangladesh, and labour migration. The fifth Report (2010-2011) critically analysed the role and influence of external stakeholders in shaping the country's socio-political policy domain and its effect on the overall governance in Bangladesh. The sixth Report is a departure from all previous reports from a thematic as well as methodological perspective and adopted an indicator-based approach in measuring some key governance dimensions. IGS has been working to develop innovative governance indicators to present a quantitative assessment of governance in Bangladesh for quite some time. The idea was to complement the qualitative assessment of governance in an attempt to enrich the public discourse and deepen the analysis of governance issues in Bangladesh. The 2012 Report has a reflection of that tedious effort.

The Report offers four governance indicators to capture the geographical variation of governance. Such an exercise can provide some useful cues in setting standards for improvement as well as indicate where funds could be used more effectively (Besancon 2003). In other words it can serve as a more effective guide to public policy in improving governance.

Global institutions like World Bank, Transparency International and others have produced indicators measuring multiple dimensions of governance in cross-country settings. However, those indicators were not explicitly meant to address sub-national variations in governance. IGS has long felt the need to bridge this gap and produce indicators to address sub-national issues by tracking and monitoring specific changes in certain aspects of governance. A further rationale for preparing such indicators by IGS is that almost all other global governance indicators are created based on expert opinions which may be subjective in nature. The indicators of SOG 2012 cautiously avoided that approach and are based on objectively verifiable officially generated secondary data. Though collecting the large data set proved to be a challenging task, the generous support of public officials concerned coupled with the arduous efforts of the IGS researchers made this research possible.

The exercise is the first of its kind in the governance discourse of Bangladesh. We are aware that shortcomings remains in the methodological approach followed in the SOG report. We take full responsibility for any shortcomings in the analysis of data and wish to invite your comments and feedback to improve these indicators, which at this stage remain a work in progress.

As always, the Report is the outcome of the hard labour of a pool of young researchers of IGS who deserves recognition for their dedication and commitment. In this collaborative feat, there are many people whose contributions must be acknowledged. Among them, Professor Nizam Ahmed, M M Reza, and M Shahidul Islam deserve special mention for their valuable feedback on the chapters. Dr Rizwan Khair, Director of IGS, who has overseen the research and worked hard throughout the process, also deserves special mention.

We would also like to express our gratitude to International Development Research Centre (IDRC) whose Think Tank Initiative grant to IGS has made this sixth State of Governance in Bangladesh Report possible.



Dr Sultan Hafeez Rahman
Executive Director

The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2012

Executive Summary

The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2012 (SOG 2012) report represents the Institute of Governance Studies' evaluation of governance performance within some of the most crucial and challenging arenas of public service in Bangladesh. In a nation so heavily marked by partisan politics, we consider the intersection of competitive party politics and public service, and ask whether 'unruly politics' affects the quality of our public services. We believe such a meta-analysis to be appropriate to the state of governance since in a democratic system parliamentary bills determine policy which is implemented by the various ministries.

Problemsatically, the culture of boycotting the incumbent at parliamentary sessions remains largely unchanged. The scenario suggests that parliament still does not truly represent the electorate, and consequently, bills passed towards public policy reflect interests of the incumbent party more than that of nation. Thus we ask: what is the state of governance of our democracy? What is the state of national representation at our Parliament? Does the winner-takes-all configuration of political power affect public service provision? Are some electoral constituents better 'served' than others in terms of resource allocation? How well equipped are the district-level public schools and hospitals, to handle citizen's demands for education and health?

In this year's report, we have presented our findings and analyses such that they may appeal to the specialist working with education and health, but also to the 'generalist' with broader interest into the themes of politics, governance, and national development. The first chapter sets the tone for the Report, elaborates the themes discussed above and introduces some key findings from the district-wise analyses. The second chapter considers the state of parliamentary representation under the label 'voice'. The third and fourth chapters evaluate the state of public school and hospital governance respectively, and do so independently of 'politics'. The fifth chapter re-introduces the theme of politics and representation under the label "concentration of political power", to consider district-wise development expenditure as being related to parliamentary and ministerial incumbency. The sixth chapter resumes the meta-analysis introduced in chapter one, and considers the effects of partisan politics on public service, in light of empirical evidence presented in the previous chapters.

Methodologically, this year's research effort represents a break from the IGS norm of conducting surveys and focus group discussions with 'samples' of the citizenry. The 'empiricism' of SOG 2012 is mainly based on data-bases from the government ministries. Thus, for the first time we are able to present a detailed picture of district-wise public services and compare it to the state of 'representation' of the electoral constituents (the districts) at the national democratic forum (the Parliament).

Conceptually, as we evaluate 'governance', we have chosen to focus on the 'inputs' of governance in the construction of indicators. By inputs we mean resources and activities through which our institutions can be said to deliver public services. We only consider outputs cross-check the validity of our constructed indicators; to see whether better funded and equipped schools actually result in better equipped students and healthier citizens.

Our empirical findings have verified that competitive and party politics does have an effect on public policy and expenditure. Voice and attendance in plenary sessions is determined by incumbency and such bias ultimately translates into public expenditure in the regions at the district level. We have also found female representation to have improved considerably in the 9th Parliament. Considering that an association exists between female representation and women-related social outcomes, such representation may lead to policy-making favourable to women.

Our study did not specifically identify incumbency bias in the delivery of public health and education. We did establish the fact that school and hospital governance surrounding 'inputs' affect outcomes in both education and health. We also found urbanisation, population density and remoteness to affect the governance and performance of the two sectors. Having found no effect of incumbency in these public sectors, we examined the data-sets for other relationships between politics and public policy. Here, our findings show that ministerial position as well as standing committee membership does reflect on development expenditure in the districts of Bangladesh and that incumbency matters.

We believe that an empirical study using data-sets provided by the Government of Bangladesh brings a heightened degree of legitimacy to our analysis of governance. This can be considered to be useful to both the citizenry and the donors and also to the Government and people's representatives. This endeavour has been made possible with the access to information and computerisation of data in recent years. This particular governance study performed by IGS 'capitalises' on this opportunity and provides a report that is less marked by our own research bias. The use of public information and standard methods enabled us to convey 'facts' surrounding governance that are verifiable, replicable and more open to public critique. We hope that through such strategies we are in a better position to fulfil our role as an agent of transparency and allow us to stimulate further debate towards good governance and public accountability.

1

Introduction

1.1 Context, relevance and study objectives

Since 2006, the Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) has annually produced a report called *The State of Governance in Bangladesh* (SOG). Within the Bangladeshi research community, the report represents a unique ensemble of collaborative research. Drawing on expertise from multiple disciplines the SOG reports have aimed to evaluate the state of governance as a reflection of local institutions and processes that underpin the greater national development project (IGS 2006). The first three Reports (2006, 2007, and 2008) focused on the institutions and politics of Bangladesh from a governance perspective. The 2009 Report moved away from the broad macro perspective to a sector-wide analysis looking at food security, energy, 'digital' development and international labour migration. The 2010-11 Report, which was composed 40 years after the country's independence, brought together the themes of autonomy, independence and policy issues related to the influence of external actors in Bangladesh.

This 2012 Report makes a significant departure from the previous reports, from a thematic as well as methodological perspective. Four themes of governance in Bangladesh are explored in this year's Report: a) the representation of voice within our parliament b) the extent to which political power is concentrated in geographic clusters c) the current state of education among public schools and d) the current state of health service provision among public hospitals. Thus, on one hand our research evaluates how representatives of state formally represent the electoral constituents in parliament and via the ministries. On the other hand, we evaluate how this form of representation translates into public service delivery within the most crucial sectors of education and health. This represents a continuation of previous IGS research into these two sectors (SOG 2010-2011 and SOG 2006).

The current Report is the first that informs the selected themes by using existing secondary data provided by the government ministries¹. This availability of data represents an opportunity to break with strategies of past SOG reports in which empiricism was ‘constructed’ around strategies that mainly relied on survey-type data outlining citizen’s perception, expert opinions and statistical data provided by various government and non-government agencies. The empirical approach of this year’s Report has the benefit, for the first time, in providing a nationwide assessment of district-level performance of public service delivery. This allows for a discussion that is more free from our own research bias and interests, allowing us to confidently report our findings as ‘objective’ and ‘sound’. Importantly, given that our work is based on data-sets that are created for the public domain, our findings can easily be verified by peers of the scientific community.

According to IGS, the concept of governance is best defined as the sum total of institutions and processes by which society orders and conducts its collective or common affairs (IGS 2006)². The preceding five Reports have examined various institutions and sectors using both primary survey data and secondary information. The aim was to identify the nature of the governance challenges that prevails within our socio-political landscape. The focus on governance is important because within the development literature, there is a strong consensus that the association between good governance and long-term development outcomes is incontrovertible (Rodrik 2008)³.

Four dominant issues that need mentioning have emerged from the last five Reports of IGS. First, partisan politics has infiltrated all aspects of public organisations (IGS 2006). This is the outcome of a patron-client political framework⁴ that hinders the public sector’s capacity to emerge as an effective and accountable organ of the state⁵. Second, formal accountability mechanisms are weak and ineffective, partly because of partisan penetration of public institutions, and in part because formal rules are absent or inadequately framed. Nonetheless, there are signs that informal institutions often determine the ‘rules of the game’, particularly where tangible resources are at stake. Third, demand for reform is mainly generated by external actors (IGS 2012). Fourth, knowledge of governance is inconclusive because much of it is produced by or for the media, civil society and donors and is therefore oriented towards news-making and advancing a particular reform agenda (IGS 2006).

-
1. Some of the data used, to the best of our knowledge, have not been used in any earlier empirical enquiry on the State of Governance in Bangladesh.
 2. It must be stated here that while there has been a considerable growth in issues and ideas that falls within the notion of governance, there is a broad agreement that governance is about how authority is exercised over a country’s economic, political and social affairs (Hyden 2011).
 3. Corruption, which is a symptom of underlying poor governance, has been isolated as a fundamental detriment to economic development. See Mauro (1995), Treisman (2000), Rahman (2013).
 4. For a better understanding of patron client political framework, see Scott (1973).
 5. There are four dimensions to the penetration of politics: i) public institutions have become partisan throughout their operations and structure; ii) political parties have institutionalised their organs at the local level, which allows them to control or influence local development processes and administration; iii) civil society is often perceived to have developed a partisan bias; and d) a positive dimension to the politicisation of public life is that politics is highly participative.

Thus, to contribute to this broad governance discourse, the present edition, *The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2012*, aims to provide ‘governance indicators’ on some specific dimensions of public service delivery across the geographic space of Bangladesh. The principal motivation is to provide an investigation that ‘looks beyond the national averages’ by providing an alternate picture that is not solely dependent on macro governance assessment of any institution or sector. Rather, the objective is to identify geographical variation in the performance of institutions and sectors essential for establishing good governance. An attempt at explaining such variations will also be presented here. Such an inquiry will also bring to light some ‘islands of success’ that can better situate the dominant discourse on the state of governance in Bangladesh. On the whole, our governance indicators, which allow us to capture the variation in the quality of governance across the 64 districts of Bangladesh, will provide new insights to undertake sub-national comparative analysis. It will also allow policymakers and researchers to rank various regions.

In the following subsections, a brief rationale for selecting the areas under evaluation is provided. This will constitute a discussion on the theoretical importance of the governance topic and will comment on the framework in which public accountability is to function. A further portrayal of the existing limits to the accountability system in Bangladesh will be outlined. This will contextualise the discussion on the themes selected and formed as central chapters of SOG 2012.

1.1.1 Good governance and the quest for public accountability

In the academic literature, Bangladesh has often been characterised as suffering from a pervasive lack of public accountability and members of state to be deeply institutionalised into the illegal practice of using public resources for private gain (Word Bank 1999). Undoubtedly, this depiction is far from the expectations of governance held by the citizenry at the dawn of independence. In 1991, when democratic form of governance was re-introduced, hopes for public accountability were high. However, in 2006, when democracy was yet again surrendered to autocracy, it was done so without much resistance from the citizenry, civil society members and the international community. Apparently, so grand was the scale of institutionalised corruption, politicisation of the bureaucracy, judiciary and private markets (which eventually threatened life, liberty and property in relation to the dysfunctional police and justice system) that autocracy appeared as a welcome force in society. How did this pathology of Bangladeshi democratic governance emerge? How is public accountability envisioned in principles of state, and how were circumvented in practice? And finally, how do the institutional arrangements that reflect this pathology affect the nature of public service? The following introduction will discuss these issues in relation to theory and practice, and in doing so, contextualises the empirical work to be presented in this year’s edition of the IGS *State of Governance Report 2012*.

1.1.2 Historical context: governance and accountability discourses

At the turn of the 16th century, enlightenment philosophers encoded the expectations upon governance from a newly emerged class of traders and industrialists. These were in turn inspired

by the French and American revolutions and helped lay the foundation for the paradigm of law, civil society and democracy that still prevails in contemporary governance discourse. But the idea of 'people's sovereignty' was not without risks, as shown in the violent excesses of the French revolution. In Napoleon's time, Benjamin Constant⁶ wrote that central state, formed by a sovereign people, could be equally oppressive as the Ancien Régime (Constant and Fontana 1988), echoing Plato's assertion that all democratic systems must eventually degenerate into oligarchy followed by dictatorship. Addressing the threat of the tyrannical majority under a democratic system, Alexis de Tocqueville considered that central power must remain dispersed in civil society via associations and local townships (de Tocqueville 1838). Adam Smith's prescription to the problem of usurpation of the modern central state was largely to prevent state monopoly and balance the state via the 'free', privately owned, markets (Davis and McGregor 2000), thereby retaining a degree of peoples' sovereignty. Locke's idea to balance the state involved separating the powers of the state, across three branches of government, so as to balance the powers of the executive (Locke 1772).

Most representative democracies of today have built on the 'social contract' theories of the enlightenment philosophers, which were eventually incorporated in the constitution of the United States. Today, the legacy of the time can be found in the continuity between the British and American Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Human Rights, pronounced after the World War II. It embodies the ideas of secularism and non-discrimination, of separation not only between church and state, but between state, market and civil society and is essential to the post-enlightenment paradigm of governance. Most notably, this paradigm sees the state as a servant (as understood in the concepts 'public service', 'civil service') of a sovereign people, rather as a ruler. This idea is at the heart of what may be considered the modern social contract, and is of high relevance to governance in Bangladesh. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh is best understood as the embodiment of the social contract idea. In fact the 'fundamental principles' and 'fundamental rights' sections of the constitution spells out rights, freedoms and correlative duties of both state and citizen. Doing so, it envisions members of state and the citizenry as legal entities whose relationship is bound by legal contract, rather than the will of the sovereign ruler.

1.1.3 Accountability and the imbalance of power in Bangladesh

The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh follows a parliamentary framework of representative democracy where parliament is conceived as the supreme law-making body of the government. In a sense, it is the most essential platform for identifying the 'national interest' based on discussion, debate and the formal representation of citizens' voice. Hence, parliament becomes the "place where political commitment for the greater good would be established (IGS 2009: 33)."

With the aim to secure, as far as possible, the idea of citizen sovereignty, and to prevent usurpation and tyranny, formal powers of the state is dispersed across three branches of government: the

6. Benjamin Constant wrote on the subjects of liberty and usurpation in France during time of Napoleon.

'executive', the 'judiciary' and the 'legislative' branches. This 'Westministerial model' for balancing power is, among the representative democracies of the world, universally adopted, but often with slight modifications with regards to the powers awarded to the executive in relation to the other two branches.

Typically, in welfare regimes of Northern and Western Europe, the executive has evolved with greater powers than in the USA, in relation to the powers of the other two branches. Across the Atlantic, the tradition that has evolved is one where parliament (congress and senate), and notably the judiciary stand out as comparably powerful, in the process of determining public policy, and the meaning of the national interest. Formally, the state envisioned in the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, is one that more closely resembles the European welfare state as opposed to the 'minimalist' state in the USA. Thus, the idea that the state should be accountable to the citizenry, via the parliament and the judiciary, is at once made difficult by the constitutional powers awarded to the executive, compared to the two other branches of government in Bangladesh.

Adding to this difficulty at the outset of the accountability project are the prevalence of a) a bi-polar political culture (Stiles 2002) in which contestation and political dissent of party rhetoric is punished by excommunication⁷, b) the politicisation of the judiciary via appointment of party-loyal judges to the supreme court (New Age 2011) and c) the politicisation of the bureaucracy via appointments of party-loyal top-bureaucrats. All this suggests that there is a significant 'accountability-gap' between the policy and practice of governance in Bangladesh. Exactly how the central institutions of accountability are a) supposed to check and balance the executive branch and how they b) actually function in practice is discussed in the following section.

1.1.4 The Bangladeshi model for balancing power

In the ideal British Westministerial (tripartite government) system, executive is designed to be accountable to the parliament as well as the judiciary. As part of the legislative process, members of parliament can question and scrutinise any bill presented by the ministers and ministries. Importantly, parliament can hold the executive to account via plenary sessions and standing committees, which are parliamentary committees formed with the ultimate goal of auditing ministerial planning and to produce reports for the general public. The judiciary in Bangladesh holds the 'power of review'⁸ that awards it with the power to judge whether or not laws passed in parliament may violate fundamental rights of the citizenry and thus whether or not laws passed are 'constitutional'.

7. This policy is specified in Article 70 of the Constitution, and is discussed further in sections 1.1.7 and 5.2.2
 8. In 2010, the High Court of Bangladesh wrote off the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which considered proclamations made by the military government between 1975 and 1979 to be valid.

1.1.5 Executive dominance & the institutions of accountability

Previously we asked whether the bi-polar nature of political society in Bangladesh is reflected in public service provision. We considered this question to be relevant given the extreme polarisation of competitive electoral politics and the extension of this culture of bi-partisanship across both civil society and private markets (Stiles 2002). In other words, given the extent of polarisation, can we expect this phenomenon to a) be mirrored within the civil service sector (which is the primary implementing body of public policy) and b) reflect the way that public expenditure is allocated across regions in Bangladesh? Is it reasonable to expect that districts considered as incumbency strongholds receive more than their fair share of public expenditure?

1.1.6 Increasingly politicised bureaucracy

Zafarullah and Khan (2001) and Jahan and Shahan (2008) have shown how bureaucrats have tended to adopt a more overt political stance after the reemergence of democracy in 1991. The post-independence autocratic regime (1975-1990) depended on the bureaucracy as the central institution to implement public policy and governing the country. In these challenging early years of independent governance, it was generally perceived that any form of change within the administration to challenge *status quo* would disrupt the process of public service provision. However, with the introduction of competitive electoral politics, in 1991, much needed reforms were not carried out, despite external pressures, due to "bureaucratic inertia and political inaction" (Zafarullah and Khan 2001: 995). Nonetheless, a gradual process of politicisation began to emerge that allowed ruling parties to exert more influence upon the leadership of the civil service sector. According to Zafarullah and Khan (2001), this was done without disrupting the existing administrative structure of the civil bureaucracy. Surveys (TIB 2007; Jahan and Shahan 2008) have shown that the recruitment process is heavily politicised and a high degree of political patronage exists in the enrollment of civil servants. According to Zafarullah and Khan (2001) and Jahan and Shahan (2008), promotions have occurred during the democratic period on non-merit criteria. Given the centralised system of the bureaucracy and the political affiliation of the civil servants, partisan interest can be assumed to reflect on public policy/expenditure through the bureaucracy.

1.1.7 Dysfunctional Parliament

Since the Prime Minister of the executive cabinet appoints the ministers, they are first and foremost accountable to the office of the Prime Minister. The office of the Prime Minister is in turn accountable to parliament, which is accountable to the electorate through the system of representation at the parliamentary sessions. But given what we know of parliamentary process in Bangladesh since 1991, what can we really expect from the Parliament as an institution of

accountability? In practice, does the Parliament actually hold the executive accountable? Does it manage to translate the idea of 'national interest' into public policy?

Most recent governance research indicates that this confrontational and bi-partisan political system is reflected within the Parliament and that the body does not, in fact, hold the executive accountable in an effective manner (IGS 2009). The fact that discussions during plenary sessions sorely lack the presence of constructive debates on public policy that really matters to most citizens has been witnessed and widely reported (The Daily Star 2013). Instead, the function of the Parliament as the core institution of public accountability has been seriously eroded by a long-standing culture of parliamentary boycott, by the opposition, during the successive AL and BNP regimes since 1991. Moreover, Article 70 of the Constitution does not allow an elected MP to vote against his party. This can amplify partisan debate within the Parliament and reflect on public policy. The parliamentary committees can address the shortcomings of the plenary sessions, but these have often been found to be inactive and the committees are typically biased towards the incumbent party (IGS 2009). This leaves much discretion for the executive branch to determine public policy and seems to beg the question of whether the effects of politicisation can be expected to render into public expenditure.

1.1.8 Lack of judicial autonomy

The dominance of the executive over the judiciary has for decades been a matter of intense debate across civil and political society in Bangladesh. However, the process of separating the operation of this branch of government, from the executive, was only seriously initiated under the regime of the Care-Taker Government (CTG), which came into power in 2007.

In 2007, the Judiciary was said to be formally separated from the Executive. A number of commentators did, however, point out that this separation was incomplete. Moreover, under the current Awami League regime, it appears that some of the powers of the District Magistrates were returned to them, formally reducing the autonomy of the judiciary from the executive. Specifically, the new ordinance allowed the District Magistrates to initiate some cases but not to try them. According to Blair (2011), the judiciary still lacked control "over postings, promotions and disciplining judges" as of summer, 2011. According to Mollah (2012) and Blair (2011) the judiciary can currently be seen as being only nominally independent from the executive, whereas significant barriers to *de facto* autonomy remains.

1.2 Theme selection and overview of SOG 2012

This report constitutes four chapters that provide a detailed examination of institutions and sectors, each of which maps onto a distinct feature of governance. Additionally, each issue examined under this current Report offers fresh insights to the existing qualitative work

undertaken for the preceding State of Governance in Bangladesh reports. The areas that are scrutinised within each chapter are:

- Voice and Parliament
- Governance within education sector
- Governance within health sector
- Concentration of political power and distribution of public expenditure

The current *State of Governance* report starts off by seeking the relationship and effects of party politics and the politicisation of the bureaucratic system from the lens of parliamentary accountability. The Report, in *Chapter 2*, verifies the bi-partisan nature present in the parliamentary system of Bangladesh. The reflection of party interest overshadowing national interest becomes evident when analyses suggest that there is significant channeling of public expenditure towards regions represented by constituents in the parliament belonging to the incumbent.

Further testing has shown that this bi-partisan nature of politics do not get translated into two of the biggest sectors of national concern, education and health, whose governance issues at the district level are discussed in *Chapter 3* and *Chapter 4*, respectively. According to Hyden (2011), governance is typically a slow moving variable. The two sectors of education and health are (relatively) large sectors and such drastic effects of channeling public expenditure may not translate well into the governance of the sectors (using the variables used for measure). Nevertheless, more dominant and/or equally slow moving factors like geography and demographics have been found to have an effect on the health and education sectors. However, given that we did not find any conclusive evidence of politicisation (*vis-à-vis* allocation of resources) in the health and education sector, a question arises: do the cases of education and health suggest that civil bureaucracy is in some positive way insulated from the effects of politics and the prevailing norm of patronage and rent?

Thus, to further verify the effect of party politics we look at the correlation of public expenditure and concentration of political power in *Chapter 5*. The final round of testing verifies the prevalence of patron-client politics and the hypothesis stands as development expenditure reflects the bi-partisan nature of politics. Chapter 6 elaborates on the meta-analysis discussed at the beginning of this chapter and considers broadly, the intersection of party politics and public service. All chapters make use of tables, maps and seatte-plots, many of which can be found in the Annexure chapter.

1.3 Key findings

1.3.1 Voice and Parliament

Parliamentary democracy found a new beginning in 1991 after a prolonged period of military rule post 1975. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a simple majority in 1991 and Bangladesh

Awami League (AL) emerged as the chief opposition in the Parliament. Since then, both these parties have succeeded each other in every respective election. Yet, even after such political achievement at the national level, Parliament has rarely emerged as a venue where real discussion and deliberation hardly occurs (Amundsen and Jahan 2012). Also, existing works have provided evidences to show that the Parliament is a mere ‘law approving body’ – where no consensus building across political stakeholders adequately occurs (IGS 2009; IGS 2012). This phenomenon is in complete contradiction to the essence of a democratic framework, which promises to ensure that the concerns and voice of the people will be heard in the Parliament through their elected representatives.⁹

Thus to provide a more in-depth assessment of this issue, this chapter scrutinises specific means through which concerns of the people find representation in parliament. These involve studying the nature of the composition of the parliament and the behaviour of the parliamentarian in the House. To this end, the analysis develops three core indicators: (i) Average Attendance of MPs by district; (see map 1.1) (ii) Participation in the budget sessions through speech and (iii) Ratio of Women MPs in a district. Each indicator has been calculated using records on 8th and 9th Parliament.

These core examinations reveal two essential findings. First, the state of Voice – measured by the noted three indicators – experiences substantial variation across the geographic space of Bangladesh. This heterogeneity is interesting as these indicators are associated with important public service outcomes. The two indicators on political behaviour not only reveals that the indicators’ experience across spatial variation, it also highlights that even within the ruling political parties in both 8th and 9th Parliament, there is a substantial variation in political behaviour. In particular, variation in average attendance and budget speech participation of MPs between districts with only ruling party MPs is suggestive that the existing narrative, which explains the general attendance of MPs from the sole lens of one’s party affiliation, is deficient.

Second, there is an acute ‘missing women leader’ problem across the political space of Bangladesh. This is counter-intuitive since, at present, the office of the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Speaker of the House, Minister of Foreign Affairs are all occupied by female political legislators. Yet, the analysis reveals that there are some severe spatial disparities. For example, electoral outcomes of the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Parliament¹⁰ reveal that 39 districts never elected any female legislator between 1991 and 2008. Nevertheless, there are some improvements in the 9th Parliament as 19 lawmakers were directly elected from 17 districts. We also find some anecdotal evidence on the positive link between women representation and women-centric public service outcomes.


9. A central philosophy underlying the notion of representative democracy is to develop a polity where a government is formed by discussion (Mill, 1861).

10. Since the 6th parliamentary election was not participatory and the government failed to last even two months, we ignored this parliament from our examination.

Map 1.1

BANGLADESH

Attendance in 9th Parliament



1.3.2 Governance within education sector

According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh the provision of education falls under the basic necessities. Providing for universal education is stated to be a fundamental principle of state policy. Bangladesh has taken great strides in the overall education sector and the achievement of gender parity in the enrolment of primary and secondary education in terms of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is particularly noteworthy. The chapter on primary education looks at the educational performance of the 64 districts to assess the effect of school-level governance and the quality of primary schools.

The findings of the research suggest that school governance matters for district performance. Apart from the average primary school quality (reflected by school-level infrastructure index), the effect of other factors relating to geographical position and demographics is also seen.

The research shows that district schools with school management committees (SMCs) composed of trained members and headed by female has a positive effect on educational outcomes with respect to primary school completion (PSC) examination. It has also been found that a group of these districts that rank favourably are at an advantage being situated in urban areas and / or divisional headquarters.


Dhaka is the best performing division and Sylhet is the worst with respect to governance of the education sector. The Sylhet district, which is a divisional head, is an exception that performs poorly. We observed a disadvantage across the whole division of Sylhet, some of which is attributed to the fact that the districts are located in remote areas making governance difficult. However, when schools operating only in single-shift are taken into account with "effective SMC" a systematic positive association is seen with PSC results irrespective of divisional identity, extent of remoteness and urbanisation of the districts.

The findings further suggest that many poorly performing districts like Sylhet has low school governance, using IGS's own measurement on governance process (see map 1.2), as well as low educational performance. There are exceptions like the district of Narayanganj, which has low educational performance with high school governance. However, there are no districts with high educational performance with low school governance. When primary school quality has been taken into account it has been found to be positively associated with educational performance. There are exceptions, e.g. a number of districts in the Dhaka region, where educational performance is witnessed to be high despite low primary school quality. The case of Dhaka and its adjacent districts indicate that school governance is more likely to become a binding factor than school quality in terms of infrastructure on educational outcomes. Thus, school governance, broadly defined as a combination of trained SMC members, female headship and single-shift operation, has an effect on educational performance even when primary school quality and contextual factors are taken into account.

Map 1.2

BANGLADESH

State of school governance



1.3.3 Governance within health sector

The Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh considers health to be a basic necessity of life and states that provision of such necessities is a fundamental policy of the state. Proper governance of the health sector becomes essential to adhere to the policy, and the chapter on health services provide measures to assess the health sector governance at the district level. A comparison of the 64 districts has been made in terms of governance of the sector using functionality of equipments and the availability of manpower (see map 1.3). We consider if there is an association with performance defined in terms of outpatient service delivery at the district level health units.

A basic premise at the outset of the chapter is that a hospital or any health unit will function better if the inputs are available and functioning. Competing explanatory variables such as population density and remoteness of the districts are taken into account to see if these factors affect the functionality of equipments, availability of manpower and service delivery of the health units. The research findings confirm the validity of our basic argument while the socio-economic nature and geographical location of districts do affect the governance factors significantly. Our findings suggest that availability of manpower and functionality of equipment do affect the outpatient service delivery positively and significantly.

Our analysis also shows that there is notable variation across the country for the indicators used to measure health sector governance. For the availability of manpower the percentage of positions filled in terms of the allocated positions of physicians and nurses are taken into account. We found that, on average, 60 percent of the sanctioned physician positions are filled. Other findings suggest that there is an urban bias with a higher percentage of positions filled in the urban centres. Moreover, hospitals located at the seven divisional headquarters rank better than hospitals dispersed across the respective districts. The Dhaka division has the highest filled in percentage of physicians at 80 percent, followed by the Chittagong division at 63 percent.


All the districts in Chittagong show better results in terms of physician positions except for three in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region – Bandarban, Rangamati and Khagrachari. The Khulna and Sylhet divisions have 58 percent and 55 percent of their allocated physician positions filled, respectively. The Rajshahi and Rangpur divisions rank next with a percentage of about 45 percent of filled positions. The Barisal Division is the worst performing district with only 43 percent of the sanctioned positions filled. In terms of districts, Dhaka ranks the highest with 99 percent and Panchagarh is the lowest at 22 percent.

The availability of nurses is lower than that of physicians with a national average of about 42 percent. However, when the divisional performance is taken into account we find that distribution is less varied. Rangpur division has about 65 percent of the sanctioned nurse positions filled, followed by the three divisions of Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet all at about 48 percent, Khulna at 38 percent, Rajshahi at 36 percent and Barisal at 35 percent.

Map 1.3

BANGLADESH

State of hospital governance




The district variation in terms of the functionality of equipments (ambulances, ECG and X-ray machines and calorimeters) is not very pronounced. Dhaka and its nearby districts have the highest percentage of functional equipments with a divisional average of 77 percent. The Rangpur and Rajshahi divisions have a lower percentage of functional equipments. However, the Gaibandha district in the Rangpur division ranks quite highly. The Sylhet division ranks with Barisal among the lowest performing districts with respect to equipment functionality. When performance of the health sector is taken into account Dhaka is the best performing division and Barisal the worst.

1.3.4 Concentration of political power and resource allocation


The political process within Bangladesh has undergone significant scrutiny over the last one decade, in an attempt to pinpoint and evaluate factors that have undermined the prospects of democratisation within its political periphery. In particular, existing works have noted that concentration of political power within the two primary political parties have effectively resulted in a scenario where one experiences an acute 'winner takes all' phenomenon. This translates into a state where politics is deeply confrontational (IGS 2009; Ahmed 2009). Thus, this chapter offers a descriptive scrutiny of a pertinent inquiry in political economy: does concentration of political power - as a result of ministerial allocation in certain region - shape resource distribution within the given political space? This inquiry is argued to be of both intrinsic and instrumental importance for two reasons. First, if resource distribution is product of the power structure that prevails with a given polity, then it is of intrinsic concern to those who believe in the idea of 'distributive justice'. Second, timely and effective distribution must reflect on the capacity and autonomy of the ministries of public service and is thus instrumental to ensure state accountability to its citizens. Yet, if the preference of vested quarters or *de facto* power of state organs (in our case, the influence of ministers and standing committee chairpersons) shape resource distribution, then it brings to question the quality of government effectiveness in undertaking such decisions.

Consequently, to implement the research, the chapter employs a novel technique to measure the variation in the degree of concentration of political power across the 64 districts of Bangladesh (see map 1.5). The main objective is to evaluate if there is evidence in favour of our expectation of bias: that concentration of power, as a result of imbalanced ministerial allocation across certain districts and across regimes, may significantly influence resource distribution (see map 1.4). The result suggests that concentration of political power have a strong association with resource distribution across the political space of Bangladesh. The analysis is also suggestive that geographical disparity of concentration of political power is varied across political regimes and that economic and geographical factors cannot completely predict the variation in resource distribution.

Map 1.4



Map 1.5



1.4 Concluding remarks

The State of Governance Reports represents IGS's commitment to understanding and disseminating of the state of governance that prevails in Bangladesh. In that respect, the principle objective of this report is to provide a district-level assessment of the state of governance in Bangladesh. To this end, the report utilises specific governance-related indicators developed by research team.

The analysis undertaken in each of the core empirical chapters (Parliament, Education, Health and Power concentration) offers an assessment of governance within the respective service sectors and institutions that indirectly regulate public service outcomes. This assessment is performed by building indicators based on 'inputs' as opposed to 'outputs'. When the indicators predict performance it shows that theory building is sound and policy-makers can emphasize and upgrade inputs accordingly for better service delivery. The two chapters relating to the core public services of education and health reflect a strategy consistent with the broader trend within the governance discipline of constructing 'actionable governance indicators'. A similar strategy is also evident in the other two chapters where in assessing governance, 'inputs' are examined against outcomes categorised as development expenditure. Such strategies allow us to consider insights that are often hidden under aggregate narratives on the public sectors.

Each chapter is written as a stand-alone chapter, allowing specialists to review their subject(s) of question and their institutional arrangements without specific reference to the macro-political landscape discussed in this introduction chapter. The Report is written for the purpose of discussion and policy debate among citizens and their representatives as well as non-government agencies and development partners in Bangladesh. For example, a district-wise analysis can aid parliamentarians and potential Members of Parliament (MPs) to better represent their constituents by looking at the various natures and aspects of governance discussed in the Report. Moreover, this Report can be considered to be a baseline on the district level analysis of governance issues, and creates numerous indices. This can particularly be of relevance to academics and analysts as the Report introduces a new body of knowledge and the analyses can be further pursued. Finally, the geographical perspective can also aid the donors in locating areas of concern and they can allocate or reallocate their funds as they perceive to be necessary from the findings of the report.

2

Voice and Parliament: Empirical Insights for Bangladesh

2.1 Introduction

A central idea underlying the notion of representative democracy is to develop a polity where a government is formed by discussion (Mill 1861). In essence, the aim of such democratic framework is to ensure that the concerns and the voice of the people find mentioning and deliberation in the parliament through their elected representatives. Such mechanisms also make certain that elected representatives offer a degree of accountability by transforming the parliament into a venue where real discussions and debates are undertaken. After the third wave of democracy, which mostly involved decentralisation of political power (Huntington 1991), citizens found a scope for expressing their preferences over state policy through their elected representatives.¹ In some cases, political institutions aiding participatory governance were introduced so that citizens can have a direct voice in matters of public interest. In fact, the three most essential functions of the parliament, which are (i) ensure appropriate representation, (ii) provide effective laws addressing the changing needs of the society, and (iii) maintain accountability of the representatives and other organs of the state, faced significant challenges in different countries. Against this context, this chapter aims to scrutinise some specific aspects of democratic governance in Bangladesh. Within the existing body of work on the state of democratic transition in Bangladesh, there has been a consensus that the institutions for democratic consolidation have come under severe strain over the past two decades (IGS 2006-11; Amundsen and Jahan 2012). Yet, specific mechanisms that allow a democratic political framework to work adequately have been far less scrutinised.²

Thus, in this chapter we study some distinct features of democratic performance. Our primary objective here is to evaluate the current state of voice across the political arena of Bangladesh.

1. Parliaments provide a link between the concerns of the people and those that govern. Proper articulation of citizens' concerns in the parliament is a prerequisite for the legitimacy of government. A global opinion poll in 2008 found that 85 percent of people believed that the 'will of the people should be the basis of the authority of government' (Power and Rebecca 2012).
2. Especially mechanisms that depend on the behaviour of legislators.

Unlike the World Governance Indicators – Voice and Accountability³, which captures the perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to select their government, this analysis aims to understand the extent of the concerns and aspirations of the people find mentioning within the parliament through *de jure* means. Hence, we employ a more micro focus in studying the mechanisms through which citizens can find their preferences and priorities addressed in a polity. This involves studying both the nature of the composition of the parliament and the behaviour of the parliamentarians in the House.

To this end, we develop three core indicators, which aim to measure two key characteristics of the Parliament: (i) participatory behaviour of parliamentarians; (ii) state of women representation in the Parliament. The measurement of behaviour of the parliamentarians is undertaken with the help of two specific indicators: (i) *average attendance of parliamentarian in a district*; (ii) *average length of a speech by MPs in a district in a Budget session of the parliament*. To measure the state of women representation in Bangladesh, we compute a third indicator: (iii) *proportion of elected female MPs in a district*. Additionally, since these indicators are computed at a district level, it allows us to examine their spatial variation across the political landscape of Bangladesh. This is an original endeavour within the Bangladeshi context, since most governance narrative or analysis, so far, are undertaken at a macro level (or sector /institutional level).⁴ These indicators also allow the chapter to undertake numerous descriptive analysis.

In the next section, we discuss some related work. Section 2.3 discusses the source of our data and the methodology that we have employed to quantify the variation in our indicators across the 64 districts of Bangladesh. Section 2.4 explains the undertaken analysis and provides interpretation of the results. Finally, Section 2.5 provides concluding observations and discusses possible avenues for future research.

2.2 Related literature and political background

2.2.1 Related literature

The nature of this empirical investigation makes the work closely related to the study of political shirking as it involves a scrutiny of how well legislators perform their legislative duties. Moreover, the literature on political shirking⁵ is diverse, and it constitutes multiple streams – constituting studies trying to identify what lawmakers actually do and how they influence policy. To begin with, there is an essential strand within the literature on political shirking which studies the role of institutional design to make legislators more effective. The emphasis on institution is important because institutions determine the level of shirking in a given political arena in two key ways. First, institutional arrangements determine the incentives of politicians. They influence how legislators

3. For more information, see Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kray and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006).

4. If one continues to produce such indicators over time, then one will eventually have a panel data on these indicators across both time and space in Bangladesh.

5. To avoid or neglect a legislative and constituency-bound duty or responsibility

perform in the parliament, and decide on transfers, taxes and public good provision towards specific groups of citizens⁶. Second, institutions shape the process through which political selection takes place in a given polity (Besley 2005; Acemoglu et al 2008; Besley and Reynal-Querol 2009). Selection of politicians matters as it affects their competence, honesty or motivation⁷. Consequently, on the role of institution in shaping incentives for politicians, Besley and Case (1995) identify that policies are different in states when U.S. state governors are barred by term limit to stand for re-election. Analysing the effect of term limit is interesting because the prospect of facing re-election has been much emphasised as the primary disciplining mechanism in a representative democracy.

In addition to this, Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) notes the effects of term limits in U.S. Congress, and it highlights that term limits may discourage relatively 'skilled' and 'policy minded' politicians from staying in Congress. The paper shows that term limits might tend to tilt the composition of Congress towards younger and less experienced politicians. Keane and Merlo (2007) contribute to this by pointing out that term limits will disproportionately reduce the continuation probabilities of members of the majority party. Tituunik (2008) uses a unique randomised experiment in the state senates of Arkansas and Texas to pinpoint that senators serving shorter terms exhibit higher abstention rates. Likewise, Dal Bo and Rossi (2008) focus on an experiment in the Argentine Senate to suggest that longer terms enhance legislative productivity. Conversely, Smart and Sturm (2004) show that term limits can benefit voters (*ex ante*) as it makes politicians more truthful about their policy preference by reducing the value of occupying public office.

Institutions also determine the level of political shirking in a given political landscape by influencing political selection. More specifically, since any political arena will suffer from incomplete contracts, adoption of socially optimal policies will ultimately depend upon an incumbent politicians' capacity to use his or her discretion effectively. Hence, selection of political leaders matter, and a handful of empirical studies confirm this issue. For example, Rehavi (2007) uses regression discontinuity design for close elections to identify that women's representation affects policy formulation in U.S. state legislatures. This is also reflected in the findings of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) which examine two Indian states – Rajasthan and West Bengal. The authors show that the kind of issues favoured by women get more attention when women leaders are selected. In line with this, Pande (2003) finds that reservation for scheduled tribes and scheduled castes at the state level in India affected policies towards these groups. These

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- 6. Autocracies are often governed by groups of elite while representative democracies create incentive to appeal to important swing groups (for more information, please see Acemoglu et al (2005)). Furthermore, institutions create the level of accountability a political arena exhibit, which in essence determines how politicians are punished for misdemeanors and rewarded for good behaviour.
 - 7. Institutional arrangements in political arenas differ in the way they select their leaders. For example, military dictatorships tend to select leaders with good credentials from the armed forces. Monarchs rely on hereditary norms in facilitating succession. Democratic institutions rely on how leaders appeal to the mass electorate. It is also important to mention that coalition formation can also differ between autocratic and democratic arrangements as highlighted by Acemoglu et al (2008).

examinations also collectively show that ‘leader’ identity can influence a leader’s behaviour in democratic policymaking process.

Some studies on political shirking rely more on legislators as the unit of observation to understand whether legislators are actually working or shirking. Two issues are mostly studied to analyse shirking – namely voting patterns and expenses/monetary returns to a political career. On the issue of voting, an interesting body of work has emerged focusing on whether politicians behave differently after they have decided to retire from politics. This emphasis is insightful since if a legislator is in politics to serve public interest, then the decision to retire will not affect his or her voting pattern in his last term. On the contrary, if a legislator is governed by self-interest, then it is possible that the voting pattern will change when he decides to retire. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on these competing views remains mixed. For example, Lott (1987) studied the question of whether a congressman’s decision to retire alters how he votes⁸. The author identifies that while congressmen do not vote as regularly in their final term as they do otherwise, congressmen carry on voting in the same way whenever they do vote. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that a legislator’s personal ideology restricts shirking as they continue to vote for what they believe, but they do less of it as they no longer face re-election. Likewise, Lott and Reed (1989) notes that congressmen in the U.S. miss more votes in their final term in office, even though no evidence suggests that their voting patterns change significantly. In addition to this, Lott and Bronars (1993) study congressional voting pattern in the U.S. between 1975 and 1990, and highlight no significant change in voting behaviour in representative’s last term in congress. The authors use this evidence to suggest that selection works well for U.S. Congress, leading to a set of politicians who are well aligned with the constituent interests.

On a different note, McArthur and Marks (1988) study U.S. Congressional behaviour in lame duck sessions⁹, and identifies that retiring congressmen were significantly more likely in 1982 to vote against automobile domestic content legislation than others. More recently, Padro-i-Miquel and Snyder (2006) use subjective measure of legislative performance in North Carolina to examine the effects of legislative tenure. The study suggests that legislative performance increases with tenure, and it considers ‘learning-by-doing’ as a possible explanation. Besley *et al* (2011) also, examine the behaviour of lawmakers in the British House of Commons between 2001 and 2004, and find that retiring MPs significantly vote less than their non-retiring colleagues. Additionally, the authors also show that experience and party affiliation are important predictors of parliamentary attendance. Similarly, Rahman (2013) shows that veteran MPs on average have lower levels of attendance in the Parliament of Bangladesh. Other factors that explain legislative attendance is party affiliation and dynastic identity.

8. Their sample was taken from the 94th and 95th Congresses in the U.S.

9. After an election, members who have not been re-elected are at times called upon to vote on legislation before the new swearing in takes place.

On the whole, this chapter contributes to this growing body of work on various dynamics surrounding political shirking. This chapter also contributes to the growing literature which provides governance indicators at a regional or sub-regional level, so that it is possible for one to scrutinise its variation within a given political arena¹⁰.

2.2.2 Context of the present political culture

Parliamentary democracy was reintroduced in 1991 after a prolonged period of autocratic rule following independence. The election was held on 27th February 1991 in which all parties participated. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Begum Khaleda Zia won a simple majority, and Mrs Zia was sworn in the Office of the Prime Minister on the 20th March 1991. Alternatively, Sheikh Hasina Wajed became the leader of the opposition in the Parliament, a position she earlier held in 1986. Since then, both these leaders have succeeded each other in every respective election to attain the highest executive political office¹¹. At present, Sheikh Hasina Wajed is the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, after Awami League won the ninth-parliamentary election on the 29th of December 2008. This election was preceded by the military backed caretaker government during which numerous political leaders (including Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia) were arrested under charges of corruption (Alamgir 2009).

While electoral democracy entertained a new beginning in Bangladesh in 1991, the process of democratic consolidation in Bangladesh is far from complete (IGS 2011). Political violence grips the country in each election year with opposition parties always contesting the legitimacy of election proceedings – either through demanding a neutral head of the Caretaker Government or Chief Election Commission. At present, the debates surround whether the current government will introduce a neutral, non-partisan interim government, without which the primary opposition parties have pledged to boycott the 10th parliamentary election¹². Furthermore, in each respective election since 1991, the primary opposition party has always rejected the outcome (IGS 2006).

In terms of the performance of the Parliament, it is well acknowledged that the Parliament of Bangladesh have failed to emerge as a venue where real discussion and debates are undertaken (Amundsen and Jahan 2012). In fact, respective opposition parties have boycotted a lion's share of parliamentary sessions over the last two decades¹³. Thus, *de jure* mechanisms which allow people to express their concerns through their elected representatives have come under severe strain in

10. For example, 'Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2012' measures governance for countries within Africa.
11. Khaleda Zia won the election held on the 15th February 1996, giving her two successive victories. This election, nonetheless, was boycotted by Awami League and all other major political parties. Consequently, the government only lasted a month, and in June the seventh national parliamentary elections took place in which Awami League won.
12. For more discussion on this, please see: <http://www.bangladeshchronicle.net/index.php/2013/06/pm-rejects-khaledas-demand-for-restoring-caretaker-govt/schedule?>
13. The current opposition parties led by BNP has boycotted more than eighty percent of all available sessions till 2013. For more discussion, please see <http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/culture-of-parliament-boycott-in-bangladesh/>

our polity. Even so, what is still not known is how representation varies across the political landscape of Bangladesh and what may account for such variation. Consequently, this chapter encapsulates a unique first step towards assessing the state of voice within the political arena of Bangladesh and how it varies geographically.

2.3 Data and methodology

2.3.1 Source of data

In order to compute our indicators and undertake the necessary empirical investigation, a new data set was compiled on all elected legislators in the 8th and 9th National Parliament of Bangladesh¹⁴.

The constructed database includes two indicators on legislator behaviour and one indicator on the composition of the parliament. The two measures on leader behaviour, which reflect attendance and budget speech participation of lawmakers, are taken from the Legal Office of the Parliament. For the 8th National Parliament, the attendance data is taken from all 23 sessions. And, for the 9th National Parliament, the measure is computed by repeating the same procedure for first fifteen sessions (given that this Parliament is still in progress)¹⁵. To compute our third measure on the gender composition of the Parliament we received our data from the Bangladesh Election Commission [BEC]¹⁶. To study other characteristics, we used the *Member Directory* on the 9th National Parliament produced by NDI¹⁷, which provides useful information on the individual characteristics of MPs.

Data on the development expenditure for FY12 has been taken from the official accounts of the District Accounts Officer (DAO) offices and Upazila Accounts Officer (UAO) offices¹⁸. Due to the distinct method of maintaining data, both offices keep the accounts of Sadar (named after the District head in the DAO list) and the remaining *upazilas* (named after the *upazila* head in the UAO list) of a particular district separately. We summed up the data of Sadar and other *upazilas* and gave the final count of the development expenditure that the district spent in a given year. However, unlike other *Sadar upazilas*, Dhaka as a unit is not exhibited in the DAO count. The expenditure of Dhaka has been merged with the counts of different ministerial and other heads maintained by the Chief Accounts Officer (CAO) office. Despite that, the *upazilas* under Dhaka

14. In terms of administrative structure, Bangladesh is a unitary parliamentary republic consisting of three hundred parliamentary seats. These constituencies are located in six administrative divisions, which in turn are subdivided in 64 districts. This means that each district constitutes one or more parliamentary constituency, and each division has more than one district. There is a unicameral parliament known as the Jatiyo Sangsad.

15. This information is collected from the Legal Office of the National Parliament of Bangladesh.

16. Bangladesh Election Commission publishes Statistical Report of 5th, 7th, 8th and 9th of Parliament Election.

17. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). For more information, see <http://www.ndi.org/>; The *Member Directory* project on the 9th National Parliament of Bangladesh was partially funded by USAID.

18. These offices are operated under the Office of the Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh.

district have been listed by the UAO offices, for the sake of maintaining uniformity in calculation, we have deliberately excluded Dhaka district from the expenditure count. Alternatively, the data on development expenditure for fiscal year 2006-07 is taken from Khondker et al (2011). It must be mentioned here that data on development expenditure for 2006-07 and 2011-12 are taken from different sources. This hinders their comparison. District Accounts Officer (DAO) and Upazila Accounts Officer (UAO) generally exclude development expenditure on large scale inter district projects. The data and their standardised values are presented in Annex 2. The following section, describes the methodology that quantifies the variation in the state of voice across the political arena of Bangladesh.

2.3.2 Measure of voice in the Parliament

As the central institution of democratic accountability, the Parliament embodies the will of the people in government, and carries the expectation that democracy will be responsive to their wishes. As the elected body represents society in all its diversity, parliaments have a unique responsibility for reconciling the conflicting interests and expectations of different groups and communities through the democratic means of dialogue and compromise. The past few years have witnessed numerous efforts across many parliaments to engage more effectively with the public and to improve the way they work: to become more genuinely representative of their electorates, more accessible and accountable to them, more open and transparent in their procedures, and more effective in their key tasks of legislation and oversight of government (Battheem 2006). As a new democratic country, there are many unresolved issues in Bangladesh both from socio-economic and political perspectives which ought to be identified, discussed and resolved in parliament.

A voice indicator can be considered as a useful tool of accountability of the Members of the Parliament towards the citizenry. To operationalise this idea, we consider three specific indicators. The first two indicators quantify the average behaviour of MPs in a given district within the Parliament. The third indicator measures the state of women representation in a particular district. We assemble these indicators using the following method:

I. Average attendance of MPs:

$$\text{Average Attendance of MPs in a District}_i = \frac{\sum \text{Average Attendance of MP}_j \text{ in District}_i}{\text{Total Number of MPs in District}_i}$$

There is no perfect measure to assess the overall performance of an MP and the services he or she delivers to their constituents. However, we look at the rate of attendance¹⁹ in parliamentary sessions since existing work uses such technique to measure a legislature's involvement in daily

¹⁹. Attendance is verified by the signature of MPs before parliament sessions.

legislative business (Besley *et al* 2011). Although MPs have to fulfill numerous tasks, one of their main duties is to attend and represent their constituents in Parliament and, therefore, to participate in parliamentary debates, other proceedings and voting processes.

II. Average length of budget speech of MPs:

Average Length of Budget Speech in minutes of MPs in a District,

$$= \frac{\sum \text{Average Length of Budget Speech in minutes of MP}_j \text{ in District}_i}{\text{Total Number of MPs in District}_i}$$

There is an obligation on the part of the legislature to ensure that all revenue and spending measures it authorises, legally and constitutionally, are fiscally sound, match the needs and aspirations of the population with equity, and that they are being implemented appropriately and efficiently²⁰. Through debate on various aspects of the budget, the MPs put their views, which are taken into consideration by the Minister of Finance when the budget is finalised and presented for authorization at the end of the parliament's budget session. Hence, this indicator provides a unique proxy for measuring the extent MPs participating in the budget sessions for voicing the needs of their constituents²¹. After the computation of this indicator, we then use the frequently employed standardisation technique to provide the ordinal ranking of the districts²².

III. Proportion of elected female MPs in a district:

$$\text{Ratio of Elected Female MPs in a District}_i = \frac{\text{Total Number of Elected Female MPs in District}_i}{\text{Total Number of MPs in District}_i}$$

In recent literature, scholars of political economy have isolated the role of leader-identity in determining the behaviour of policymakers. In particular, Rehavi (2007) employed close election to pinpoint that women's representation affects policy formulation in U.S. state legislatures. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) examined two Indian states – Rajasthan and West Bengal and showed that the kind of issues favoured by women get more attention when women leaders are selected. Thus, our indicator will help us examine these two issues. First, how does female representation vary across the political arena of Bangladesh? Second, how does female representation affect outcomes in the districts? Such scrutiny will allow us to pinpoint if female representation is bearing an instrumental role in shaping outcomes preferred by women. In the next section, we present our core analysis of these noted indicators.

20. It further symbolises that it is "we the people" who make and implement the budget for themselves (PILDAT 2010).

21. This indicator, in comparison to measuring only attendance, works as a better proxy of legislator's involvement with the daily legislative business of the parliament.

22. The formula for standardisation is: $[X - \text{Min}(X)] / [\text{Max}(X) - \text{Min}(X)]$. Hence, a score of one reflects the unit with the highest value and a score of zero reflects the unit with the lowest value.

2.4 Analysis and caveats

2.4.1 Explaining attendance

Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 shows the variation in average attendance of MPs in the 8th and 9th Parliament of Bangladesh. As can be seen, there is a considerable variation in the frequency of how MPs on average attend parliament. In the 8th National Parliament, MPs from a given district on average attended approximately 56 percent of the sessions. Yet, some districts entertained highly participative MPs, whose average attendance ratio was greater than 80 percent (for example Joypurhat district and Rajbari district). Other districts, such as Gopalganj and Madaripur had MPs whose average attendance was below 25 percent. Even for the first 15 sessions of the 9th Parliament, such variations prevailed. While the average attendance of MPs from a given district at present is 63 percent, the range nonetheless between the top performers and poor performers have increased. For example, for the 9th Parliament, average MPs from Feni district have attended less than 10 percent of the sessions. Others, for instance the Munshiganj district, had MPs with average attendance as high as 90 percent. Collectively, these variations in average attentiveness of MPs across the 64 districts of Bangladesh is suggestive that the state of voice – mechanism through which the concerns of the people can find mentioning within the parliament through their elected representative – experiences significant variation across the political space of Bangladesh.

Interesting to note is the anecdotal evidence of a unique characteristic of Bangladeshi parliamentary political culture: the systematic boycott of the Parliament by the primary opposition parties (Amundsen and Jahan 2012; IGS 2011). Specifically, if we see Figure 2.1 it can be noted that districts with low average attendance are generally AL electoral strongholds, such as Madaripur and Gopalganj. On the other hand, Figure 2.2 shows that in the current 9th Parliament, MPs from districts with an electoral tilt towards BNP have low levels of average attendance such as Feni and Laksmipur. To better understand the evolution of this culture, Table 2.1 details out the degree of ‘boycott by opposition parties’ over the last two decades. As shown, over the last three parliaments, the rate of absenteeism has increased dramatically, especially by opposition parties in the 9th Parliament. A tactic which is most prominent among the opposition is that they keep boycotting the Parliament until they reach the maximum threshold of consecutive days that a parliamentarian can be absent before losing his or her membership²³. When such thresholds are near, MPs from the opposition camp joins the parliament for a short while and, in the process, abide by the legal requirements to maintain their membership. This ‘boycott culture’ has also undermined the capacity of Parliament to evolve into a venue where real discussions and debates are undertaken on essential national issues (IGS 2011).

23. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh necessitates that an MP will lose his or her membership if he or she is absent for 90 consecutive days.

Figure 2.3a and Figure 2.3b displays scatter-plots between the average attendance of MPs from a given district and its share of MPs from the primary opposition party for both the 8th and 9th Parliament. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the negative association between the two variables (for both the political regimes) is in line with the explanation that affiliation with an opposition party is an important determinant of an MP's attendance in the Parliament. This is also in line with the findings of some contemporary empirical work on legislator behaviour (Rahman 2013; Besley 2011). Yet, the scatter-plots also evidence an often ignored but crucial issue; that even *within* political parties that form the government, there is a considerable variation in MP's general attendance in the parliament. To highlight this argument in a lucid manner, it is worth exploring one key insight from both Figure 2.3a and Figure 2.3b. That is, within districts which *only* have MPs from the incumbent political party, there is a significant variation in average attendance of legislators. For example, during the 8th National Parliament, districts with *all* ruling party legislators²⁴ had average attendance as high as 84 percent (Joypurhut) and also as low as 47 percent (Chandpur). Similarly, for the 9th National Parliament, districts with *all* ruling party MPs had average attendance as high as 90 percent (Munshiganj) and also as low as 42 percent (Tangail).

Overall, these variations in average attendance of legislators between districts with only ruling party MPs is suggestive that the existing narrative, which explains general attendance of MPs from the sole lens of one's party affiliation, is incomplete. What these findings motivate, nonetheless, is an in-depth scrutiny of the overall combination of factors that makes some legislators have greater attendance than others in their daily legislative duties. These initial findings are also indicative of the scope of Parliament acting as a mechanism for channelling the concerns of the people.

Table 2.1: Parliament boycott by opposition

Parliaments	Fifth (1991-1996)	Sixth (1996-2001)	Eight (2001-2006)	Ninth (2009-)
Days Boycotted	118 Days (43% of total working days)	156 days (41%)	223 days (60%)	208 Days (out of 254 days in the first 13 sessions) (82%)

Source: IGS (2011)

24. This is reflected by a score of 'zero' in the horizontal axis in both Figure 2.3a & Figure 2.3b.


Figure 2.1: Average attendance of MPs in a district in the 8th Parliament

Figure 2.2: Average attendance of MPs in a district in the 9th Parliament (15 Sessions)






Figure 2.3a: Share of AL MPs in a district 2001-06 & average attendance of MPs in a district 2001-06**Figure 2.3b: Share of BNP MPs in a district 2009-12 & average attendance of MPs in a district 2009-12**

2.4.2 Understanding budget speech participation

Monitoring the average participation of legislators in the national budget session from a given district provides a unique scope for evaluating a specific behaviour of legislators in the Parliament. This is because while engaging in discussions and debates in the Parliament is an important obligation of legislators, participation in the budget session (through a speech) might carry more relevance since respective MPs can voice the development needs of their constituents²⁵. Hence, Figure 2.4a, Figure 2.4b and Figure 2.4c provides the variation in the extent an average MP from a district participated in budget sessions for FY10, FY11 and FY12. Moreover, as noted earlier, there is a considerable variation across districts in the average participation rate of legislators during the budget sessions. To better understand the source of this variation, one can note that the districts with electoral tilt towards BNP (for instance, Lakshmipur district and Feni district) have a score of zero in the first three budget sessions of the parliament. Such low scores are outcomes of the fact that the primary opposition alliance has boycotted the first three budget sessions of the parliament²⁶. Furthermore, Figure 2.4d reveals this systematic inverse relationship between a district share of MPs from the opposition party and the average participation of its MPs in the budget sessions. Figure 2.4d also endorses our earlier assessment that even within districts with no MPs from the opposition political party there is a substantial variation in the manner MPs have participated in the budget sessions through debates and discussions. For example, MPs in Madaripur district on average have much higher participation in budget sessions through debates and discussion in comparison to Habiganj district in 2011.

Yet, an important question that demands attention at this point is: can participation in budget discussions or attendance in daily legislative business have any instrumental relevance in shaping public policy? That is, within a political space where democratic norms have failed to consolidate and politicisation have crippled state institutions²⁷, can such *de jure* tactic or approach be of any practical purpose? Exploring whether such legislator behaviour does have a causal role in determining public policy within Bangladesh is not within the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, we do explore if participation in budget sessions have any correlation with policy decisions. More specifically, we employ a simple univariate Ordinary Least Squares methodology to see if there is a significant positive correlation between the average participation of an MP in a district in debates and discussion during the budget session FY11 with subsequent development expenditure per capita across districts in FY12.

Table 2.2 provides our findings under multiple geographic restrictions. To start with, Column 1 examines the relationship between standardised values of average budget speech participation of MPs in a district in 2011 and development expenditure per capita in 2012 across the 63 districts of Bangladesh²⁸. Here, the results do not indicate any significant correlation. However, this estimation

25. While the Bangladeshi legislative process is not necessarily a budget-making legislature, participation in budget speech can (theoretically) allow political leaders to obtain some leverage in influencing resource distributing decisions.

26. As noted earlier, it is explicitly product of the ‘boycott culture’ prevailing within the political contours of Bangladesh.

27. For an in depth assessment of the state of democratic institutions, please see IGS (2006).

28. Dhaka District is excluded from all analysis since the data on development expenditure per capita 2012 is not available.

might suffer from the presence of Rangamati district, Bandarban district, and Khagrachari district – which were among the top five recipients of development expenditure per capita in 2012²⁹. Additionally, it is essential to note here that the political and development dynamics of Rangamati district, Bandarban district and Khagrachari district are unique as these regions suffered a two decade long civil/guerrilla conflict amounting to pseudo-session activities. Hence, security concerns mostly shape development agendas of such regions (UNDP 2005).

Consequently, in Column 2, we redo the analysis by excluding these three districts. Our results highlight a strong positive correlation between the variables of interest. R-squared values of the overall model shares significant improvement as it explains approximately 40 percent of the variation in development expenditure per capita in 2012. In Column 3, we exclude districts by exploiting the natural boundaries within Bangladesh. More specifically, the country is divided into three pieces by the extensions of two major Asian rivers Jamuna and Padma in Bangladesh. The natural border by these two rivers bisects the land mass into two regions in terms of their geographical connectivity with Dhaka and Chittagong. Therefore, there are integrated regions consisting of areas which are geographically contiguous to either the Dhaka or Chittagong metropolitan areas. These regions are categorised as ‘east of rivers’ and they entertain a relatively less depressed economy (Shilpi 2008)³⁰. The rest of the country is less integrated due to the geographic obstacles. These remaining regions are also noted for witnessing lower economic development due to their geographic impediments – and are categorised as ‘west of river’. Accordingly, the estimations in Column 3 exclude regions that are considered as economically better-off. To some this extent allows us to control for special cases across the 64 districts of Bangladesh. Our results also highlight a stronger positive association between standardised values of average budget speech participation of MPs in a district in 2011 and development expenditure per capita in 2012.

When we focus on regions which are economically better off, by excluding districts ‘west of rivers,’ the relationship is no longer significant (Column 4). In Column 5, we re-evaluate the relationship by excluding Gopalganj district and Sylhet district, which entertains two important portfolios – Prime Minister and Minister of Finance – that can shape resource distribution. Moreover, the results show that after imposing such restrictions, the correlation coefficient is significant at 5 percent. Lastly, in Column 6, we exclude an additional five districts by dropping districts which entertain the divisional headquarters of the administration. This is because such administratively important units might bear MPs who finds more scope to speak during budget sessions and also receive higher resources for political considerations. Nonetheless, as we can see, the results remain qualitatively unchanged.

Overall, these findings hint that *de jure* process – the participation of MPs in debates and discussions during the budget sessions – is associated with resource distribution. Thus, while

29. Please see Annex 2.

30. In 2005, for example, the incident of poverty (according to head count ratio) in the Rajshahi Division—the northern region of Bangladesh—was 51.2%, contrary to the Dhaka, Sylhet and Chittagong Division’s moderate score of around 35%. For more information, please see Household Income Expenditure Survey 2005, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS).

answering our earlier question which explores the practical relevance of *de jure* political behaviour in shaping policy, the descriptive evidence in sight is difficult to reconcile with notions that are too dismissive of legislative behaviour in shaping resource distribution. Rather, what it provokes is an intellectual drive to formulate a better understanding of factors that can explain the variation of such political behaviour (i.e. participation in budget session).

Figure 2.4a: Standardised values of average Budget speech 2009-2010





Figure 2.4b: Standardised values of average Budget speech 2010-2011

Figure 2.4c: Standardised values of average Budget speech 2011-2012




Figure 2.4d: Share of BNP MPs in a district 2009-12 & standardised values of Budget speech participation




Table 2.2: Budget session participation and development expenditure per capita 2012

	Dependent Variable: Development Expenditure Per Capita 2012					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Standardised Budget Session	0.347	0.983***	1.14***	0.233	0.507**	0.507*
Participation	(0.631)	(0.284)	(0.235)	(0.156)	(0.259)	(0.262)
Constant	0.558***	0.362***	0.385***	0.399***	0.439*	0.426***
	(0.142)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.053)
All Districts except Dhaka	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Bandarban, Rangamati	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Khagrachari excluded						
Ban. , Rang., Khag. excluded	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Districts East of River Excluded						
Ban. , Rang., Khag. excluded	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Districts West of River Excluded						
Ban. , Rang., Khag. excluded	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
Gopalganj & Sylhet Excluded						
Ban. , Rang., Khag, Gopalganj excluded	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Sylhet & Other Divisional Head Quarters Excluded						
R-Square	0.01	0.38	0.49	0.06	0.09	0.09
N	63	60	37	23	58	54

(*), (**)& (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; Dhaka is excluded from all analysis

2.4.3 State of female representation

In the public choice discourse, the assumption that politicians are driven by self-interest is well grounded (Besley 2004). This approach, however, assumes that political actors behave in a similar fashion, under certain institutional arrangements, irrespective of identity. Recently, however,

empirical studies have illustrated the role of leader-identity in determining the behaviour of policymakers. For example, Rehavi (2007) showed that women's representation affects policy formulation in U.S.'s state legislatures. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) also found that the kind of issues favoured by women get more attention when women leaders are selected. Collectively, these findings support the notion that availability of women policy makers can be an important source of policy change that can facilitate women's empowerment.

Hence, to measure the state of voice, especially of women through elected female representatives, the analysis – with the help of the third indicator - monitors the share of elected female MPs across the 64 districts of Bangladesh. This helps quantify the scope women electorates have in voicing their concern through elected female representatives. Consequently, this allows us to explore two essential issues. First, we examine the variation in the share of elected women representation across all districts. Second, we examine if such variation is associated with 'women-centric' public service outcomes.

Figure 2.5 brings to attention that within the political arena of Bangladesh, there are thirty-nine districts that never produced a single elected female representative after the re-emergence of parliamentary democracy in 1991. This is a thought provoking observation, since within our present political arena, the office of the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Speaker of the House, Minister of Foreign Affairs are all presently held by female political leaders. Yet, Figure 2.5 highlights that underlying such aggregate political dynamics, there might be some structural constraints that – at the local level – have contributed to this '*missing women leader*' phenomenon. We propose that future work should examine the nature of such constraints, which clearly diminishes the scope of women leaders to find representation in parliament.



On the other hand, Table 2.3 does hint, that over the last four decades there has been some improvements on this dimension. Specially, the 9th Parliament witnessed the entry of 19 female MPs through direct elections³¹. This is a significant landmark since in all preceding parliaments no more than 8 MPs were ever female. To further elaborate this evolution, Table 2.3 shows the magnitude of women's representation in Bangladeshi politics since 1973. Furthermore, it highlights the increasing trend in women finding direct representation in Bangladeshi parliament. The provision of quotas has also created a scope for them to enter parliament. In magnitude, 18.6 percent of the parliament in Bangladesh constitutes women representatives in the 9th Parliament. If we compare this with the average women representation in the parliament as shown in Figure 2.6, it can be observed that Bangladesh had some success in ensuring women's representation in politics given the estimates are slightly greater than the Asian average and marginally lower than the world average. Figure 2.7a and Figure 2.7b, which charts the score of our third indicator across

31. In the Parliament of Bangladesh, reserved seats are institutionalised for women. However, we focus on women leaders who are directly elected to the Parliament.

the 64 districts for both the 8th and 9th Parliament also shows a significant improvement in the share of elected women representatives between the two political regimes. More specifically, in the 8th National Parliament, there were only five districts which had at least one (or more) female elected MPs. In the 9th Parliament, seventeen districts have at least one (or more) female elected MPs. In our view, this highlights a substantial improvement.

Lastly, Table 2.4 descriptively explores if the presence of elected female representative has any association with ‘female-centric’ public service outcomes. This is essential since our choice of the indicator, “Proportion of Elected Female MPs in a District,” is influenced by the proposition that women representation aids ‘women friendly’ public service outcomes as it allows women electorates to voice their concerns and preferences through elected female representatives. Hence, if this is true, then regions witnessing directly elected female leaders are likely to experience female centric public service outcomes. To test this hypothesis empirically, we use the recently constructed ‘Composite Deprivation Index – CDI’ computed by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in collaboration with UNICEF. The indicators that were measured under CDI for 2009 are (i) Female Literacy, (ii) Skilled Birth Attendant, (iii) Sanitation, and (iv) Net Attendance Ratio Secondary Education. Table 2.4 tests the differences in means among these variables across districts that witnessed no elected female legislator and at least one elected female legislator between 1991 and 2008.

In this regard, our findings highlight some interesting issues. First, Row 1 and Row 2 show that districts entertaining at least one female MP between 1991 and 2008 witness better public service outcomes that are related to women. More specifically, districts with at least one female elected MP have better female literacy outcomes and skilled birth attendant outcomes. This is in line with the recent findings which suggest that women leaders favour policies that are generally favoured by women electorate (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Even so, we abstain from claiming a contributory role of female legislators since we cannot control for district heterogeneity. Second, Row 3 and Row 4 pinpoint that a similar conclusion cannot be drawn when we study non-gender centric public service outcomes, such as net attendance ratio in secondary education and sanitation outcomes. Consequently, it provides an implicit justification to our choice of the variable for measuring voice through such specific means. These estimations and descriptive analysis also provides motivation for further exploring two key issues: (i) the nature of structural factors that explains the variation in the state of voice across the political arena of Bangladesh, and (ii) explore the types of issues that are causally explained by the variation of these indicators.

Figure 2.5: Women leader disparity across districts (1991-2008)**Figure 2.6: World and regional averages of women in Parliament**

Source: Inter Parliamentary Union 2012

Table 2.3: Women in Bangladesh Parliament

Parliament	Quota	Directly Elected	Total Women MPs	Total Representation (%)
First (1973-75)	15		15	4.8
Second (1979-82)	30	2	32	9.7
Third (1986-87)	30	5	35	10.6
Fourth (1988-90)		4	4	1.3
Fifth (1991-1995)	30	4	34	10.3
Sixth (1996-96)	30	3	33	10
Seventh (1996-2001)	30	8	38	11.5
Eight (2001-2006)	45	7	52	15.1
Ninth (2009-)	45	19	64	18.6

Source: Amundsen and Jahan (2012)

Figure 2.7a: Proportion of elected female MPs in a district in the 9th Parliament





Figure 2.7b: Proportion of elected female MPs in a district in the 8th Parliament

Table 2.4: Differences in public service delivery across districts with at least one elected female MP and no elected female MPs

	At least one Female MP (1991-2009)	No Elected Female MPs (1991-2009)	Difference	Pr(T > t)
	1	2	3	4
Female Literacy (2009)	52.9	47.9	4.95**	0.016
	(2.01)	(1.28)	(2.27)	
Skilled Birth Attendant (2009)	26.1	20.1	6.05**	0.015
	(2.204)	(1.65)	(2.72)	
Sanitation (2009)	55.6	55.6	0.013	0.49
	(2.47)	(2.15)	(3.34)	
Net Attendance Ratio	50.4	49.2	1.181	0.3
Secondary (2009)	(1.56)	(1.47)	(2.24)	

(*), (**)& (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively

2.5 Concluding remarks

The principle aim of this chapter was to assess the state of voice within the political domain of Bangladesh. This is argued to be important since the idea of democracy encapsulates a polity where extensive deliberation on issues of value to common people produces outcomes that are conducive to the general welfare of the society. Thus, for such polities to arise, specific democratic mechanism must function to ensure that the concerns of the people are challenged into discussion in the Parliament. Hence, the preceding analysis brings to attention the importance of exploring some of these specific *de jure* mechanisms that can allow the concerns of the electorate to find expressions in the parliament through monitoring both (i) the political behaviour of legislators and, (ii) the nature of gender composition of the parliament. The analysis measures the behaviour of the parliamentarians with the help of two indicators: (i) average attendance of parliamentarians in a district; (ii) average length of a speech by MPs in a district in a Budget session of the parliament. To quantify the state of women representation, we compute a third indicator: (iii) proportion of elected female MPs in a district. Moreover, since these indicators are computed at a district level, it allows us to examine their cross-sectional variation. This is an innovative effort as

most governance narrative or examinations are undertaken at a macro level. Additionally, given this examination focuses on specific means through which the voice of the people find deliberation in the Parliament, it opens scope for better in depth micro analysis.

These estimations show that the ‘State of Voice’ – measured with the noted three indicators – experiences substantial variation across the 64 districts of Bangladesh. This variation is insightful since these indicators are associated with important public service outcomes. To be more specific, our two indicators on political behaviour not only reveal that the indicators experience a cross spatial variation, it also highlights that there is a stark difference in political behaviour even within the incumbent political parties in both 8th and 9th Parliament³². In particular, the results indicate substantial variations in average attendance of legislators and budget speech participation between districts with *only* ruling party MPs. This highlights that the existing narrative, which explains general attendance of MPs from the sole lens of one’s party affiliation, is not adequate. Collectively, the descriptive evidence reasserts our earlier suggestion that one needs a better understanding of factors that shape the general attendance of legislators in their legislative duties in the Parliament.

Hence, this scrutiny provokes questions concerning the factors that explain its variation. It also brings to attention important questions: if such *de jure* political behaviour has some scope in shaping public service outcomes, then why do certain regions underperform? Is this association driven by some omitted variable unaccounted for in the analysis? Or, is there an underlying causal dynamics? Future work on such issues must offer serious attention to these inquiries.

Our work also shows that there is an acute ‘missing women leader’ problem across the political space of Bangladesh. While, at present, the office of the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Speaker of the House and Minister of Foreign Affairs are all occupied by female political legislators, there are some severe spatial disparities. For instance, our review of the electoral outcomes of the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Parliament³³ reveal that across 39 districts, there was not even a single elected female legislator between 1991 and 2008. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, there are some improvements in the 9th Parliament as 19 lawmakers were directly elected from 17 districts. Our analysis also shows that there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that direct women representation has some positive association with women-centric public service outcomes like female literacy and skilled birth attendants across the geographic space of Bangladesh.

32. As noted earlier, political behaviour is measured through a legislator’s general attendance in the parliament and participation in debates and discussions of the budget session.

33. Since the 6th parliamentary election was not participatory and the government failed to last even two months, we ignored this parliament from our examination. Even so, as Table 2.3 depicts, there were only 3 elected female lawmakers in this election.

On the whole, this chapter provides a novel step towards assessing the ‘State of Voice’ through monitoring some specific mechanisms. The formulated indicators not only allow a cross-sectional comparison, it can (over time) allow the area to entertain a rich stock of information. Nonetheless, our focus on specific mechanism might mean that our evaluation suffers from narrowness in scope. Even so, it does open up an avenue where better micro-analysis can be undertaken. Overall, the present scrutiny has opened up an essential dimension of political economy in Bangladesh that is ripe for further exploration.

3

School Governance and Educational Outcomes

3.1 Introduction

Bangladesh's recent progress in human development is a well-documented phenomenon (World Bank 2013). Particularly noteworthy is the achievement in improving educational access. The country has met the MDG target of achieving gender parity in primary and secondary enrolment by 2015. Although budget share in education in Bangladesh is one of the lowest in South Asia, much progress has been achieved in the education sector (Mahmud, Asadullah and Savoia 2013). Nonetheless considerable challenges remain. Firstly, a significant number of children drop out before completing primary school whilst many remain out-of-school. Second, the post-2015 MDG targets include ensuring access to quality education. Yet the level of student learning remains very low in rural Bangladesh. Third, primary schools in the country are severely resource constrained. Classrooms are overcrowded and many are in not usable conditions. As a result, the majority of the schools operate in double shifts to minimise costs. Given these constraints, it is unsurprising that children often complete the school curriculum without attaining basic numeracy and literacy skills (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2013). Finally, studies have shown how the completion of primary education is often not adequately rewarded in the labour market (Asadullah 2006).

In recent years, a number of steps have been undertaken by the government to improve the situation. However, most reform initiatives focus on 'inputs', i.e. by improving physical capacity of the schools. For instance, recently a large number of new teachers have been appointed to maintain a reasonable teacher-student ratio. Textbooks are now being delivered to most students by 31st January. Introduction of primary school completion (PSC) examination has provided a mechanism to hold schools accountable. Other reform measures include the injection of large number of female teachers as well as the provision of stipends to 50 percent students in all schools and the introduction of *upazila* education planning. However, in addition to increasing school

budgets and improving physical infrastructure, improving the governance process in the education sector is essential.

International evidence shows that test scores are remarkably low in developing countries but responsive to reforms that improve accountability and incentives (Kremer, Brannen and Glennerster 2013). Ensuring quality education for all will require better governance such as developing institutional mechanisms that hold schools and teachers accountable. This can improve school effectiveness by minimising various forms of corruption (such as teacher absenteeism, leakage in fund disbursement) and ensuring accountability and oversight. Unsurprisingly cross-country studies suggest that higher public spending on education leads to a significant increase in primary education completion rates only in the least corrupt countries and better-governed countries (Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008).

Weak accountability leads to poor motivation, corruption and inadequate incentives for performance in the public sector and results in poor service delivery. Giving communities voice over their children's education is found to improve schooling outcomes (World Bank 2004). There is an emerging consensus in the research literature that most of the incentives that affect learning outcomes are institutional in nature (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). These include (a) choice and competition, (b) accountability of the school authority to students and parents and (c) school autonomy in terms of local decision-making and fiscal decentralisation (Hanushek and Woessmann 2007). The importance of decentralisation in the education sector is also recognised in the government's planning documents. There is therefore a growing demand for indicators to measure how and whether these institutional factors work, and how they affect education results (Fiszbein, Ringold and Rogers 2011).

Measuring the state of governance in the education sector is a complex task since it involves quantifying the formal and informal processes by which education policies are formulated, priorities identified and resources allocated. Governance is an issue not only for the central government but also for every level of the system, from the education ministry down to the classroom and community (UNESCO 2009). In this background, this chapter documents the state of primary education in Bangladesh at the district level with a focus on school governance and educational outcomes. Instead of developing a broad base indicator of educational governance, we construct a simple composite indicator that captures aspects of school management effectiveness combined with *female headship*. We then compare our indicator to a composite index of educational performance.

Our analysis addresses a very specific dimension of governance in the education sector leaving others to be examined in follow up studies. These include performance of school-based institutions, effectiveness of local level administrative bodies (e.g. *upazila* and district education offices) and specific institutional processes that reduce room for a variety of corruptions¹.

1. While we have looked at SMC capacity, we have not examined its actual functioning (due to unavailability of the data).

The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of the primary education situation in Bangladesh, followed by Section 3.3, which discusses the ideas and measurements behind educational governance. Section 3.4 explains the data used and Section 3.5 discusses the results. Section 3.6 is a summary of key findings and other concluding remarks.

3.2 Primary education sector in Bangladesh

There are 37,672 government primary schools in Bangladesh. Adding to this number, the government has recently decided to nationalise existing Registered Non-government Primary School (RNGPS)². Apart from state-supported schools (e.g. GPS³ and RNGPS), there are at least 12 additional types of schools that operate in the primary education sector. Approximately 40 percent of the primary schools operate outside the state sector. Schools differ considerably in terms of physical resources, drop-out rates and student performance in public exams. In recent PSC exams (conducted at the end of primary education), RNGPS performed poorly whilst students from NGO and private (kindergarten) schools outperformed GPS and RNGPS. In sum, considerable gaps and differences remain between educational institutions of different types (GPS, RNGPS, *madrasa*, NGO, English medium and others) and in different locations. Part of the disparity can be explained by differences in student background. However, there is evidence that the overall level of learning is low and not related to socio-economic and demographic background of the student (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2013). Quality is particularly poor in rural areas thereby causing the rural-urban gap to expand. Given that rural households primarily rely on GPS and RNGPS⁴ (compared to their urban counterparts who have a wider range of schools to choose from), it is important to understand the constraints facing these schools.

In general, the causes of poor student performance can be categorised as institutional, community and governance challenges. In Bangladesh context, inadequate governance procedure is a huge problem in terms of irregularities in educational budget and resource management (e.g. fund leakage owing to lack of proper audit), human resource management (illegal side payments made by teachers, teacher absenteeism and shirking in school), accountability amongst institutional providers (e.g. school being open on time), informal payments made by users (e.g. to admit students in schools). In the past decade there have been a number of surveys that confirms this. In a public expenditure tracking survey in Bangladesh conducted in 2005, a fairly positive picture emerged at national level and at lower levels in terms of teacher payment system. Resources for the payment of teacher salaries were not 'leaked' between the centre and local offices, or between local offices and schools. Regarding small repairs and construction work at school, no major

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2. However, share of the state-supported schools in primary education may further increase following the proposed expansion of primary education up to grade 8.
 3. Government Primary School
 4. NGO-run schools also play an important role. But their share in total primary school enrolment is rather small. Most of these schools also do not have a permanent presence and are often closed after completing a 3-year cycle.

leakage of funds was found. However, nearly 20 percent of stipend payments were misallocated due to exaggerated attendance figures and payments to ineligible children and 5 percent of stipend resources were unaccounted for. Evidence of informal payments made to local education offices were also reported by 16 percent of recently transferred teachers and about 40 percent of head teachers. In addition, and despite the rhetoric of free universal education, around 10 percent households reported making informal payments to get their children into the primary school stipend scheme (Financial Management Reform Programme 2005). A more recent study by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) once again confirms that students have to pay hefty fees to secure admission in primary schools in urban areas (TIB 2012). Therefore it is not surprising that perception of corruption is high and perceived institutional quality is low. Reportedly, youths and household respondents from field surveys rated the education sector as one of the most corrupt (see Graner, Yasmin and Aziz 2012).

At the policy level, the government acknowledges the importance of improving teaching and learning in primary and secondary education for developing the foundation for a highly skilled workforce (e.g. vision 2021). The New Education Policy 2010 and the Fifth Five Year Plan serve as two influential documents that together provide a rough guideline for governance reform in the education sector⁵. Building on various international declarations on "Education for All", the national policy documents aim to remove inequalities in access to education at all levels and improve education quality. Currently, the most important reform initiative addressing these issues is the Third Primary Education Development Program (PEDP3), a 5-year programme (2011-2016) prepared by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). The PEDP3 document has identified a number of pragmatic steps to improve the state of governance in the education sector. It draws on the experiences and lessons learned from two previous programmes (PEDP I and PEDP II) but makes a shift to a results-based culture. This puts a greater emphasis on rewarding results, rather than inputs. The basic aim for the programme is to establish an efficient, inclusive and equitable primary education system delivering effective learning to all children in primary school. The focus of PEDP3 is to improve quality of teaching and learning through a range of activities. These include providing infrastructural support to the schools, turning all double shift schools into single-shift schools for increased contact hours, revising the existing teacher training modalities and encouraging communities to participate in school management.

3.3 Understanding educational governance

Given the diversity of issues, measuring governance in the education sector is a challenging task. Although there are different views on definitions, frameworks and measurable indicators of governance, there is some consensus on the need to separate governance determinants from

5. For a recent review of policy documents and reform initiatives in the education sector, see Ahsan and Mullick (2013).

governance performance⁶. The former relates to ownership structure of the educational organisation, degree of decentralisation (e.g. decisions accorded to local education authorities instead of central actors; local authority to hire and fire teachers), presence of formal procedures to ensure oversight and deal with leakage and provision for stakeholder participation. The latter includes outcomes such as teacher absenteeism, informal payments to access educational services, budget fund leakage and teacher's payroll leakage, bribes paid to secure jobs or schools charging unauthorized fees. This chapter builds on the existing literature (Lewis and Pettersson 2009; UNESCO 2009; Fiszbein, Ringold and Rogers 2011) and develop a quantitative measure of governance with a focus on institutional determinants.

The term "educational governance" draws attention to a number of factors that matter for the quality of and access to education services. According to the UNESCO 2009 Global Monitoring Report (GMR), governance structures in the education sector link many actors and define the terms of their interactions. A good governance regime allows parents to participate in school decisions and hold teachers and schools accountable. An effective regime allocates rights and responsibilities in a way that ensures accountability at all levels of the sector. Governance rules also define the terms on which governments recruit, allocate and train teachers. They have an important bearing on the skills and motivation that teachers bring to the classroom. An effective governance regime also specifies the relationship between school bodies, local government and central government (UNESCO 2009).

Acknowledging the diverse zones of governance and its underlying drivers, the 2009 Global Monitoring Report of UNESCO selectively focuses on four of the most important currents in governance reform and themes that are considered to have been neglected in wider education reform debates: (a) financing strategies for closing the regional inequity gap, (b) choice, competition and voice (e.g. increased private participation as well as the devolution of authority to school and community level), (c) teacher governance and monitoring and (d) integrated approach to education and poverty reduction (i.e. remove barriers to EFA associated with disparities based on wealth, gender, ethnicity and other factors).

3.3.1 Measuring educational governance

In the education sector, there are governance issues at many administrative levels (e.g. school, *upazila*, district etc.) affecting various aspects of school management and operation (e.g. teacher

6. The cross-country governance literature defines governance at the country level and focuses on process by which government is monitored and capacity of the government to implement sound policies (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008). For measurement purpose, Kaufmann and Kraay focuses on two classes of indicators: rule-based (e.g. is there a legal provision to deal with a certain problem?) and outcome based (e.g. is the legislation enforced?) measure. This led to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) which aggregates 310 variables from multiple sources and clusters them into 6 dimension of governance (voice and accountability; government effectiveness; control of corruption; regulatory quality; rule of law; and political stability and absence of violence).

recruitment, monitoring, fund transfer). We focus on the school level and single out School Management Committees (SMCs) as the key institution of analysis. Without primary survey work, there is no way to know whether SMC meetings take place regularly. In the absence of such data, we limit our focus to the management capacity of the school. This is assessed in terms of three institutional dimensions: a) the proportion of trained SMC members, b) the presence (or absence) of a female head teacher and c) the prevalence of single- (or double-) shift operation⁷.

In theory, SMC matters for school governance. They have total management control over primary schools in Bangladesh. SMCs provide a way for local community members and parents to become an effective part of school management. During SMC meetings various problems facing the school can be discussed and most of the community and institutional problems can be resolved. Governance problems arise when PTA/SMC meetings are irregular (Chaudhury *et al* 2006). In such cases, it is not possible to communicate the issues affecting performance as well as resolving problems like teacher absenteeism. For Bangladesh, Ahmed and Nath (2005) found that SMCs were not able to exercise their authority. This is partly explained by anomalies in member selection – SMCs often were made up of people without sufficient background in education management and whose selection were owed to personal relationship with head teachers and elected local political leaders. There is some dissatisfaction with how SMCs are functioning. For example, they often lack the necessary resources to carry out their designated responsibilities and are also accused of being dominated by head teachers and local political leaders (Bennell and Akyeampong 2006).

In Bangladesh, an important study has highlighted the fact that head teachers are an important determinant of good management and school quality and outcomes (Ahmed and Nath 2005). However the role of female leadership in school management is less understood. According to Oplatka (2006), female head teachers are found to adopt an inclusive, participatory style, to pay much attention to vision-building for the school. Other characteristics associated with women's leadership may include good conflict management and interpersonal skills (de la Rey 2005). Women are also described as more likely to lead by consensus, to be encouraging of participation and sharing power and information. Finally, in the context of severe gender disparities in Bangladesh, female leaders can serve as role models for future generations, shaping parents' and children's beliefs about what women can achieve. This 'role model effect' can help close gender gaps in other spheres (Pande and Topalova 2013).

In the above context, there are a number of reasons for which we can expect a female head teacher to deliver good governance. Studies find that greater female political representation is associated with lower corruption (Dollar *et al* 2001; Swamy *et al* 2001). A recent policy experiment

7. Even here, there are multiple institutional determinants at play such as presence of other school management bodies and ownership structure of the school (e.g. whether government or government aided or NGO run). Some districts rely more on state-run schools whilst non-state providers dominate in others. For our purpose, again, we focus largely on government supported primary schools (GPS and RNGPS).

in neighbouring India increased the political representation of women at the local government level through quotas⁸. Early evidence from four South Indian states suggests that village councils led by women are no worse or better in their performance than those with male leaders (Ban and Rao 2008). Thus, while in the final analysis, the question as to whether female school leaders are preferable to men cannot be empirically established, we conjecture: a) women are equally capable compared to men to lead schools and b) a healthy balance between male and female leadership in schools has both intrinsic and functional value.

Lastly, we argue that single-shift operation is conducive to good governance. For a variety of reasons, students in developing countries are often taught for only a fraction of the intended number of school hours. Time is often wasted due to informal school closures, teacher absenteeism, delays, early departures and poor use of classroom time. Studies have confirmed that the amount of time spent engaged in learning tasks is systematically linked to test scores (Amadio 1998; Carnoy *et al* 2004). Most importantly, the losses in many countries raise issues of governance and monitoring (Abadzi 2009).

An institutional determinant of hours spent in teaching and learning is whether the school is operated in single-shift or double-shift mode. An in-depth study of Bangladesh's government primary schools and registered non-government primary schools found large disparities in annual lesson time and identified double-shift operation as negatively affecting the contact time between teachers and students. The number of contact hours as a proportion of scheduled contact hours for students in separate shift schools ranged between 27 percent (worst case for grades three through five) and 78 percent (best case for grades three through five)⁹. Clearly double-shift operation cuts down teaching and learning time although the latter captures chronic deficiency in inputs. Moreover, headmasters managing and leading these schools are also more constrained in administrative sense. The need to coordinate between two sessions means less time for overall planning, control and monitoring activities. This in turn can limit the beneficial effect of an otherwise effective SMC. For similar reasons, the GoB also intends to reduce the share of such schools in the primary education sector.

For our purpose, we combine information on trained SMC members, female headship and single-shift operation and compute a composite index called "school governance index (SGI)". The SGI aims to capture school governance in terms of voice and/or management capacity of the school and is calculated based on census data on GPS and RNGPS and then aggregated at the district level.

8. In an unprecedented effort to increase women's political voice, India amended its constitution in 1993 to reserve one-third of the seats at every level of local government for women. The quota dramatically raised the number of women among local leaders, from fewer than 5 percent in 1992 to close to 40 percent in 2005.
 9. See Rahman, Spaulding and Tietjen (2004).

3.3.2 Measuring district educational performance

Comparison between districts requires careful considerations of the institutional set-up and contextual factors that are likely to support any given governance arrangement. For example, the independence of school-based institutions can improve performance when it limits undue political interference (e.g. local politicians cannot influence teacher recruitment process) and can worsen performance when it insulates the institution from accountability for results (e.g. no verifiable way to assess performance). Second, the observed association between “good governance” and educational performance may not be causal. Good governance can be an outcome of earlier investment that raised educational performance (e.g. social campaign or NGO intervention that increased female literacy and empowerment and in turn ensured the availability of literate parents and females who could lead the SMC). Good governance may coincide with other changes that simultaneously occurred and subsequently improved a district’s performance. In other words, a district that performs well need not be better-governed. Third, there are aspects of governance that are concerned with the process independent of their impact on outcomes (e.g. bribes paid by teachers to receive salary, donations made by parents to secure admission in school).

For these reasons, at the outset of this analysis, we do not use outcome/output measure as an indicator of good governance¹⁰. We measure governance mechanism directly instead of simply relying on outcomes. In addition, an attempt is made in our analysis to account for some important contextual factors at the district level. These include remoteness, urbanisation, population size and density. Nonetheless we do need an aggregate performance indicator to understand the significance of SGI ranking of districts. District educational performance can be judged across multiple dimensions such as effectiveness in attracting children to school, retaining them in school, helping them to complete a given schooling cycle and do so with minimum learning. Equally, the institutional mechanism and the associated governance regimes would also vary. Districts may vary in terms of monitoring and implementation of stipend schemes that helps attract students from poor families to school. Equally, coverage of initiatives to aid children in remote and under-developed communities (e.g. Reaching-out-of-the-school project) may also vary between districts. We do not have institutional information on such demand and supply side programmes aiding school-going children and their effectiveness at the district level. Therefore, we cannot separate aspects of governance that apply separately to issues of access and quality¹¹. Acknowledging the possibility that districts ranking may differ depending on the output measure we choose, we additionally create a composite output indicator. This facilitates robustness analysis that we discuss later in the chapter.

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10. Another reason for this is that outcome related governance measure can be manipulated with the goal of influencing performance. For instance, whilst performance in PSC makes school accountable, this can be influenced to show good performance and governance (Asadullah 2013).
 11. For a review of the literature on the importance of local educational governance and administration for improving access to education, see Dunne, Akyeampong and Humphreys (2006).

If high SGI value indeed reflects good governance, it should reflect in better educational outcomes. In order to explore this empirically, we need a measure of district level performance in terms of educational outcomes that is sensitive to local/school level governance. At the country level, one such composite index on outcomes is UNESCO's Education Development Index (EDI). The EDI is the arithmetic mean of four components: total primary NER, adult literacy rate, gender-specific EFA index (GEI) and survival rate to grade 5 where GEI is the simple average of the GER in primary education, the GER in secondary education and the adult literacy rate. According to UNESCO (2009), Bangladesh lies in the lowest category (ranked 109) in a cross-section of 129 countries in terms of its EDI.

The goal of EDI is to rank countries in terms of educational development across a wide range of dimensions. Whilst this is a useful exercise on its own right, this is less appropriate for our purpose as it is not directly sensitive to the effectiveness/performance of SMC. Nonetheless, we adopt a suitably modified version of UNESCO's EDI. We label our modified index as "Education Performance Index" (EPI) which is a simple average of participation rate and pass rate of primary school students in PSC 2011. Since there are multiple dimensions of performance, we consider several variants of EPI. As a simple average, EPI may mask important variations among its components: for example, results for goals on which a district has made less progress can offset its advances on others. Since both goals (participation in terminal exam and performance conditional upon participation) are equally important, a synthetic indicator such as the EPI is still useful to inform the debate on education inequality in Bangladesh. An index like EPI can contribute towards a performance-oriented reform strategy which will make school authority and education officials at the local level accountable to parents and communities.

Lastly, a related study to assess district level performance is World Bank (2009)¹². The study calculates a weighted composite index called EDI for each district combining information on student enrolment, physical infrastructure, drop out and so on. Annual School Census 2009 data is used for calculation purposes. A number of findings are noteworthy. Although it finds *upazilas* to vary in terms of educational development within districts¹³, district level pattern is same as that based on *upazila* level EDI. Second, among the six divisions of the country Sylhet performs the worst in terms of education development at the primary level followed by Chittagong and Barisal. Dhaka and Khulna top the list among the divisions. Rajshahi is highly represented both among the top 10 percent and the bottom 10 percent of *upazilas* in terms of availability of access related inputs. Narayanganj is identified as the most developed district in Bangladesh. In sum, the report concludes that Sylhet region is the lowest performing region along with the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

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- 12. This is inspired by an earlier attempt to rank districts in India for planning and resource allocation purposes. The purpose was to identify the most deprived districts in terms of educational development, on the basis of various criteria, including spatial and gender/social groups' disadvantage (Jingran and Sankar 2009).
 - 13. For instance, while 35 percent of the top 10 percent *upazilas* are from Dhaka, 6 percent of the bottom 10 percents are also from the same division.

Districts and *upazilas* that have remote areas and are vulnerable to disasters are also mostly suffering compared to average *upazilas* and districts. Whilst useful for understanding the level of educational development, World Bank (2009) study is of limited use for our purpose. The index computed does not study institutional factors. As such, it is unsuitable for understanding spatial variation in physical outputs and inputs and the links in between through the lens of governance.

3.4 Data

Our data is assembled from two flagship publications of Directorate of Primary Education (DPE), namely Annual School Census (ASC) 2011 and Annual School Performance Report (ASPR) 2012. *Upazila* rather than district is the most relevant administrative unit as far as management and performance of primary schools are concerned. However data on functioning of *upazila* education offices is non-existent. Our choice of school governance indicator is primarily guided by data availability and simplicity of the index. Information on the three constituent sub-indices (sex of the head teacher, percentage of SMC members trained and whether the school is double shift) is routinely gathered by DPE. At the same time, they are easy to collect. The potential for measurement and/or reporting error is therefore minimised.

We adjust data on each of these 3 sub-indices so that they are bounded between 0 and 1. This is done as follows. First the maximum (i.e. best) and minimum (i.e. worst) values in an indicator are identified . Then we use the following formula to obtain normalised values:

$$SI_{ji} = \frac{(Observed X_{ij} - Worst X_j)}{(Best X_i - Worst X_j)}$$

Subsequently each j-th SI for i-th district is combined into a composite index, SI_i , which is a simple average of the constituent sub-indices, SI_{ji} . The advantage of this index is that the first two sub-indices can be combined to capture school governance effectiveness leaving single-shift also as a proxy of budget adequacy. In order to measure outcome and governance indicators in a way that is easy to interpret, we scale the data so that each indicator is bound between zero and 1. The same approach is adopted in constructing the EPI.

3.5 Results

3.5.1 Educational outcomes across Bangladeshi districts

For EPI, we have considered district ranks of five variants of EPI (see Annex 1). The first version ($EPI_{gender-sensitive}$) is defined over participation and pass rate in PSC 2011 and pass rate of females vs. males. The remaining versions are gender blind. The second version (EPI) is the additive product of participation and pass rate in PSC 2011 whilst the third version (EPI_{GPA}) is a product of participation

rate and pass rate with GPA5. In addition, we construct two variants by further combining info on enrolment in primary school (as a percentage of total school age population in 2011). This yields $EPI_{inclusive}$ and $EPI_{inclusive-GPA}$, respectively.


Irrespective of which EPI we use, Sunamganj ranks at the bottom of the list in 4 instances. When gender-sensitivity is taken into account, Cox's Bazar replaces Sunamganj. Other bottom 10 districts include Bhola, Cox's Bazar, Moulvibazar, Habiganj, Brahmanbaria and Gaibandha which features in each ranking. Amongst others are Shariatpur and Sirajganj which features three times in Table 3.1. Sylhet also features twice and marginally misses out on two other occasions from being in the bottom 10. The result is quite similar to the findings of several other previous reports (e.g. World Bank 2010). HIES 2005 has also identified Sylhet as the worst performing region in terms of literacy (BBS 2005)¹⁴.

Among divisional head-quarters, poorly performing districts are Chittagong (varies between 22 and 37), Barisal (varies between 12 and 26) and Sylhet (varies between 44 and 58). In fact, seven of the bottom 10 districts are from Sylhet division (all of bottom 5) and Chittagong Hill Tracts. Looking at the high performers, Jessore, Panchagarh, Munshiganj, Satkhira and Khulna are always present amongst the top 10 districts irrespective of how we rank district educational performance. Dhaka, Joypurhat and Rajshahi only feature amongst the top 10 when relying on EPI variants that are sensitive to GPA awards in PSC.


Lastly, when using the first and second variants of EPI, there is a great deal of homogeneity across districts in terms of absolute value of the underlying indices. However, this picture is misleading as districts do vary a great deal in terms of educational outcomes. Dhaka, the capital, ranks 43rd and 46th for the first and second variants, respectively. This implies that PSC pass rate is a poor measure of educational achievement of districts in Bangladesh. This is explained by the fact that overall pass rate is unusually high when compared to available evidence on the level of learning. The other noticeable pattern is that spearman's rank correlation coefficient between EPI and $EPI_{inclusive}$ is low (same is true for EPI_{GPA} and $EPI_{inclusive}$). Therefore, throughout the chapter, we rely on EPI_{GPA} as our primary composite indicator of district educational performance. Figure 3.1 reports district ranks of EPI_{GPA} .

14. According to the HIES 2005, Sylhet division has only 36 percent literate population and only 76 percent of the 6-10 year-old children enrolled in schools. On the other hand, Khulna tops the division list with 87 percent children enrolled (BBS 2005). for further details on the backwardness of Sylhet, see Nath et al 2001.

Figure 3.1: District ranking in terms of EPI_{gpa}*



* Light coloured bars represent divisional head quarters

Figure 3.2: District ranking in terms of SGI*

* Light coloured bars represent divisional head quarters


Figure 3.2 shows the district ranks of SGI. Table 2 at annex 1 also reports the district ranks of SGI. Districts that rank well in terms of SGI are districts from Dhaka division such as the capital city, Narayanganj, Manikganj, Narsingdi and Munshiganj. Others in the top 10 list include Joypurhat, Chittagong, Bogra, Pabna, Khulna and Nilphamari. Note that even if we consider the parsimonious version of SGI (see Column 5, table 2, annex 1), 9 of the top 12 SGI still remains in the same bracket. Districts at the bottom of the table include Sunamganj, Netrokona, Noakhali, Dinajpur, Kushtia, Sylhet, Rangamati, Bhola, Bandarban and Mymensingh. How do districts compare in terms of educational outcomes and school governance indicators? This is discussed in the following section.

3.5.2 Does school governance explain regional disparity in student achievement?

The earlier section documented geographic disparity in primary education outcomes in Bangladesh. In this section, we ask how governance at the school level in a district helps explain across district differences in outcomes. Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 report bivariate scatter-plots showing correlations between four variants of EPI and SGI. In order to assess the relative importance of single-shift operation in explaining the influence of SGI, we additionally report a regression line rather than purge SGI of information on single-shift operation status. We report the regression line separately for the parsimonious and full version of the composite index. Irrespective of the variant of EPI used, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between EPI and SGI. Using the parsimonious version of SGI however returns a slightly flatter regression line.

Low SGI districts such as Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat, Sylhet, Sunamganj, Habiganj and Moulvibazar also lie much below the regression line. However, a high score of our governance determinant indicator is not always good or bad. There are couple of districts that deviate from the average relationship. Narayanganj, an old industrial town close to the capital, has high SGI but lies much below the regression line. On the other hand, districts that rank much above despite medium SGI include Khulna, Rajshahi, Jessore, Tangail and Munshiganj. Favourable contextual factors partially explain such positive and negative deviance. However, in one instance, districts cluster together and systematically fail irrespective of the state of governance. Sylhet as a division is a glaring example of this.

Figure 3.3: Scatter-plots EPI (4 variants) and SGI indices



3.5.3 Contextual factors: Linking governance to educational outcomes

Section 3.4.2 has a number of limitations. We neither measure corruption nor the performance or integrity of individuals who work within the education system. We do explain how the effectiveness of school management matters for educational performance at the district level. However, we do not measure all aspects of educational governance or all factors that affect educational outcomes. Districts vary not just in terms of socio-economic profile of students and teachers; there are many contextual and structural differences that matter for educational performance.

Educational inequalities can exist in both access and quality due to socio-economic differences. Children from the wealthiest 20 percent of households in Bangladesh enjoy higher primary net attendance rates and better test scores compared to those from the poorest quintile. Part of the difference is also driven by their region of location. Some districts offer better opportunities to educate children and better livelihood choices to parents to invest in children. In general, poor girls and boys in rural areas are less likely to attend school and more likely to drop out than their urban cousins. This means that educational outcomes are likely to be better in more urbanized districts irrespective of the difference in governance structure. In other instances, infrastructural factors enable better governance. In TIB survey 2006, teachers point out that schools that have better access to roads and are proximate to sub-district headquarters are frequently inspected by Upazila Education Officer (UEO). Those located in remote areas are seldom visited (Islam 2008). Equally, the potential for political interference remains an important institutional determinant of governance. In this section, we account for the contribution of some of such factors.

To this end, we reconstruct the scatter-plots by netting out the contribution of specific contextual factors that may cause educational outcomes to vary. This is done in a number of ways. First, we net out the influence of remoteness (percentage of schools located in remote areas such as *haor*, hills, *char* areas and tea garden), belonging to a given division and being the divisional head district. The latter captures structural commonalities across divisions. Second, we control for the contribution of urbanisation. This is done using two proxies: percentage of schools located in urban areas and population density of the district. As before, all graphs are reported using four composite output indices, one focusing on pass rate and the other giving more weight to graduates attaining GPA5 and another two variants additionally accounting for out-of-school population.

Figure 3.4: Scatter-plots of EPI (4 variants) and SGI controlling for contextual factors (remoteness and division district headquarters)




Figure 3.5: Scatter-plots of SGI and EPI controlling for urbanisation





Figure 3.4 reports data with controls for remoteness and district divisional headquarters (HQs). Once again it highlights the problem of relying on simple EPI (that uses pass rate in PSC) instead of EPI_{gpa} . Dhaka is ranked very low in the first plot whilst it retains its usual location in the top right-hand side corner when EPI_{gpa} composite measure of output is used.

Lastly, additionally accounting for female literacy in the district significantly reduces explanatory power of SGI. However, the association with EPI still remains significant when we use GPA based composite EPI. Separate examination of EPI and female literacy confirms a positive and statistically significant relationship which is consistent with the larger literature on the benefits of female literacy. This highlights the possibility that districts enjoying high female literacy (e.g. Jhalokati, Barisal, Dhaka, Pirojpur and Barisal) are likely to benefit from greater involvement of educated females in the management of schools. But children in these districts are also likely to benefit from educated mothers. Figure 3.4 captures the combined influence of these possibilities. For poor female literacy, in districts such as Sherpur, Kurigram, Bandarban, Cox's Bazar, Lalmonirhat, Gaibandha, Sunamganj, Habiganj and Bhola, education outcomes are likely to suffer.

Figure 3.6: Scatter-plots of SGI and EPI controlling for female literacy



3.5.4 Explaining school governance determinants

Our measure of SGI comprises of trained SMC members, female headed SMC and school operating in single-shift. In this section, we shed some light on one of the constituent elements of SGI, namely female headship. Recruiting and retaining women teachers have become priority strategies for improving girls' education in many developing countries. Indeed, Bangladesh has made great strides toward gender equality in segments of the education sector including enrolment and teacher recruitment. Today, majority of the primary school assistant teachers are female. The total number of teachers is 441,143 (all types of schools). Of these teachers, female teachers are 248,336 (56.3 percent). The percentage of female teachers in two major categories of schools, GPS and RNGPS, is 61 percent and 42 percent respectively (ASPR 2012).

One strategy to make the education sector more gender-inclusive is to increase the number of women in education leadership by increasing their share in head teacher positions. However, we find that females have a lower presence in school leadership position. In Bangladesh, female headed schools (district average) range from 16 percent to 53 percent. This is despite the finding that pro-female teacher recruitment policy is paying dividends by helping to improve performance at the district level. This raises an important question: why are there so few female school administrators? More importantly, why certain districts have more female head teachers than others?

A number of reasons can be put forward. First of all, differential qualification is a problem. In all types of training, female teachers lag behind males. We find that female head teachers are less in districts with high male literacy but very high where adult female literacy is high. Further exploration reveals that in districts where the relative supply of literate males is less, females have highest share in school headship. Secondly, it's a challenge to recruit and place female teachers in remote and rural locations where the presence of female head teachers is very small.

Today, women represent a majority of teachers, yet men occupy most administrative positions in primary schools. To be precise, although female share in assistant head teachers is high, only 24 percent women are in leadership positions as head teachers. This is likely to improve in the future. Rapid growth in female enrolment and decline in poverty will have much influence upon employment opportunities for women and their professional development. This might increase the number of women in teaching and educational administration.

Whether the policy of running more schools with female heads can be effectively leveraged in all districts remains to be seen. Although the numbers of women employed in the economy has been increasing during the last two decades, women are still reported as facing barriers and being discriminated against while reaching upper levels in their careers. If these hidden structural barriers remain, it will be difficult to increase female work participation. Similar structural obstacles are likely to be in place in the education sector. To begin with, female teachers have greater family obligations, are less qualified (compared to their male colleagues), operate in a male dominated work environment with relatively few women administrators¹⁵. Moreover, in areas where gender norms are more traditional (e.g. Bhola and Sylhet), further feminisation of SMC leadership will be difficult. However, if achieved, this will have added social return as these female leaders may bring about larger social change¹⁶.

To better understand the factors influencing favourable ranks in SGI, Table 3.1 below reports the correlations between the SGI index and a number of factors such as remoteness, population density, percentage of schools in urban areas, percentage population below the poverty line and female literacy in the district. Divisional head-districts systematically enjoy better-managed schools (and hence have a high SGI value). Districts in Sylhet have, on average, very low rankings in terms

15. For a review on barriers to women's career advancement in educational systems within developing countries, see Oplatka (2006).

16. A recent policy experiment in neighbouring India suggests that placing female leaders in positions of power can dramatically change public attitudes (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande and Topalova 2009).

of SGI. For others, the association is positive and significant except for Khulna and Chittagong. Lastly, female literacy is positively and significantly correlated with SGI. This also explains why netting out the contribution of female literacy reduces the size of the correlation between EPI and SGI in Figure 3.6. Low literacy areas therefore may be at a disadvantage in terms of ensuring local participation in school managed by female educators.

Table 3.1: Correlation matrix of SGI and contextual factors

	SGI	Remoteness	Pop. density	Urban	Poor	Female literacy
SGI	1					
Remoteness	-0.4002 0.001	1				
Pop. density, skm	0.5273 0	-0.2353 0.0613	1			
Urban	0.4645 0.0001	-0.1266 0.319	0.7945 0	1		
Poor	-0.0683 0.5918	0.0332 0.7948	-0.367 0.0029	-0.2622 0.0363	1	
Female literacy	0.333 0.0072	-0.3124 0.012	0.4036 0.0009	0.4548 0.0002	-0.35 0.0046	1
Divisional head	0.2526 0.044	-0.1162 0.3603	0.326 0.0086	0.526 0	-0.1144 0.368	0.3491 0.0047

Note: 2nd row indicates p-values.

3.5.5 The role of physical inputs

It is well-known that state-supported schools are under-resourced in Bangladesh. Improving the provision of basic infrastructure and teachers is a key objective under PEDP3. To this end, four “Primary School Quality Level” (PSQL) indicators – student-classroom ratio (SCR), student-teacher ratio (STR), availability of safe water, and separate toilets for girls – have been used to monitor improvement in school infrastructure. Whilst our focus throughout has been on governance, in this section we reconsider the EPI-SGI link taking into account the poor physical condition of schools using PSQL index as a proxy.


Figure 3.7: Scatter-plots of EPI and PSQL index


Figure 3.7 plots data on EPI (EPI_{gpa}) and PSQL index¹⁷. Irrespective of whether we use simple EPI or EPI_{gpa} , the relationship is positive and statistically significant. This implies that the observed correlation between district EPI and SGI could be owing to better ranked SGI also enjoying better PSQL rating. The other notable point is the variation observed in PSQL index value. Districts such as Cox's Bazar, Brahmanbaria, Narayanganj, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Bhola, Kishoreganj, Netrokona, Jamalpur, Comilla and Sherpur have poor PSQL rating. On the other hand, schools in Jessore, Joypurhat, Dinajpur, Thakurgaon, Jhenaidah, Barisal and Naogaon enjoy better physical infrastructure. In general, districts belonging to the Dhaka region (e.g. Gazipur, Munshiganj and Narayanganj) including the capital do not do well. The same thing is true for Sylhet division as a region with the exception of Moulvibazar. Very low PSQL partly explains Narayanganj's negative deviance in SGI-EPI relationship discussed earlier in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.6 revisits the above relationships taking into the level of school infrastructure alongside various contextual factors. Once we account for the contribution of school infrastructure (via the PSQL index), the positive correlation between SGI and EPI is significantly weakened. In case of GPA based composite outcome indicator (EPI_{gpa}), the positive relationship becomes difficult to identify in terms of statistical significance. This therefore highlights the point that whilst school governance matters, this on its own may not deliver large-scale gains in educational performance if infrastructural improvements are not brought about. We also repeated the analysis holding the

17. The percentage of schools reporting to have met 3 out of 4 PSQL indicators.

total number of primary schools in each district constant. However, the positive association remains. This implies that supply of schools alone also cannot ensure expected outcome.

Figure 3.8: Scatter-plots of EPI and SGI, controlling for PSQL index and other



The wide geographic variation in input as captured by PSQL index highlights the need for using a transparent needs-based approach to planning new infrastructure¹⁸. In 2011, less than one-quarter of schools (both GPS and RNGPS) meet three out of four key PSQL indicators. This demonstrates the huge need for investment in basic infrastructure and teachers in order to meet minimum standards related to the PSQL indicators (ASPR 2012). Given that a large number of schools are under state-management, ensuring good governance in the allocation of educational resources needs to be addressed.

3.5.6 Emerging education clusters

In this section, we summarise the findings on district ranks and re-organise districts in terms of outcomes in three dimensions: performance, governance and inputs. The table below (Table 3.2) lists the top and bottom 10 districts in terms of their EPI_{gpa} ranking but at the same time indicate the district's rank in terms of SGI and PSQL index.

18. The proportion of schools which meet the PSQL standard of 40 students per 'effective' classroom is 67 percent. If double-shifting is ignored, then only 21 percent of schools meet the 40:1 SCR. According to DPE records 40,440 new classrooms have been constructed by March 2011 (ASPR 2012). This rate of construction appears to have been sufficient only to keep up with enrolment growth.

Table 3.2: List of top and bottom 10 performing districts

Districts	EPIgpa	SGI	PSQL
Low performers			
Sunamganj	Lowest	Low	Low
Moulvibazar	Low	Medium	Medium
Jamalpur	Low	Low	Low
Bhola, Gaibandha, Brahmanbaria,			
Cox's Bazar, Habiganj and Kishoreganj	Low	Low	Low
Shariatpur	Low	Low	Medium
High performers			
Joypurhat	high	High	High
Dhaka	high	High	Low
Munshiganj, Tangail, Narsingdi	high	Medium	Low
Bogra, Rajshahi, Jessore, Khulna, Panchagarh	High	High/medium	High/medium

The star performers come from Dhaka, Rajshahi and Khulna division. Districts from the Chittagong and Barisal regions belong to the middle category. In general, low EPI_{gpa}-performing districts also suffer from low SGI and PSQL index. For example, Jamalpur's rank in EPI_{gpa}, SGI and PSQL is 10, 13 and 10, respectively. Two exceptions are Narayanganj and Moulvibazar which have favourable SGI. On the other hand, high performing districts also enjoy high SGI and PSQL index. An exception is districts from the Dhaka region, which have favourable low PSQL rank. This is attributable to high STR and SCR because of high population pressure in these districts.

There are districts that marginally fall out of the bottom 10: Narayanganj (ranked 53 in EPI_{gpa}) and Bandarban (ranked 54 in EPI_{gpa}). In general, districts from the Chittagong Hill Tracts area rank poorly. Our list of under-performing districts has a significant overlap with UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2009 which identifies Bhola, Sunamganj, Kishoreganj, Habiganj, Bandarban, Natore and Netrokona as poorly performing in terms of student enrolment rate.

Many of these districts share a number of common contextual features. For instance, most star performers tend to be urbanised¹⁹ whilst their lagging counterparts have schools in remote areas. The entire region of Rajshahi and Rangpur has benefited from extensive NGO intervention (e.g.

19. Dhaka, Munshiganj and Narsingdi are amongst the top 10 most urbanised districts in Bangladesh whilst Bogra, Rajshahi and Khulna are amongst the fast growing urban districts.

BRAC's non-formal school scheme since mid-1990s)²⁰. This is perhaps one reason why the otherwise ecologically vulnerable region of Rangpur, which suffers from seasonal hunger, does moderately well in education. At the same time, a number of locality specific factors are at play.

- Narsingdi and Munshiganj are both historically well-developed areas although the latter has few flood-prone localities, adjacent to the river Padma.
- Joypurhat is relatively small in size and enjoys good communication infrastructure.
- Panchagarh, the constituency of Late Jamiruddin Sarkar (education minister during 1991-95) benefited from a large number of primary schools being set up in the early 1990s. Indeed it ranks 15th and 11th in terms of per capita number of schools and government supported schools respectively.
- Jessore and Khulna both belong to high literacy regions. Cox's Bazar on the other hand suffers from remoteness and high illiteracy, which makes it extremely difficult to recruit school teachers, let alone females. This has also restricted operation of BRAC's education programmes in the region.
- Narayanganj has favourable SGI but has a low PSQL index²¹. The district also suffers from high in-migration. A large proportion of school going children belong to working-class families that are temporary settlers.
- Kishoreganj is well known for its haor areas (in *upazilas* such as Itna, Nikli, Mitha-moeen and Ashtogram).
- Brahmanbaria, although significantly urbanised, is well-known for conservative gender norms and high concentration of madrasas. The district experienced burning of NGO (e.g. BRAC, Proshika) schools and offices in 1993 and 2003. A number of *upazilas* (Nasirnagar, Sadar, Sarail and Bangsarapur) also have remote (i.e. haor) areas.
- Moulvibazar has many tea garden estates whilst Sunamganj is home to haor area. Only in 2011, BRAC has expanded coverage of its education programme in response to poor state of educational development.
- A significant part of the population in Gaibandha is urbanised (population density is 1125 sq km). Why the district falls behind whilst its neighbour Panchagarh excels is unclear. One explanation is that Gaibandha has large number of schools located in char lands particularly in Shagadha, Sundarganj, Phulchari and Sadar *upazilas*. Many *upazilas* also suffer from river erosion.

3.6 Conclusion

The New Education Policy 2010 has set the goal of ensuring quality education in all schools irrespective of locations; rural and urban. Yet, we have documented significant variation in

20. In the late 1990s, approximately 16,000 out of 34,000 of BRAC's non-formal schools belonged to Rajshahi-Rangpur region.

21. This is likely to reflect large population – Narayanganj is the second most densely populated (4308 sq km) out of 64 districts (BBS 2011).

outcomes across districts that are not affected by remoteness. Without disaggregated analysis at the upazila level, it is hard to identify the factors that make districts vary in terms of student performance. An attempt was made in this chapter by focusing on specific institutional determinants of governance. We find that school governance matters for district performance. Districts with SMCs composed of trained members and headed by a female rank favourably in primary school completion (PSC) examination outcomes. But a group of these districts belong to better-off regions (e.g. urban, divisional head). Sylhet division (including Sylhet district) performs poorly. Part of the observed disadvantage is explained by schools being located in remote areas which make them difficult to govern. When districts with “effective SMCs” also have schools operating in single-shift we do see a systematic positive association with district ranks in PSC results irrespective of divisional identity of the district, extent of remoteness and urbanisation.

Poorest PSC-performing districts belonging to Sylhet also have low SGI values. However, there are important exceptions. Narayanganj performs poorly despite having a favourable SGI value. On the other hand, no district has high EPI with low SGI. However, a number of districts in the Dhaka region have high EPI despite a low PSQL index. Adverse contextual factors partly explain why there is a negative deviance. However, cases of positive deviance needs be explored further. The case of Dhaka and many adjacent districts indicate that poor school governance instead of poor physical conditions is likely to become a binding constraint on educational outcomes. Fortunately some of the districts we highlight as laggards have already been identified by NGOs and governments²². Follow up studies should revisit this association at the school level particularly in such regions where governance and resource constraints both bind to better inform the current development interventions. Governance challenges in remote areas also need to be looked at.

Our analysis is meant to serve as a benchmark exercise to stimulate a debate about governance issues and policy in the education sector. As mentioned earlier, we do not rule out the significance of other forms of governance challenges. Moreover, continuous gathering of information on governance performance (e.g. bribes paid by teachers to get a job or by households to access educational services) is crucial if we are to understand the gravity of the governance crisis in the education sector. At a minimum, a more comprehensive approach²³ focusing on institutional determinants is needed in order to better understand education governance in Bangladesh.

The positive association between school governance and PSC performance implies that geographic targeting combined with better training provision for SMC members in lagging locations is one policy instrument that the government can consider to improve educational opportunities across the country. But such policy change must be informed by more research. Whilst we know that

22. For instance, BRAC has up scaled its non-formal education scheme in Sylhet. Since 2003, all upazilas of Bhola except Monpura are also being extensively covered by BRAC. Similarly BRAC has introduced boat schools to reach out children in haor areas of Kishoreganj.

23. The Indonesia Local Education Governance Index (ILEGI) can be a good example of comprehensive assessment that is based on five strategic areas of education governance.

school management is correlated with good educational performance, we do not know what well-managed schools do differently. This requires primary survey data. Using available information on contract teachers, we examined whether these schools hire more such teachers who are easy to hire and fire. Districts such as Barguna, Gopalganj, Cox's Bazar, Sylhet, Kurigram and Nilphamari employ more para teachers although they do not rank at the top in terms of SGI. Part of this is explained by remoteness (Sylhet, Kurigram and Nilphamari). But Barguna tops the list even after smoothing out the influence of remoteness. It does not seem that schools with better SGI recruit more teachers locally to improve overall performance. Therefore, future work should look into the institutional performance of "well-managed" schools.

Strengthening SMCs in under-performing districts should be prioritised. Given the policy relevance of the issue, the evidence presented here need to be followed up by school level studies on the effectiveness of SMC. That way, we can verify whether or not SMC as a proxy of governance determinant truly leads to better performance.

4

Assessing Health Governance in District Hospitals

4.1 Introduction

Health is a universally recognised significant index of human development. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Article 15a) makes the provision of securing basic necessities to its citizen including medical care one of the fundamental principles of state policy. Over the past 40 years since independence, Bangladesh has increased its real per capita income by more than 130 percent, cut poverty rate by 60 percent, and is well set to achieve most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (GoB 2011a). Despite low social indicators and continuing prevalence of poverty, the health sector in Bangladesh has shown impressive progress (Pose and Samuels 2011).

However, this overall progress in the health sector has not been equally realised throughout the country, rather regional variations are high in terms of achievement in social sector indicators, including health and education. For instance, BBS and UNICEF (2009) provides a district and *upazila* ranking based on MDG achievement which shows that some regions are lagging behind in terms of achieving the targets whereas some are doing quite well. Similarly, World Bank (2012) produced a study on health care system which focused on the readiness and ability to facilitate the delivery of quality services in the health sector. This is based on selected samples of *upazila* health facilities, community clinics and private health care at *upazila* level and reports strong presence of regional disparities. However, most of the studies focused on measuring the performance of the health sector in terms of achieving output or outcome, and hardly looked at the input distribution and the process of achieving these outcomes. As Lewis and Patterson (2009) argues, the performance in the health sector is actually determined by the relationship between policymakers, policy implementers and service providers, but review of literature shows that most of the studies on the health sector in Bangladesh, and also globally, examine it only from the policymaker and policy implementer level. Only a few studies look at the provider level and, in terms of coverage, they are not comprehensive enough to enable a comparative analysis of all the districts.

Against this backdrop, we argue that a provider level analysis at regional level is crucial to have a better understanding of the state of health sector governance. At the same time, looking beyond the ‘performance only’ indicators can provide more insight into health sector governance by looking at different aspects including provision of inputs/resources, supervision and management and their translation towards input. Additionally, studying health sector governance in a district disaggregated manner can be helpful to better prioritise, target, plan and budget (BBS and UNICEF 2009).

This chapter attempts to identify objectively measureable indicators to assess the state of health sector governance at the provider level, which allows comparing the performance of all 64 districts of Bangladesh. It does not attempt to create a composite index to provide a comprehensive view of the governance of district level health units. It rather attempts to create a simple index looking in terms of a) functionality of equipments and b) availability of manpower to see if these two variables can affect the service delivery of hospitals in terms of outpatient department (OPD) service delivery.

Our research design originates with the premise that a hospital can function better if the inputs, both in terms of manpower and equipments, are available and functioning.

We found that both functionality of equipment and the prevalence of filled up positions for physicians and nurses positively and significantly affect the OPD service delivery. We also found that population density and remoteness has significant impact on input allocation, equipment functionality and OPD service delivery.

Our findings also suggest that, both in terms of input functionality and input availability, there are variations across regions. When physician positions are considered, on average 60 percent of total sanctioned positions in the district level health facilities (including district hospitals and Upazila Health Complexes) are filled, even though variations are pronounced when compared among districts. The ranking suggests that there is a significant urban bias; meaning more physician positions are filled in the urban centres compared to other districts. Our analysis indicates that all the divisional headquarters perform better than all other districts in a specific division (Dhaka 99 percent, Chittagong 87 percent, Khulna 71 percent, Rangpur 82 percent, Sylhet 60 percent, Rajshahi 56 percent and Barisal 57 percent). Dhaka has the highest percentage of physician positions filled whereas Panchagarh has the lowest physician positions filled in (22 percent). Among the seven divisions Dhaka division also has the highest filled positions (80 percent) followed by Chittagong division which has 63 percent of physician positions filled.

The districts of Chittagong mostly show the same pattern except for three hill districts – Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban – which have the lowest percentage of physician positions filled up (ranging between 36 percent and 48 percent). Among other divisions, Khulna and Sylhet divisions have 58 and 55 percent of their allocated physician positions filled, respectively. The

figure is 46 percent in both Rangpur and Rajshahi divisions. Barisal is the worst performing division with only 43 percent of the positions filled.

When the filled up positions of nurses are considered, the national average suggests that district level health facilities are even less equipped in terms of nurses, only 42 percent of total position are filled even though the distribution is more equal throughout the country: Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet divisions have 48 percent of nurse positions filled, followed by Khulna (38 percent), Rajshahi and Rangpur (36 percent and 65 percent, respectively) and Barisal (35 percent).

Interestingly the findings suggest that in terms of equipment functionality the district variations are not very pronounced. Dhaka as a district along with nearby districts has the highest numbers of functional ambulances, ECG and x-ray machines and colorimeter, with a divisional average of 77 percent. In comparison, most of the districts under Rajshahi and Rangpur division, except a few districts under Rangpur, are performing poorly. The overall performance of equipment functionality is also low in Sylhet and Barisal division. Bhola is the worst performing district with 28 percent functional equipments.

The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a contextual overview of the health situation in Bangladesh, followed by Section 4.3, which shows a comparison of the health sector in Bangladesh with other South Asian countries. Section 4.4 explains the theoretical framework and Section 4.5 discusses the findings. Section 4.6 is a summary of key findings and other concluding remarks.

4.2 MDGs and health sector progress

Despite being a resource poor country, the case of Bangladesh is exemplary compared to other developing countries in terms of attaining the health related MDG goals. Bangladesh has made dramatic advances in child survival (UNDP 2013), and received the UN MDG award for being on track for reducing infant and child mortality (MDG 4). Moreover, life expectancy at birth has increased, contraceptive prevalence rate has also risen and fertility and maternal mortality ratio have declined (GoB 2010). UNDP (2005) reported that Bangladesh can be considered as a role model for UNDP by showing that sustained improvement in human development is possible even in poor countries at relatively modest levels of income growth (Bhuyan n.d.). Nevertheless, many challenges remain in the health sector. Poor access to services, low quality of health care, high maternal mortality ratio and poor status of child health still remain as challenges (Mahmood 2012). For instance, although maternal mortality ratio has declined, it is still far below the related MDG target. Moreover, only 15 percent of child births take place at health facilities (GoB 2010), and just 31.7 percent of births are administered by the trained personnel (NIPORT, Mitra and Associates and ICF International 2013).

Table 4.1 summarises the target, benchmark and the latest information on the achievement of health related MDGs in Bangladesh. Due to paucity of information available close to the year 2013, we used the latest available sources to show the achievements on MDG.

Table 4.1: Leading MDGs targets and indicators for health sector in Bangladesh

Goals/ Target	Base Year 1990/91	Current Status*	Target 2015	Status
Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger**				
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger				
Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age (6-59 months), (%)	66	36.4 (BDHS 2011)	33.0	Achieved
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality				
Target: Reduce by two thirds by 2015 the under 5 mortality rate				
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	146	53 (BDHS 2011)	48	Achieved
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	92	43 (BDHS 2011)	31	Achieved
Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health				
Target 5 A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio				
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	574	194 (BMMS 2010)	143	On track
Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, %	5	31.7 (BDHS 2010)	50	Needs attention
Target 5 B: Achieve by 2015, universal access to reproductive health				
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR), %	39.7	61.2 (BDHS 2011)	72	On track
Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability				
Target: Halve by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation				
Proportion of population using an improved drinking water sources, %	78	98.2 (SVRS 2011)	100	On track
Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility, %	39	63.6 (SVRS 2011)	100	Needs attention

* We have considered BDHS data for most of the goals. Wherever BDHS data is not available we have used BMMS and SVRS data.

**Though this goal is not directly related to our analysis but it has huge impact on overall public health. Hence we have included it here.

Source: Adapted from GoB, 2013.

The table shows that improvements in some health indicators are remarkable, especially in reducing child mortality. However, in some aspects the country is lagging behind. We argue that poor governance in the overall public health sector remains a big problem in Bangladesh (World Bank 2012). For instance, skilled health personnel constitutes less than one-third of all births. This figure is even lower in slums and tribal areas. Although there are about 30,000 doctors registered in Bangladesh, in reality the doctor to population ratio is 1:4,000. Moreover, there is an extreme scarcity of trained nurses, who are another important part of the health sector workforce (GoB 2010). We also face the problem of absenteeism of doctors and paramedics at government health centres and the availability of essential drugs and medical supplies is inadequate. Finally, the public expenditure, less than or equal to 0.9 percent of GDP, in this sector is undoubtedly very low.

4.3 Health sector performance: Bangladesh compared to South Asian countries

South Asian countries vary greatly in terms of size, population, political regimes and state investment in welfare schemes. These factors reflect the variations in access to basic needs and subsequently health outcomes (Baru 2008). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in the composite index for overall health system attainment of 191 member states, Bangladesh is ranked 131. This is below Sri Lanka, India and the Maldives, but above Pakistan, Bhutan and Nepal (WHO 2000). Similarly, out of 162 countries, Bangladesh ranks 146, according to the Human Development Index, 2012, trailing behind Sri Lanka, Maldives, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan (UNDP 2013). Table 4.2 below describes the MDGs performance of South Asian countries.

Table 4.2: MDGs performance of South Asian countries

Countries	Under five mortality rate (per people births)	Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	Maternal mortality ratio (per 1000 live births)	Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	Contraceptive prevalence rate	% of people using improved drinking water sources	% of People using improved sanitation facility
Bangladesh	53	43	194	31.7	61.2	98.2	63.6
Nepal	50	41	380	19	48	89	31
Sri Lanka	17	14	39	99	68.4	91	92
India	63	48	230	53	54	92	34
Pakistan	87	70	260	39	27	92	48

Source: All other countries', except Bangladesh, data collected from Haq 2012. Data for Bangladesh is complied and collated by authors

Box 4.1: Bangladesh health sector overview:

Bangladesh has a health system which is dominated by the public sector while the private sector is run by local entrepreneurs, different NGOs and international organisations. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) is the highest government authority for policy formulation, planning and decision-making at macro- and micro- levels and to achieve goals related to the health sector of Bangladesh. It is also responsible to ensure basic health care to the people of the country irrespective of class, age and gender.

The Ministry is comprised of two separate wings namely, Health Wing and Family Planning. Each of the wings is managed through separate Directorates under the ministry. Under the ministry four Directorates viz. Directorate General of Health Services, Directorate General of Family Planning, Directorate of Nursing Services and Directorate General of Drug Administration are providing health services to the citizens. The Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) is the key agency that implements the national health policies and programmes. The healthcare infrastructure under the DGHS can be divided into various tiers, viz. national, divisional, district, *upazila*, union, ward and village levels. In each district, there is a district hospital while Upazila Health Complex is at the *upazila* level. At the union level, there could be rural health center, union sub-center or union health and family welfare center. The Civil Surgeon is the chief of the district health service. The Upazila Health Complex is administered by the Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer. At present, there are 406 Upazila Health Complexes in the country. At the ward level, community clinics (10,479) have been established to provide health service to the poor in the remote villages (Rahman 2012).

From Table 4.2, we can see that, Bangladesh is performing better than Nepal, India and Pakistan in achieving some targets (under-five mortality rate, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality ratio, proportion of birth attendant by skilled health personnel). However, in two other cases (contraceptive prevalence rate and using improved sanitation facility) Bangladesh is ranked lower than the mentioned countries. However, the table shows that Bangladesh is ranked first among the five countries in case of having access to improved sources of drinking water.

According to the Sixth Five Year Plan (FY2011-FY2015), the goal of the health, population and nutrition (HPN) sector is to achieve sustainable improvement in health, nutrition, and reproductive health, including family planning, for the people, particularly of vulnerable groups, including women, children, the elderly, and the poor (GoB 2011b). In order to

fulfil the goal of Vision 2021 the incumbent government took many initiatives. Formulation of National Health Policy (NHP) 2011 is one of them. The objectives of the NHP 2011 are to ensure availability of primary health care and emergency health service for all; to increase and spread the accessibility of quality health care and equity based service delivery system and to motivate people in prevention and limit diseases. The development program under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) is implemented through a Sector-wide Approach titled "Health, Population and Nutrition Development Program 2011-2016" (HPNSDP 2011-16). The programme aims at improving access to and utilisation of HPN services in order to reduce morbidity and mortality, reduce population growth rate and improve nutritional status, especially of women and children.

4.4 Theoretical framework

Governance in health can be defined either in terms of input, or in terms of output or process (Kaufman 2008). Input indicators can be understood as *de jure* indicators which usually cover commitments made by countries in the form of constitutions, national policies or international treaties. Process indicators are *de facto* indicators which reflect the action of the actors; functions of the involved institutions to fulfil their responsibilities and commitments. Output or outcome indicators are also *de facto* indicators which reflect the end result or benefit enjoyed by people. Stecher (2005) argues that among these three types of indicators, only process indicators can provide a comprehensive picture of governance because input indicators can only reflect the basic standard of service, whereas output indicators limit itself in assessing the quality but does not provide any direction for improvement. The existing health governance indicators usually combine all three aspects of governance, for example WHO (2008) developed health indicators as a combination of all three (see Box 4.2). Based on that basic health governance framework, Lewis and Patterson (2009) argued that role of standards, information, incentives, and accountability should be reflected while assessing the health governance. They elaborated on the WHO (2008) framework by adding the proposed dimension in their indicators of health governance (see Box 4.2 for both lists).

This discussion was further developed by Reid (2009) in World Bank's Actionable Governance Indicator (AGI). AGI indicators re-emphasised the importance of including 'missing middle' in the input-output framework to understand governance better. They have developed a formal model which actually goes beyond the traditional input-output measures and presented as indicators in three different layers: indicators to measure governance performance, indicators which determine the governance performance and a third set of indicators which explain the contextual factors.

BOX 4.2: List of indicators in health sector governance

WHO (2008) health indicators list

Policy Index:

- Existence of an up-to-date national health strategy linked to national needs and priorities
- Existence of an essential medicines list updated within the last five years and disseminated annually
- Existence of policies on drug procurement which specify the most cost effective drugs in the right quantities; and open, competitive bidding of suppliers for quality products
- Tuberculosis: Existence of a national strategic plan for TB that reflects the six principal components of the Stop TB Strategy as outlined in the Global Plan to Stop TB 2006–2015
- Malaria: Existence of a national malaria strategy/policy which includes drug efficacy monitoring, vector control, and insecticide resistance monitoring
- HIV/AIDS: Completion of the UNGASS National Composite Policy Index Questionnaire for HIV/AIDS

Child Health: Existence of an updated comprehensive, multi-year plan for childhood immunisation
Existence of key health sector documents, which are published and disseminated regularly (such as budget documents, annual performance reviews, health indicators)
Existence of mechanisms, such as surveys, for obtaining timely client input on the existence of appropriate, timely and effective access to health services

Marker Indicators for Governance:

Human Resources: Health worker absenteeism in public health facilities
Health Financing: Proportion of government funds which reach district-level facilities
Health Service Delivery: Stock-out rates (absence) of essential drugs in health facilities
Health Service Delivery: Proportion of informal payments within the public health care system
Pharmaceutical Regulation: Proportion of pharmaceutical sales that consist of counterfeit drugs
Voice & Accountability: Existence of effective civil society organisations in countries with mechanisms in place for citizens to express views to government bodies

Lewis and Patterson (2009)

Budget and resource management:

PEFA Indicators track budget credibility, comprehensiveness, transparency, execution, reporting, recording, and external audits and scrutiny
Discrepancy between public budgeted health funds and the amounts received by health providers
Irregularities associated with government payroll for health workers
Differences in prices paid for similar medical supplies/equipment across health facilities

Human resources

Frequency of illegal side payments/bribes influencing hiring decisions and of payments for particular assignments
Existence of licensing requirements and of continuing educations programmes and their operation
Fraction of physicians or nurses contracted for service but not in site during the period(s) of observation
Types of incentives and accountability mechanisms facing public providers Institutional providers

Incentives and accountabilities in hospital payments

Average length of stay and bed occupancy rates
Informal payments
Frequency of illegal charges for publicly provided health services
Perceptions of corruption and institutional quality
Fraction of households, experts or public officials perceiving corruption in health; relative ranking of health sector on corruption index
The Country and Policy Institutional Assessments (CIPA) for health

4.4.1 Replicating the World Bank model: Hypothesis, assumptions and variables

This chapter builds on the AGI framework of health governance. The objective is to assess the governance at the local level and for doing so this chapter concentrates on district level public health facilities. There can be many arguments in limiting the local providers to only district level hospitals. For us, the reasons were two-fold. We have chosen the district level because so far we do not have a very systematic comparison of district performances. It is also because we have access to some organised government data sourced at the district level. At the same time, it is also easier to concentrate on 64 districts rather than considering 500 *upazilas* or even going beyond that. This chapter, following the AGI model, hypothesises that the performance of a district hospital depends largely on the availability and maintenance of input. Here, the performance of the district level public hospitals are measured in terms of number of daily patients attended, that is, the hospital's Outpatient Department (OPD). OPD is considered as one of the major services that any hospital provides and it is crucial because in most cases it is the first point of interaction between the hospital staff and patients, and functionality of OPD reflects the state of hospital functionality (Das n.d.). The quality of OPD services requires not only physical inputs like physicians, nurses and technicians, but also depends quite heavily on machines and medicines.

In many countries of the world, including Bangladesh, allocation of input are decided centrally. Even though it is crucial for ensuring governance in the health sector, this does not reflect the status of governance performance of local institutions; this rather reflects governance as a central issue. In this chapter, we recognise the importance of input allocation in determining the performance of hospital but again this factor is included as an 'external factor' which would give an idea about how resources are allocated centrally. Our reading on health governance literature suggest that health staff absenteeism and stock out rates of essential drugs are well established measures of governance (WHO 2008, Lewis and Patterson 2009); institutions which ensure better supervision and monitoring can demand more accountability from their staff and ensure better utilisation/maintenance of their resources. In this line, we argue that better equipment functionality is also a reflection of how well the local institutions maintain them.

In this chapter, for the first time in literature, we include equipment functionality as a governance variable and to see if this has any affect on Outpatient Service delivery, which is measured only in terms of number of patients attended at OPD. Along with this, to see how the input allocation affects the day-to-day service delivery, we use physician and nurse positions filled and assess whether it affects the service delivery.

Our analysis does not include the essential drug stock record and staff attendance as these data are not available at the district level. Our pursuit for collecting data from different departments of health directorate suggest that attendance records are not kept, monitoring is done sporadically and these records are not kept for future use. Similar findings apply for essential drugs. There is no

systematic record available for public to use. A World Bank health service delivery survey (2012) does record the hospitals performance considering staff attendance and essential service delivery but they are done at divisional level using samples from 40 districts. So we had to exclude them from our analysis.

The AGI model and Sevedoff (2011) argue that the organisational level output delivery can affect the broader health outcome. In this chapter, we wanted to see if there is any significant relationship between these two, but regarding the health outcome we only have data on child mortality rate (either infant or under five mortality rate). But it is actually far-fetched to hypothesise that the day-to-day hospital service can affect child mortality, if we could have other outcome such as health status or disease prevalence rate, they could have been used as a better indicator to link with OPD. Even if there is any linkage between OPD and child mortality, this should be a subject of huge time lag and in one year period it is not logical to find any significant correlation. That is why we chose to exclude it from our analysis.

4.5 Data and method

This chapter looks at the daily average OPD patient attendance as a function of equipment functionality and available manpower. Functionality of the equipment is the weighted average of total equipments which includes x-ray machines, colorimeters and ECG machines. The manpower variable is the average of physicians' and nurses' position filled as a percentage of total sanctioned. For OPD patient delivery, the variables are presented as daily averages scaled by the total number of hospital beds. It is to be noted that, when we report the district level values of equipment, we have district level values of equipments as reported in Local Health Bulletin (LHB). Some of the districts are excluded in the analysis as there is no information on outpatient service delivery and in some cases there are no district hospitals as such, for example Dhaka, Rajshahi and Mymensingh. We also excluded medical college hospitals as they are very different from district hospitals in every capacity and including them in the analysis would create serious bias in the ranking.

For all data, we have considered 2011 as the reference year. Data on physician and nurse position and equipment functionality has been taken from Local Health Bulletin 2012 and Health Bulletin 2012 produced by Directorate of Health, Bangladesh. Population density data has been collected from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). To calculate remoteness we have used the average distance of a district from the capital. This data is collected from Local Government Engineering Department (LGED).

To remove the scale bias, we have used the HDI methodology adopted by UNDP. The formula for standardisation of variable is:

$$\frac{X_i - \text{Min}(X_i)}{\text{Max}(X_i) - \text{Min}(X_i)}$$

That is, the standardised value was obtained by dividing the difference between each observation and the minimum value by the range of the observations. This produces rankings of 64 districts, where the best performing district would receive a value of one and the worst performing district would receive zero. When we create any composite index, equal weights are used for all variables.

4.5.1 Limitations

Due to unavailability of data, the AGI model cannot be fully replicated in this study. Even though the variables reflect the governance performance, it excludes the important control variable which is the 'governance determinants'.

Looking at the single output variable in terms of OPD service, it disregards the other major activities of district hospitals including preventive health and family planning activities. This only provides a partial analysis of the hospital performance. Again, we feel that the governance analysis is also partial because we had to exclude other critical governance performance variables like the essential drug stocks and staff attendance due to unavailability of data.

The usual disclaimers for LHB that DGHS uses apply here. LHBs are being prepared under an experimental project. Due to lack of statistical knowledge and skills of concerned local staffs, some health bulletins may show incorrect information and data.


4.6 Findings

4.6.1 District rankings in terms of staff and equipment availability


Physician and nurse availability

In health resource allocations, positions are sanctioned centrally, and it is usually done based on hospital capacity (measured in terms of beds). However it is evident from the records that concentration of physicians is higher in urban and developed regions compared to their rural and underdeveloped counterparts. For example, Chaudhury and Hammer (2003) show that the vacancy rate is highly uneven among the districts and vacancy rates are much higher in the poorest part of Rajshahi and Khulna divisions. Their findings show that in the richer regions of Dhaka, Khulna and Chittagong divisions, average vacancy of all positions is much lower than that of the poorer regions of Sylhet, Rajshahi and Barisal, even though there are no substantial differences based on different levels of health facilities within the districts. When only physician's vacancy is considered it is 37 percent for the richer regions compared to 50 percent for the poorer.

Figure 4.1 Filled-up positions of physician*



* Light coloured bars represent divisional head quarters

Figure 4.2 Filled-up position of nurses*

* Faridpur: No data

* Light coloured bars represent divisional head quarters


Figure 4.1 depicts district-wise variations in terms of filled up positions of physicians. It shows that magnitude of difference in districts in terms of percentage of filled-up positions of physicians is very high. The pattern of difference is quite similar to WB (Chaudhury and Hammer 2003) findings, which reflect that there has been little improvement in regional physician vacancies from 2003 to 2011.

Largely, percentage of filled positions is highest in Dhaka and its nearby districts followed by the districts under the Chittagong division. Chittagong Hill Tracts are exceptions; three Hill Tracts districts – Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban – is positioned far below the national average (see Figure 4.1) and in terms of magnitude the difference is very high when compared to the divisional headquarter (roughly 0.84 vs. 0.28 in a scale of one). All the divisional headquarters are performing satisfactorily in terms of physician vacancies except for Rajshahi and Barisal, with scores of 0.43 and 0.46, respectively, which is below the national average of 0.5.

Looking at the districts that are lagging behind, the result is again similar to that of the WB (Chaudhury and Hammer 2003). All the districts of Barisal and Rangpur division (which was the part of former Rajshahi Division) except for the Rangpur district itself are positioned below the national average. Also, half of the districts of Rajshahi and Sylhet divisions stand below the national average. Habiganj and Sylhet districts are marginally above the national (0.50 vs. 0.50/51) average. Panchagarh, the most remote district (in terms of average distance in Kilometres from Dhaka) has the lowest percentage of physician positions filled. Among Dhaka, most districts have a higher rate of physician positions filled compared to the national average, where the exceptions are Faridpur, Gopalganj, Narsingdi and Netrokona. In Chittagong, all the districts except Cox's Bazar, Noakhali and three hill districts, stand above the national average.

Even though the average nurse availability in terms of filled up positions for nurses (See Figure 4.2) are low in district hospitals compared to that of physicians, the distribution is much better when district ranks are considered. It is rather better, as reflected, both in terms of higher national average (0.50 vs. 0.75) and in terms of number of districts that rank above the average. Chaudhury and Hammer (*ibid.*) reported that scope of private practice plays an important role in physician positioning, but the scope for private practices is generally low for nurses. This perhaps explains why there is less urban bias towards nurse position.

The graph of district rankings does not show any specific pattern even though all the divisional head quarters except Sylhet are positioned above the national average. Rajshahi and Rangpur divisions are performing better in terms of nurse positions filled in compared to physician positions, even though Barisal does not show any improvement. The Chittagong Hill Tracts region is also performing better in terms of nurse availability. In contrast, the overall ranking of Sylhet division actually decreases in terms of nurse positions filled-up, all four districts rank below the national average.

Figure 4.3: Equipment functionality at districts*

* Light coloured bars represent divisional head quarters

Equipment functionality

Equipment functionality is measured in terms of number of equipment functional out of total equipment available. The overall distribution suggests that the magnitude of difference between districts is not very pronounced. The national average stands at 0.6, meaning that on average 60 percent of hospital equipments are functioning properly whereas 40 percent are dysfunctional.

At first glance, the graph reveals an interesting finding that there is no obvious urban bias in terms of equipments functionality; instead some big cities as well as divisional headquarters have less functioning equipments, which is different from the input allocation pattern.

A closer look towards divisional performance however reveals that for Barisal, the condition is still very similar to that of physician and nurse positions filled. In terms of equipment functionality, it lies far below the national average. Only one district out of six districts in the Barisal division lies above the national average, whereas three districts among the rest lie in the bottom ten. Chittagong comes out as a surprise: in spite of being the regional headquarter, as a district it stands in the bottom ten. As a division, Chittagong shows mixed performance. Three of its districts are in the bottom ten but the rest are doing well; and the three hill districts are also performing much better compared to their previous positioning in terms of nurse and physicians. Khulna as a district lies below the national average, whereas 70 percent of the districts under the Khulna division lie above the national average. Rajshahi shows an interesting feature; Joypurhat ranked first in terms of functional equipments available, even though more than 60 percent of its districts are positioned below the average.

Even though big cities are doing well in terms of equipment functionality, remote districts are still doing poorly in maintaining the equipments. Bhola and most other districts of Barisal, and some districts of the Rajshahi and Rangpur division perform poorly. Again, the average district performance of districts under the Dhaka division is satisfactory except for Kishoreganj, Rajbari and Sherpur. Among four districts of the Sylhet division, the performance is mixed. Sylhet is in the top three of the total ranking followed by Moulvibazar, which is marginally below the top ten. Habiganj lies in the bottom ten and Sunamganj lies below the national average.

Table 4.3: District-wise ranking in terms of physicians and nurses positions filled-up and equipment functionality

Rank	Physician Rank	Nurse Rank	Equipment Rank
1	Manikganj, Narayanganj	Madaripur , Magura , Narail, Narayanganj, Tangail	Joypurhat
2	Dhaka	Rangpur	Khagrachari
3	Munshiganj	Bagerhat	Dhaka, Sylhet

Rank	Physician Rank	Nurse Rank	Equipment Rank
4	Gazipur	Dhaka, Joypurhat, Netrokona	Narail, Narayanganj
5	Mymensingh	Gazipur , Natore	Gaibandha, Noakhali
6	Comilla, Tangail	Satkhira	Gazipur, Jhenaidah
7	Natore	Jhalokati, Khagrachari, Kushtia	Faridpur, Mymensingh
8	Chittagong	Gopalganj, Meherpur, Munshiganj, Sirajganj	Jhalokati, Kushtia, Madaripur, Narsingdi
9	Madaripur, Rangpur	Khulna	Manikganj
10	Kushtia	Jessore, Pirojpur	Netrokona, Tangail
11	Kishoreganj	Bandarban, Chuadanga, Manikganj	Moulvibazar
12	Brahmanbaria	Rajshahi,	Shariatpur
13	Laksmipur, Sherpur	Chapai Nawabganj, Shariatpur	Magura, Meherpur, Pabna
14	Chuadanga	Jhenaidah	Laksmipur
15	Khulna, Feni	Chittagong	Natore, Rangamati
16	Narail	Dinajpur	Jamalpur
17	Chandpur	Mymensingh	Bandarban, Brahmanbaria
18	Sirajganj	Barisal	Chandpur, Kurigram, Nilphamari
19	Habiganj, Rajbari, Joypurhat	Thakurgaon	Almonirhat
20	Jamalpur, Sylhet	Bogra	Gopalganj, Rajshahi
21	Nilphamari	Rangamati	Munshiganj, Rangpur
22	Netrokona, Faridpur, Barisal	Chandpur	Jessore, Naogaon, Sirajganj
23	Shariatpur, Rajshahi	Kurigram	Chapai Nawabganj, Satkhira
24	Satkhira, Gopalganj	Bhola	Bagerhat, Rajbari
25	Moulvibazar	Pabna	Bogra, Sherpur, Sunamganj
26	Pirojpur	Brahmanbaria	Khulna

Rank	Physician Rank	Nurse Rank	Equipment Rank
27	Gaibandha, Narsingdi, Cox's Bazar	Barguna, Lalmonirhat, Sherpur	Thakurgaon
28	Thakurgaon	Jamalpur	Dinajpur
29	Jessore, Bogra	Gaibandha, Kishoreganj	Patuakhali
30	Rangamati, Bagerhat, Dinajpur	Feni	Chuadanga
31	Khagrachari	Patuakhali	Feni
32	Pabna	Comilla, Panchagarh	Panchagarh, Pirojpur
33	Kurigram	Nilphamari	Comilla
34	Jhalokati, Magura	Noakhali	Barguna, Cox's Bazar
35	Chapai Nawabganj	Moulvibazar	Barisal, Chittagong
36	Sunamganj	Sylhet	Habiganj
37	Lalmonirhat	Laksmipur	Kishoreganj
38	Naogaon	Narsingdi	Bhola
39	Bandarban, Patuakhali	Habiganj	
40	Meherpur	Naogaon	
41	Barguna, Noakhali	Cox's Bazar	
42	Bhola, Jhenaidah	Sunamganj	
43	Panchagarh	Rajbari	

When the district performance of physician and nurse positions filled-up along with equipment functionality are considered, we find that Panchagarh, Patuakhali and Bhola are always the laggard performers in every aspect. Panchagarh is the remotest region, and Bhola and Patuakhali both lie in the coastal zone, which are difficult to access. Among the big cities, in spite of having better allocations in terms of physicians and nurses, cities like Comilla and Chittagong are lagging much behind in terms of equipment functionality. This questions the state of governance of these hospitals. Narayanganj, Gazipur, Manikganj and Dhaka are always among the top ten districts among all the 64 districts in terms of resource allocation and maintenance.

4.6.2 Hospital governance and service delivery

Figure 4.4: Equipment functionality and its influence on OPD




Figure 4.5: Physicians filled-up position and OPD rank




Figure 4.6: Nurse filled-up position and OPD rank





Figure 4.7: Composite performance indicator and OPD rank



In this section, we test the hypothesis that better hospital governance will ensure better output. Here, as stated already, we do not have data on any other governance performance measure. We use equipment functionality as a single variable of governance performance. Our assumption is very simple to state that if district hospitals are better governed, they will have better maintenance of equipments which can in turn ensure better service delivery. So we would expect a positive relationship of equipment functionality and number of OPD patient served.

Figure 4.4 shows the correlation in terms of scatter plots. Along with this, we also report a regression line separately.

The graph shows that the relationship between OPD service delivery and equipments functionality is positive and significant, which shows that with better equipment functionality, more OPD patients can be served. However, this is not same throughout the districts; there are districts like Bhola, Barisal, Patuakhali and Dinajpur, which has lower OPD service delivery accompanied by lower equipment functionality. In contrast to that with average functional equipments, districts like Satkhira, Munshiganj and Chuadanga lie much above the regression line. Again, there are districts like Khagrachari, Sylhet, Narail and Gaibandha who are standing much below the regression line despite ranking better in equipment functionality. The regression line is not very steep which again reinforces the fact that this model only presents a partial picture of governance performance; there are many important variables which should be taken care of to see if local governance actually shows any positive influence on service delivery.

The second variable we use in this analysis is the physician positions filled-up. Figure 4.5 reports the correlation of OPD service and physician positions filled, along with a fitted line. We can see that OPD service is positively and significantly related with physician positions filled, and the line is also steep. Munshiganj, Narayanganj, Gazipur and Dhaka are doing well in attending OPD patients with more physician positions filled in. However, Satkhira with medium physician availability has a high performance of OPD patient delivery. Jhenaidah, Meherpur, Kurigram and Thakurgaon are anomalies with very low physician availability but maintain a decent rank in OPD services. Again there are districts that have lower physician positions filled in like Patuakhali, Bandarban, Noakhali, Bhola, which lie much below the regression line, whereas few districts such as Comilla, Natore and Tangail, in spite of having better physician availability, lie below the regression line.

When we look at the plots based on nurse positions filled in with OPD service, it also shows a positive relation. However, the line is flatter showing that nurse positions filled-up has relatively less importance in OPD service. Districts with very low nurse availability do not lie above the regression line, but there are districts like Sirajganj, Bandarban, Khagrachari and Tangail that lie much below the regression line with high nurses sanctioned.

The last plot shows the composite index of district health performance in terms of input availability and functionality. The plot shows that OPD service is positively and significantly correlated with the composite indicators of input allocation and governance. This implies that for having the local health unit functional, it is important to ensure the proper resource allocation along with proper supervision of them. The plot shows that districts which are well equipped with manpower and better equipments are usually top performers in OPD; districts in Dhaka division along with Joypurhat and Satkhira belong to that group. Satkhira is the best performing district in terms of OPD patient delivery; while in terms of input, it is ranked 0.6 out of 1. When both these variables are considered there is no such district which can maintain a very high rank in OPD with a very low rank in composite index.

Table 4.4: Ranking of top and bottom ten OPD performing districts

High performers in terms of OPD	Score	Ranking	Ranking in terms of input	Ranking in terms of equipment functionality
Satkhira	1.00	Highest	Medium	medium/high
Munshiganj	0.89	High	High	Medium
Joypurhat	0.80	High	High	Highest
Manikganj	0.74	Medium	High/Medium	High
Chuadanga	0.69	Medium	Medium	Low
Narayanganj	0.69	Medium	Highest	Highest
Gazipur	0.66	Medium	High	Highest
Jhenaidah	0.66	Medium	low	Highest
Naogaon	0.64	Medium	low	Medium
Habiganj	0.57	Medium	low	Low
Low performers in terms of OPD	Score	Ranking	Ranking in terms of Input	Ranking in terms of equipment functionality
Dinajpur	0.00	Lowest	low	Medium
Bandarban	0.00	Lowest	Medium	Medium

Low performers in terms of OPD	Score	Ranking	Ranking in terms of Input	Ranking in terms of equipment functionality
Chapai Nawabganj	0.01	Low	Medium	Medium
Khulna	0.02	Low	High/Medium	Medium
Rangamati	0.03	Low	Medium	Medium
Sunamganj	0.03	Low	Low	Low
Patuakhali	0.05	Low	Low	Low
Noakhali	0.10	Low	High	High
Khagrachari	0.11	low	High	High
Bhola	0.12	low	lowest	Lowest
Moulvibazar	0.15	low	Medium	Medium

Table 4.4 lists the top and bottom ten districts in terms of OPD output, and along with this it also presents their comparative ranking in terms of manpower allocation and equipment functionality.

It shows that in terms of output, the high performing districts belong mostly to Dhaka, Khulna and Rajshahi division. When top ten districts are considered in terms of both input and output, it is obvious to note that the most resourceful districts in terms of allocation belong to the Dhaka division; 60 percent of top performers are located in Dhaka. When it comes to output, with average or medium resource allocation, districts of Khulna division are performing well; Satkhira followed by Chuadanga and Jhenaidah are among the top ten performers in OPD service delivery. Joypurhat is also performing well with highest equipment functionality and high manpower allocation.

The table shows that districts in top ten generally have good resource allocation and/or better functioning of input, Joypurhat is doing well with better equipments and manpower. Satkhira is of course an exception which with medium allocation of input is maintaining a top rank in output. Habiganj, with very low input and equipment functionality is also at top ten, but this does not imply that in absolute terms it is doing very well. As seen in the district score, the score is far below the score of the 9th district, which actually implies a moderate performance.

In contrast, when the laggard districts are considered, few districts show clear association with input and equipments. Patuakhali, Bhola and Sunamganj are clearly lagging behind due to low

allocation of manpower and equipments. Compared to that, Rangamati and Khagrachari are also in the bottom ten with better resources but this might happen because of the low population density. Khulna and Noakhali are seriously underperforming being the big districts with high population density and better resource allocation. Low demand can be a reason. As Khulna has a medical college hospital, this might affect the daily patient coming to the district hospital. For Noakhali, with high income and remittance, there might be a bias towards the private health services.

4.6.3 External factors and their impact

Throughout the analysis, we have seen that resource allocation is biased towards divisional headquarters and districts closer to Dhaka; therefore we created a variable of remoteness to see if this really affects the allocation. Remoteness is constructed by calculating the average distance (/kilometre) of the district from Dhaka. We had the data at *upazila* level, from that the district averages were calculated. Along with this we also used population density to show if this also affects variables we constructed.

The findings are summarised in the following table. It shows that the correlation between physician and nurse positions filled-up is negatively and significantly correlated with distance; the more remote the district is the fewer positions are filled, on average. Again distance is negatively related with OPD patient services; the more remote the district is, the fewer the number of patients in OPD. This is partially caused by the low availability of physicians and nurses, but this also happens because the population density in those remote districts is low compared to other districts. We see that density is negatively and significantly correlated with distance. It also shows that positions filled-up are higher in more densely populated areas.

Table 4.5: Correlation matrix of the considered variables

	Density	Remoteness / distance	Composite position filled in	OPD rank	Equipment rank
Density	1				
Remoteness/distance	-.405**	1.000			
Composite position filled in	.295*	-.416**	1.000		
OPD rank	.270*	-.263*	.283*	1.000	
Equipment rank	.076	-.229	.831**	.179	1.000

** correlations are significant at 0.01 level

* correlations are significant at 0.05 level

When it comes to equipments, we find no significant correlation between distance and density. However, it shows that it is positively correlated with manpower availability. So in districts where filled in positions are higher, they actually have better functional equipments.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyse the health governance following the AGI framework which assesses the governance in health system to compare the performance of district hospitals across the 64 districts of Bangladesh. Given that the health policy of 2011 states its objective is to directly ensure the presence of full-time doctors, nurses and other officers / staff and to provide and maintain necessary equipment available, we analysed the state of the districts in terms of these three variables. This might provide a benchmark to design effective policy at district level in terms of these two variables.

This chapter started from an argument that a hospital can function better if the inputs, both in terms of manpower and equipment, are available and functioning. Our district level indicators shows that filled-in positions for physicians and nurses along with functionality of equipments can improve patient service when measured in terms of number of patients served. Again the chapter finds that there are other external factors like remoteness of a district along with population density can significantly affect the input allocation. Our findings suggest that there is a high degree of urban bias in allocation of physicians; physicians are more available in more urban regions, namely in Dhaka and its nearby districts. Our findings suggest that nurse's positions are allocated more evenly and there is no obvious urban bias. This might be because the scope of private practices is generally low for nurses. But for equipment, we find that in bigger cities and more urban areas equipments are more functional.

From this analysis, this is verified that functional equipments and manpower allocation in hospitals can improve the service delivery. But this again provides a partial picture and needs to be analysed in a more in-depth manner to establish the connection with governance and hospital performance.

Our research suggests that in terms of sanctioned positions for both nurses and physicians, filled-in positions are still very low. On average half of the posts are vacant and there are pronounced regional variations. We propose to seriously upgrade the resources towards manpower and equipment, including management in the remote districts, especially in Patuakhali, Bhola, Sunamganj and Panchagarh. Again in some areas, resources are not translated into output, which presumably calls for better management of resources.

We suggest that this analysis should be done in a rigorous manner, by taking care of all important aspects including the staff attendance, drug stock in hospital and so on. This chapter used the

supply side data to look at the performance. By adding the demand side views of these issues (quality of services, staff attendance), this would add further value to the analysis.

One important constraint we faced throughout the research is that in Bangladesh there is no central database or any effort to keep records systematically. Local Health Bulletin reflects a recent effort from the Health Directorate, but it is yet to develop fully. We argue that it is crucial to collect and stack information in an accessible manner as it would enable a more complete research strategy for this sector, which in turn can provide direction for better policy intervention.

5

Concentration of Political Power: Empirical Insights from Bangladesh

5.1 Introduction

Among the most appealing features of democratic societies is its capacity to disperse power widely across society and prevent the rise of despotism and tyranny. Importantly, democratic societies aim to retain ultimate authority with voting citizens while elected representatives speak and legislate on their behalf. Yet, most modern democracies digress from the idealized form of democratic governance (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Dal Bo *et al* 2009). Indeed, under democratic regimes power can display significant concentration across regions and actors. Focusing on the distribution of political power is crucial since social policy and *de facto* state expenditure in a given society often reflects the preferences of groups with greater political power (Acemoglu *et al* 2008; Ferraz and Finan 2010).

Against this backdrop, we aim to understand the extent ‘power’¹ varies across the political space of Bangladesh. We are also concerned with the extent to which ‘concentration of political power’ shapes resource allocation across the regions of Bangladesh. This is an important inquiry and will indicate whether the allocation of public resources reflects a ‘needs based approach’ or whether bias of special interest groups takes precedence².

Person and Tabellini (2000) as well as Dewan and Shepsle (2008a, 2008b) highlight three key conflicts of interests within modern democracies³:

1. By this, we mean the authority over the executive in shaping the distribution of economic resources.
2. In some sense, if a ‘needs based approach’ or concerns of productive or allocative efficiency do not determine resource allocation, then the nature governance prevailing within such power structure is questionable.
3. For a thorough understanding of the noted issues, please review Person and Tabellini (2000). Additionally, also review Dewan and Shepsle (2008a; 2008b).

- I. Between politicians and voters over the level of political rents.
- II. Amongst politicians over the division of rents
- III. Amongst voters over spending priorities.

More specifically, the conflict that emerges between politicians over the division of rent is ultimately shaped by the nature of the position a politician holds within their polity. In this context, it is important to mention that the political culture in Bangladesh has indeed been shaped, sometimes jolted, by the creation and distribution such rents. Patron-clientelism⁴, in particular, plays an important role in political recruiting and network parenting (IGS 2006). In many third-world countries, governments create strong clientelistic networks that provide privileged access in exchange for rent. Thus, discretionary power over the distribution of public resources to key regional pockets of choice is an instrumental tool for maintaining a strong client base⁵.

Consequently, the present analysis aims to quantify the degree to which regions are marked by 'concentration of political power' with the help of a 'Concentration of Political Power -CPP' indicator. The study employs a novel technique to map the political concentration of power across the different administrative regions of Bangladesh. We undertake numerous descriptive analyses; we measure the correlation coefficients between the development expenditure and the concentration of political power across various districts of Bangladesh. In this way, we hope to better understand how networks of power affect the distribution of public goods and services in 64 districts of Bangladesh.

In the following section, we consider the literature on causes and consequences of political inequality. Section 5.3 discusses the source of our data and the methodology that we have employed to quantify the variation in concentration of political power across 64 districts of Bangladesh. Section 5.4 explains the undertaken analysis and provides interpretation of the results. The final section offers concluding remarks and discusses possible avenues for relevant future research.

5.2 Related literature and political background

5.2.1 Related literature

Several studies have shown how economic inequality has adverse consequences for long-term economic development (Galor and Zeira 1993; Alesina and Rodrik 1994). For example, Engerman

4. Huntington and Nelson (1976: 55) noted that "in traditional societies, patron-client relations provide a means for the vertical mobilization of lower-status individuals by established elites...The introduction of competitive elections gives the client one additional resource—the vote—which he can use to repay his patron for other benefits. "Patron-clientelism explains various ways through which clients can be created in politics: the abuse of power or office, awarding privileges in return for political support, privileging elites whose views are taken more seriously, appointment of friends to positions of power, and favouring relatives or friends regardless of their merit.
5. In countries with limited resources, governments have to make a choice concerning how to distribute critical infrastructure resources. Many governments discretionarily favour certain regions or areas with critical infrastructure funding to benefit their loyal.

and Sokoloff (1997) showed how Latin America diverged from North America because it suffered from chronic inequality of economic resources. Within United States, a similar argument suggests that the US south grew slower than the north because of the prevalence of higher inequality. Multiple causal relationships appear to link these two phenomena. Some have argued that regions that exhibit greater inequality of economic wealth experience low long-term labour productivity due to powerful elites with incentives to undermine investments in human capital while promoting, instead, institutions to protect their own agricultural interest (Galor et al 2006; Ager 2012)⁶. Others have argued that economic inequality may destabilise peace and fuel political instability, which can in turn jeopardise investment decisions (Alesina and Perotti 1996).

Yet, a key limitation of this literature is that it fails to 'disentangle' the implications of political inequality from the effects of economic inequality.

In contrast, contemporary research on the source of long-term economic development has taken a key interest in the role of political inequality (or concentration of political power) in shaping economic outcomes. The theoretical frameworks examined in such work highlights how the concentration of political power influences economic trajectories of societies by determining the nature of institutions (formal and informal). More precisely, political space which exhibits acute concentration of political power exhibits the creation of extractive institutions.

On the other hand, societies where political power is more equally distributed are more likely to support the formation of inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Furthermore, these institutions ultimately determine whether sufficient incentives are available within the society to spur innovation and value addition, which ultimately shapes long-run fortunes of nations.

A particular strand of the literature on the concentration of political power is concerned with causes and consequences of political dynasties. Political dynasties may be considered as imperfections in modern democracies as they reflect inequality in the distribution of political power (Dal Bo et al 2009; Rahman 2013). A new stream of studies explore why such inheritance of political power is possible within democratic landscapes. For example, Dal Bo et al (2009) in their examination of political dynasties in U.S Congress show that political power is self-perpetuating in nature. By comparing outcomes of close elections the study shows that holding power longer increases the likelihood that one's heirs attain political office in the future in spite of their individual or family characteristics. Likewise, Querubin (2010) empirically examines the evolution of political dynasties in the Congress of Philippines and identifies that non-dynastic candidates who win their first election by narrow margins are four times more likely to have a posterior relative in office compared to those who lost their first election by a thin margin and never served. Additionally, evidence from the 1983 Congress of Argentina suggests that legislators with longer tenure in office have a higher likelihood of having posterior relatives in office (Rossi 2010). In sum, the new stream of evidence clearly shows that a leader's time in power have persistent effects by facilitating posterior dynastic succession.

6. For example, it is noted that in the US south, counties with considerably rich planter elites witnessed a slow drop in illiteracy in the post-Civil War era in comparison to counties with less affluent planter elites. Moreover, richer pre-Civil War planter elite were less likely to build so-called Rosenwald Schools for black children (Ager 2012).

In contrast, across both cross-country and sub-national data sets, Rahman (2013) identifies that small elements of luck associated with successful assassination of political leaders can significantly shape the likelihood of dynasty formation. In particular, Rahman showed that political assassinations can facilitate *de facto* inheritance of political power, and that such transmission of political power is not always a function of qualification (leadership quality, ability or merit).

Considering the socio-economic consequences of such types of concentration of political power, Asaka *et al* (2010) studied the role of dynastic identity in influencing the behaviour of dynastic legislators in Japan's Diet between 1997 and 2007. They found that fiscal transfers initiated by dynastic politicians do not necessarily result in higher economic performance. Similarly, Rahman (2013) finds that dynastic identity can make legislators less benign, and on a cross-country level, the prevalence of dynasty politics is associated with higher levels of corruption. A slightly different work, which examines the effects of concentration of political power in 19th century Colombia, highlights how political inequality is associated with adverse long-term development outcomes (Acemoglu *et al* 2008). For example, polities with substantial political inequalities, those with whom political power reside may block the introduction of new technologies or under invest in public goods because of the fear that this will erode their political power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006). In the case of Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2009) find that municipalities where political power has been historically concentrated have lower levels of current development.

Consequently, we aim to contribute to this literature by examining how concentration of political power reflected in excessive ministerial portfolios in certain regions of Bangladesh shape the distribution of development expenditure. In particular, the study evaluates whether or not resource distribution is an artefact of power concentration or other structural characteristics.

5.2.2 Political background

There is no conclusive evidence, which accurately explains why some societies suffer from deep-rooted inequalities in the distribution of political power. However, there is a broad consensus that historical factors might have played an instrumental role in shaping the concentration of political power in some nations (Fukuyama 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Within the Bangladeshi context, such narratives appear largely correct; given historical events have shaped the nature of the concentration of political power that prevails within its political arena. A growing body of evidence shows that a core factor associated with the present state of inequality in the distribution of political power is the lack of intra-party democracy (IGS 2008).

Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), who held political office together for the past three decades, are widely known for their dictatorial-type intra-party rule. Here, it is worth exploring how leadership successions have occurred in both these parties after their respective inception. First, both AL and BNP did not witness a single change in leadership for the last three decades. What is more insightful is that the top position of the party – President or Chairperson – has never been contested in either AL or BNP after Sheikh Hasina Wajed and Begum Khaleda Zia assumed their respective party positions in the early 1980s. Second, both these leaders

emerged after the assassinations of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Lt. General Ziaur Rahman, and qualitative and quantitative examinations confirm that these parties engineered a *de facto* inheritance of political power (Ritcher 1990; Thompson 2002; Rahman 2013). Collectively, these factors have hindered intra-party democracy as norms and precedents of democratic leadership succession have failed to develop over the last four decades.

These un-democratic norms have been securely institutionalised in laws that govern political parties in Bangladesh. Article 70 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh ensures that Members of Parliament who vote against their party automatically loses their seats in parliament. Thus, it can be said that Article 70 'solidifies' the control of the parliament by the government and the Prime Minister. In essence, the law ensures that Prime Minister can advocate and enact laws without much deliberation. In this way, parliamentary power is largely conceded to the executive. Furthermore, politicisation of the bureaucracy and judiciary over the last two decades has meant that the institutions of accountability are fraught with political bias. This also ensures that opposition parties are subject to limited political rights (IGS 2008).

On the whole, various historical and institutional factors have facilitated the emergence of a polity not characterised by a deep rooted concentration of political power. This study aims to pinpoint some of the broad dimensions of these power structures and how they influence government effectiveness in public service provision.

5.3 Data and methodology

5.3.1 Source of data

In terms of administrative structure, Bangladesh is a unitary parliamentary republic consisting of three hundred parliamentary seats. Parliamentarians represent constituents located in six administrative divisions⁷, which in turn are subdivided in sixty-four districts.⁸ In practice, each district constitutes one or more seats, and each division has more than one district. The unicameral parliament is known as the *Jatiyo Sangsad*.

The data on development expenditure for the fiscal year 2011-12 has been assembled from the official accounts of the District Accounts Officer (DAO) offices and Upazila Accounts Officer (UAO) offices, which are supervised by the Office of the Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh. Due to the distinct method of maintaining records, both offices keep the accounts of *Sadar* (named after the district head in the DAO list) and the remaining *upazilas* (named after the *upazila* head in the UAO list) of a particular district separately. We aggregated the data of *Sadars* and other *upazilas* and gave the final count of the development expenditure that an individual district spent in a given year. An exception was made in the case of Dhaka that, unlike other *Sadar upazilas*, is a unit which is not exhibited in the DAO count. The expenditure of Dhaka has been merged with the counts of different ministerial and

7. Only recently, it has been increased to seven Divisions by splitting the Rajshahi division into Rajshahi division and Rangpur division.

8. For more information, see: http://www.discoverybangladesh.com/meetbangladesh/the_admin.html

other heads maintained by the Chief Accounts Officer (CAO) office. Although the *upazilas* under Dhaka district have been listed by the UAO offices, for the sake of maintaining uniformity in calculation, we have deliberately excluded Dhaka district from the expenditure count.

On the other hand, the data on development expenditure for fiscal year 2006-07 is taken from Barua *et al* (2011). Worth noting here is that data on development expenditure for 2006-07 and 2011-12 are taken from different sources. This makes their comparison more complex as District Accounts Officer (DAO) and Upazila Accounts Officer (UAO) generally exclude development expenditure on large scale for inter- district projects. Nonetheless, given that the study examines data on development expenditure across districts from two political regimes (BNP between 2001-2006 and AL between 2008-12), the analysis accounts for a) the extent to which concentration of power is consistent across both political regimes and b) whether the relationship between the variables of interest is regime sensitive⁹.

Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 ranks the districts according to development expenditure they received in FY12 and FY06¹⁰. As can be seen in the case of the current political regime, development expenditure per capita for FY12 was highest in Gopalganj district. This may indicate that the home-district of the current Prime Minister was privileged with preferential treatment (in terms of resource allocation). Likewise, in Figure 5.2, the prominence of Sylhet receiving the highest development expenditure in FY06 may reflect the role of late former Finance Minister Saifur Rahman in BNP-Led Four Party's regime, who hails from the district.

Our study also benefits from a new data-set that is compiled on all elected legislators in the 8th and 9th Parliament of Bangladesh. Information on individual MPs for the 8th Parliament is collected from *Documentary on the Parliament* by Rashid and Feroz (2002). For the background characteristics of MPs, we used Member Directory on the 9th Parliament produced by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)¹¹. These sources include data on whether the documented MPs entertained ministerial portfolio during their respective tenures¹².

Accordingly, from Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, it can be seen that during both political regimes, more than thirty districts did not receive a portfolio allocation¹³. In addition, Table 5.1 shows districts which entertained MPs who found cabinet position in both regimes. It also includes the list of districts with no ministers in both tenures. As it can be seen, there are twenty-two districts in both such categories. In the next section, we discuss the methodology that quantifies the variation in concentration of political power across the political space of Bangladesh.

9. Even if we detect a strong relationship between concentration of political power and development expenditure allocation between both regimes, it is still not possible to infer that concentration of ministerial portfolios is shaping resource allocation. This is because, it possible that both regimes have allocated ministerial portfolios to fixed set of districts where they perceive a greater need for development expenditure due to the economic characteristics of such region.
10. For development expenditure data in 2006, the data is up to March. The rankings exclude Bandarban, Khagrachari, and Rangamati districts.
11. For more information, see <http://www.ndi.org/>; The Member Directory project on the 9th National Parliament of Bangladesh was partially funded by USAID.
12. To track ministerial changes within the tenure of a specific government, we reviewed multiple newspapers, so that we can monitor the number of ministers districts entertained at a point in time.
13. However, during the present government a slightly larger fraction of districts entertained ministerial portfolios.

Figure 5.1: District ranking: per capita development expenditure 2011-12

Figure 5.2: District ranking: per capita development expenditure 2005-06






Figure 5.3: Variation in ministries 2001-06



Source: Author's Calculations

Figure 5.4: Variation in ministries 2012



Source: Author's Calculations

Table 5.1: District with ministries and no ministries in both regime

Districts with minister in both regimes	Districts with no minister in both regimes
Brahmanbaria	Bagerhat
Chandpur	Bandarban
Chittagong	Barguna
Comilla	Chapai Nawabganj
Dhaka	Chuadanga
Dinajpur	Feni
Faridpur	Gaibandha
Jamalpur	Joypurhat
Jessore	Khagrachari
Kishoreganj	Kurigram
Lalmonirhat	Magura
Mymensingh	Manikganj
Narsingdi	Meherpur
Natore	Moulvibazar
Noakhali	Narail
Pabna	Nilphamari
Patuakhali	Panchagarh
Rajshahi	Pirojpur
Rangamati	Rajbari
Sirajganj	Shariatpur
Sylhet	
Tangail	
Thakurgaon	

Source: Author's Compilation

5.3.2 Measuring the concentration of political power

To measure concentration of political power across all districts of Bangladesh, we calculated the density of portfolio allocation for all districts in Bangladesh. To be precise, we use the following methodology to quantify the variation in the degree of concentration of political power across the 64 districts with the help of a CPP Index:

$$\text{Concentration of Political Power}_i = \frac{\sum \text{Number of Ministers in District}_i}{\sum \text{Number of MPs in District}_i}$$

Using this formula, each district received a score between one and zero. A score of one signifies absolute concentration of political power and a score of zero reflects low political leverage of a district in the cabinet of the government¹⁴. Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 ranks the districts according to their respective CPP scores in both political regimes between 2001-06 and 2009-12. As can be seen, for both immediate past regimes, Rangamati District received a CPP score of one indicating the fact that the sole MP from the Rangamati District¹⁵ found a position in the cabinet in both governments.

In terms of the relative positions of districts, political power is extremely concentrated in Rangamati and Gopalganj districts under the current regime. In the previous regime, this phenomenon was present in Rangamati and Munshiganj districts. Furthermore, if we compare Figure 5.5 with Figure 5.6, it is clear that the fortunes of some districts are regime sensitive. For example, due to its pro-AL electoral tilt, districts such as Gopalganj, Madaripur and Habiganj exhibits higher political leverage through ministerial or standing committee chairperson appointment during an AL regime compared to BNP tenure. In contrast, due to its pro-BNP tilt, districts such as Laksmipur, has had greater political pull during a BNP government. In addition, Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 reveal that a greater number of districts have access to power under the current government compared to the BNP-led Four Party tenure that governed between 2001 and 2006. This is probably because, under the current government, the institution of Standing Committee in Parliament has become a much more established institution compared to previous years¹⁶.

Worth noting here is that districts with similar CPP scores do not necessarily indicate that their political leverage is of equal effect. For example, in 2006 thirteen districts (including Sylhet) received a score of 0.2. Yet, compared to other districts, Sylhet enjoyed the portfolio of Ministry of Finance and Planning due to the presence of late Finance minister¹⁷ who hailed from that district and was a very influential political figure within the BNP. Hence, it is likely that the leverage of Sylhet in political decision-making outweighed the influence of other districts with similar CPP scores. A similar rationale may also apply to districts with key development ministries¹⁸. Keeping such caveats in mind, the following section reports specifically on how the concentration of power within the districts affects the allocation of central funds for district expenditure.

14. For computing this measure for the government between 2009 and 2012, we also included Standing Committee Chairman of each Ministry in the equation as the institution found sufficient policy leverage under the mentioned regime. Thus for the 9th parliament, we use the following computational methodology:

$$\text{Concentration of Political Power} = \frac{\sum \text{Number of Ministers or standing committee chairman in district}}{\sum \text{Number of MPs in District}}$$

15. Noted is that the political and development dynamics of Rangamati District, Bandarban District and Khagrachari District are unique as the noted districts suffered a two decade long civil/guerrilla conflict amounting to pseudo-session activities. Consequently, security concerns mostly dominate development agendas of such regions (UNDP 2005), and so our analysis checks the sensitivity of the inference both with and without these regions.

16. In fact, most veteran AL leaders, who were not included in the current Cabinet, were made Chairperson of different Standing Committees.

17. For more information, please see <http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2009/09/06/78271.html>

18. Such as Ministry of Education, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, etc.

Figure 5.5: District ranking: concentration of political power 2012





Figure 5.6: District Ranking concentration of political power 2006

5.4 Analysis and caveats*

An important aim of this study is to examine whether newly available data can shed light on the question of how concentration of political power across the Bangladeshi polity affects outcomes in district level public expenditure. To this end, we compared the differences in the mean development expenditure per capita in 2012, for districts with a) at least one MP who is minister or standing committee chair and b) districts with no such MP. Row 1 of Table 5.2a displays this comparison for all districts¹⁹.

The data shows that while districts with Ministers or standing committee chairs receive more development expenditure per capita, this difference for 2012 is not statistically significant (at the 10% confidence level). In contrast, if we compare the differences in the mean development expenditure per capita 2006 for districts with at least one MP who is minister and districts with no such MP, then it is evident that the difference is significant at 10%. To pinpoint the critical districts underlying these results, it is important to see Figure 5.3a and Figure 5.3b. Here, Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari district were among the top five recipients of development expenditure per capita in both 2012 and 2006²⁰. To address the possibility that the results are spuriously affected by the presence of these three districts, in Row 2 of Table 5.2a and Table 5.2b, we compare the mean development expenditure for districts with at least one minister and no ministers by excluding these three regions.

The results now highlight a stark difference in resource allocation between the regions²¹. To understand the political dynamics underlying this result, it is important to examine Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b. Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b shows that there is a strong positive association between concentration of political power and development expenditure per capita for 2006 and 2012, when the three outlier districts are removed from the analysis. In fact, for 2006, the critical districts were Sylhet and Munshiganj, which entertained powerful portfolio's during BNP-led Four Party alliance's tenure. During the present political regime, the obvious driver of the correlation is Gopalganj district, which received an extreme score for one of the aforementioned reasons.²² In Row 3 of both Table 5.2a and Table 5.2b, we reanalysed the data after excluding the districts with the division headquarters. This results in the loss of six district observations. The idea here is to minimize the possibility that these headquarters which receive both portfolio allocation and large development expenditure due to other structural considerations. Nonetheless, as can be seen, the results remain very similar as difference in resource allocation between the regions with and without a minister are statistically significant.

In Row 4 and Row 5 of Table 5.2a and Table 5.2b, we excluded districts by using the natural geographical boundaries within Bangladesh. By the route of two major Asian rivers, the Ganges

* Detailed analyses of statistical regressions are presented in the Annex-2.

19. For examining development expenditure of 2012, we leave out Dhaka district from all estimation since development expenditure for this district was not available.

20. For more details, please see Annex 2.

21. The results are, in fact, significant at the 5% confidence level.

22. It also received the third highest development expenditure per capita, highlighting the possibility.

and the Brahmaputra (known as Jamuna and Padma in Bangladesh), the country is in effect sliced into three separate pieces of land. The natural borders defined by these two rivers bisect the land mass into two regions with land access to Dhaka and Chittagong metropolitan areas. The rest of the country is less integrated due to the geographic boundaries. These remaining regions are also characterised by depressed local economies due to their geographic locations (Shilpi 2008)²³. The estimations in Row 4 include regions which may be considered economically backward, controlling for heterogeneity across the districts of Bangladesh.

Our results suggest that the differences in resource allocation within such boundaries and with and without a minister are significant in both 2006 and 2012. This outcome suggests that even within regions with high incidences of poverty, concentration of political power may still shape resource distribution. What is surprising, however, is that these differences are not significant once we consider only districts east of the region. This may indicate that regions within the western belt of Bangladesh, characterized by greater economic backwardness, face a sort of 'double jeopardy' situation, as they suffer from both political and geographic considerations.

In Row 6 and Row 7 of Table 5.2a and Table 5.2b, we employ an alternative restriction by excluding border and non-border districts, respectively. For the mean development expenditure in 2006, the differences are significant when the sample only includes border districts. Lastly, in Table 5.3, we evaluate the possibility that a subset of districts receive ministerial allocation based on their economic hardship and subsequent need for additional resources.

If this is so, then the presence of such districts will undermine our capacity to differentiate if resource distribution is a function of concentration of power or underlying economic features. Hence, in Table 5.3, we restrict the sample by excluding districts that received ministerial allocation in both regimes. The rationale here is that if the economic features of a given district shape ministerial allocation, then such dynamics ought to be consistent across both political regimes. Thus, by excluding districts with ministers in both regimes, we partially address the concern that such regions are politically empowered for due to socio-economic deprivation. However, our findings suggest that differences in mean development expenditure for 2006 is not significantly related to the presence of absence of ministerial portfolio.

On the whole, the comparisons displayed in Table 5.2a, Table 5.2b and Table 5.3 provide sufficient evidence to motivate more in-depth studies on the relationship between concentration of political power and resource distribution. Indeed, we argue that there is enough anecdotal evidence for us to be concerned that concentration of political power plays an instrumental role in shaping resource allocation at the district level²⁴.

23. In 2005, for example, the incident of poverty (according to head count ratio) in the Rajshahi division—the northern region of Bangladesh—was 51.2%, contrary to the Dhaka, Sylhet and Chittagong division's moderate score of around 35%. For more information, please see Household Income Expenditure Survey 2005, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS).

24. This is also in line with the recent evidence from Japan, where it is noted that concentration of political power in the form of dynastic legislators are associated with greater development expenditure (Asaka *et al* 2010).

Table 5.2a: Differences in development expenditure per capita 2012 across districts with ministers (or Standing Committee Chair) and no ministers

	No Minister 1	At least One Minister 2	Difference 3	Pr(T < t) 4	Sample Restriction 5
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.59 (0.106)	0.618 (0.067)	(-)0.029 (0.126)	0.41	All Districts
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.463 (0.046)	0.576 (0.039)	(-)0.113 (0.069)	0.05**	Bandarban, Rangamati Khagrachari excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.449 (0.046)	0.568 (0.042)	(-)0.119 (0.074)	0.05**	Divisional Headquarters excluded & Ban., Rang., Khag. excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.52 (0.056)	0.65 (0.059)	(-)0.13 (0.098)	0.09*	Districts East of River Excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.697 (0.264)	0.605 (0.139)	0.091 (0.279)	0.62	Districts West of River Excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.56 (0.102)	0.634 (0.063)	(-)0.074 (0.139)	0.29	Border Districts Excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.56 (0.102)	0.635 (0.063)	(-)0.074 (0.139)	0.29	Non Border Districts Excluded

(*), (**) & (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; Dhaka is excluded from all analysis

Table 5.2b: Differences in development expenditure per capita 2006 across regions with ministers and no ministers

	No Minister 1	At least One Minister 2	Difference 3	Pr(T < t) 4	Sample Restrictions 5
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	1.52 (0.135)	1.95 (0.275)	(-)0.422 (0.312)	0.09*	All Districts
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	1.37 (0.081)	1.69 (0.122)	(-)0.326 (0.149)	0.02**	Bandarban, Rangamati Khagrachari excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	1.36 (0.082)	1.59 (0.123)	(-)0.239 (0.147)	0.05**	Divisional Headquarters excluded & Ban. , Rang., Khag. excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	1.28 (0.083)	1.58 (0.162)	(-)0.303 (0.167)	0.04**	Districts East of River Excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	2.13 (0.355)	2.25 (0.479)	(-)0.122 (0.728)	0.4	Districts West of River Excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	1.45 (0.122)	1.78 (0.146)	(-)0.34 (-.198)	0.05**	Border Districts Excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	1.59 (0.227)	2.14 (0.586)	(-)0.555 (0.6)	0.18	Non Border Districts Excluded

(*), (**) & (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively

Table 5.3: Differences in development expenditure per capita across districts with ministers (or Standing Committee Chair) and no ministers

	No Minister 1	At least One Minister 2	Difference 3	Pr(T < t) 4	Sample Restriction 5
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2012	0.589 (0.106)	0.627 (0.069)	(-)0.038 (0.121)	0.38	Bandarban, Rangamati; Khagrachari Excluded Districts with Ministers in Both Regime Excluded
Mean Dev Exp per Capita 2006	1.37 (0.081)	2.07 (0.191)	(-)0.693 (0.173)	0.00***	Bandarban, Rangamati; Khagrachari Excluded Districts with Ministers in Both Regime Excluded

(*), (**) & (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively

5.5 Concluding remarks

Francis Fukuyama stated in his work, “*The Origins of Political Order*,”²⁵ that, “...the miracle of modern liberal democracy, in which strong states capable of enforcing law are nonetheless checked by law and by legislatures, could arise only as a result of the fact that there was a rough balance of power among the different political actors within the society” (Fukuyama 2012:15). This assertion not only brings attention to the importance of studying the issue of concentration of political power across polities, it also raises the need for exploring how it shapes development outcomes of contemporary statecraft.

In this context, this analysis is a modest step towards that direction. In particular, it provides a descriptive scrutiny of a pertinent inquiry in political economy: does inequality in the distribution of political power shape resource distribution within a given political space? This inquiry is of both intrinsic and instrumental importance for two reasons. First, if resource distribution is a product of the power structure that prevails with a given polity, then it is of intrinsic concern to those who believe in the idea of ‘distributive justice’²⁶. Second, resource distribution must also aim to

25. Fukuyama, Francis (2011)

26. The notion of ‘need based distributive justice’ suggests that those in acute needs should be provided with resources required to meet those needs. These groups should be given more resources than those who already possess them, regardless of their contribution in the tax pool.

maximize government's effectiveness, which is related to the capacity²⁷ and autonomy of the public sector organs to meet the mandates of the people. Yet, if the preference of vested quarters or *de facto* power of state organs (in our case, the influence of ministers and standing committee chairpersons) shape resource distribution, then it brings to question the quality of government effectiveness we experience in undertaking such decisions.

Thus, to operationalise our empirical analysis of the posed question, we develop a CPP indicator that measures the variation in concentration of political power across the 64 districts of Bangladesh. Moreover, our descriptive scrutiny is suggestive that not only some districts have not entertained a single minister from their constituencies over last one decade, but there is also a substantial variation in the degree to which districts experience allocation of ministerial portfolios. Excessive allocation of ministerial portfolio in districts, reflected by a score closer to one in our CPP indicator, is also positively correlated with development expenditure per capita in both 2006 and 2012. This relationship is particularly strong for BNP-led Four Party alliances tenure. To be precise, in 2006, when BNP-led Four Party alliance was in government, districts that entertained the highest proportion of ministerial allocation such as Munshiganj, Jhalokati and Narsingdi are the major drivers of the results as they enjoyed substantial allocation of development expenditure per capita. In contrast, under the current AL-led Grand Alliance, districts that are pivotal in shaping resource allocation are Gopalganj and Madaripur. The association between the variables of interest is also substantial when we exclude Bandarban, Rangamati and Khagrachari districts from the analysis.

The noted findings are modestly robust under multiple restrictions and it provides motivation for future empirical work in political economy to explore if there is systematic causal relationship between concentration of political power and resource distribution within the political space of Bangladesh. Future studies can also scrutinise other types of concentration of political power – especially in the form of dynasty politics – and explore how such phenomenon shape economic and political outcomes. In terms of policy implication, the results flag a rationale for caution so that public organs are more attentive to severe disparity in resource allocation across the geographic space of Bangladesh.

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- 27. The focus on the 'capacity' of the state is essential since there are countries that have performed poorly in facilitating some good governance mandates but have achieved highly in promoting economic development. China and Vietnam have consistently scored poorly according to the World Bank governance indicators (Kaufmann et al 2006). Nonetheless, these countries attained extremely impressive records for generating economic growth and poverty reduction over the last two decades.
 - 28. In the case of the 9th Parliament, we also account for Standing Committee Chair allocation.
 - 29. The Four Party alliance included Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islam; Bangladesh Jatiya Party (BJP – Naziur); Islamiya Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ).

Overall, the purpose of this research was not to provide a grand theory or evaluation of the state of concentration of political power within political landscape of Bangladesh. Rather, the aim was to examine a particular type of concentration of political power, which stems from imbalanced ministerial allocation in certain regions. In that context, the chapter has opened a unique avenue for further empirical scrutiny. It also brings to attention how distribution of political power might have shaped important fiscal decisions and, in the process, undermined the notion of distributive justice and government effectiveness.



Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

In the introduction to this year's edition of SOG, we saw how the macro-picture of public accountability is conceived to interrelate across three branches of government: the executive, parliament and the judiciary. Parliament is generally considered the most important institution of public accountability, in that law makers are directly elected and are expected to create laws that reflect the interests of electoral constituents. We also considered the accountability gap implicit in the 'bi-polar' nature of the political economy, where in parliament 'winners take all' and the opposition tends to boycott parliamentary procedure as matter of standard practice. We thus considered that this pathology may translate, in governance and expenditure terms, across our most important public sectors such as public educational and health facilities as well as development initiatives across the country such that incumbents will receive a higher than their fair share of public resources for their respective home districts. These ideas will be discussed here in relation to the empirical findings extracted from the respective chapters of the report.

The chapter will begin by an analysis of general trends across the districts in the respective sectors of interest. An attempt follows, to explain so-called 'outliers' to the general trends, with the hopes of identifying places and models of excellence and best governance practice. A reflection on our research design is then presented with a discussion on the relation of indicators operationalisation and conceptual development. The following section outlines a broad framework for conceptualising governance in 2013, accounting for current events, and scholarship within the discipline. Along with some modest recommendations, the chapter ends with a reflection of the value of the report, and ideas for improving our research design in the future.

6.2 Analysis: General trends across districts

6.2.1 Parliamentary representation and public policy outcomes

For the Parliament to function as a fundamental institution of public accountability, legislators need to represent the interests of their constituents, even if this means forgoing personal and/or party interests. When Members of Parliament partake in budget speech, ideally this process should be reflected in public policy. In other words, as the legislators put forward the concerns of their respective constituents, the distribution of resources should reflect the interests within the areas of their constituency.

The findings of our research indicate increased allocation of resources in areas where MPs have a greater participation in budget speech, a positive correlation between participation in Budget Session in FY11 and the subsequent Public Expenditure in FY12 has been found. In reality, the representation of Parliamentary activities on the public expenditure need not necessarily relate to the interests of the regional constituents. It has been found that there is a greater participation in budget speech among MPs of the incumbent compared to the MPs belonging to the opposition in 2010-11. This further poses as a problem as the study has found that party affiliation plays a significant role in participation in the parliament, with respect to the attendance of legislators in 8th and 9th Parliament. In the 8th Parliament when Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) held office the participation of the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) MPs was found to be low, and vice-versa¹. The inverse relationship indicates and accounts for the existence of the culture of boycotting Parliament by the opposition during the democratic period in Bangladesh (1991-present day).

However, our findings suggest that the CHT region, which went through a two decade long civil conflict regarding autonomy plays an important role in shaping results of the relationship. Specifically, the mentioned inverse relationship between parliamentary attendance and incumbency only becomes (statistically) significant when the CHT districts are controlled for. Also, the assertion that “east of river” districts are economically better off due to improved communication and infrastructure² is not reflected in our findings regarding budget speech participation and resource allocation. In other words, when “west of river” districts are excluded in the calculations, no significant relationship is found between budget speech participation and public expenditure.

We also evaluated the state of female representation in the politics of Bangladesh. Women leaders hold the office of the Prime Minister, Opposition, Speaker of the House and the Ministry of Foreign

1. Although such strong evidences of party politics within the parliament exist, party affiliation may not be the only determinant for MPs' participation. Significant variation has been found in the attendance of the legislators belonging to the incumbent in both the 8th and 9th Parliament. For instance, the average attendance of legislators of the ruling party in the 9th Parliament ranged between 90 percent and 42 percent.
2. See Shilpi (2008).

Affairs, but a predominant representation of women in political offices is not seen across the 64 districts. In fact, there remain 39 districts that have never been represented by a female MP. However, over time a positive trend can be seen as there are 19 female MPs who have been elected in the 9th Parliament. Previously, the highest number of directly elected female MPs stood only at eight. Finally, it has been found that representation of women in the Parliament has resulted in a positive association with female-centric outcomes in their constituencies. The districts with female MPs between 1991 and 2008 have experienced greater female literacy and a better depiction in the share of skilled birth attendants. Sanitation and secondary school net attendance ratio can be said to have controlled for the female-centric associations as no significant differences were observed in these outcomes in districts represented by at least one female leader and districts that have never been represented by women.

Given what we know of a) the culture of ‘winner takes all’ politics and b) the culture of parliamentary boycott by the opposition, we expected to find ‘effects’ of such representative bias within the education and health sectors. This idea appears reasonable since our indicators (at least partly) do reflect the allocation of resources within public health and educational institutions. However, no such statistically significant relationships were found. While this may seem counter intuitive, there are various reasons why this should be the case. Apart from the idea that governance is a ‘slow moving variable’³, it needs to be noted that analyses of these sectors involve taking only specific dimensions of governance at the local district level. For instance, for the education sector the school governance index only takes training and female representation in terms of school management committees and single-shift operations into account. Also, for the health sector equipment functionality and physician and nurse positions are taken into account. In sum, we may say that the allocation of resources under the category ‘development expenditure’ is only partly reflected in our own constructed governance indicators.

The governance indicators in consideration for the education and health sectors have been found to explain the performance outcomes of the respective sectors. Our analysis indicates that the school governance indicator is a better determinant of educational performance than the primary school (infrastructure) quality. Moreover, that urbanisation and divisional headquarters, remoteness, population density, poverty and female literacy affect school governance. The health sector analyses have found similar results where governance inputs have been found to have significant influence on health outcomes. When contextual factors – remoteness and population density – are taken into account, a significant effect on outpatient delivery in the health sector is witnessed.

Having found no conclusive evidence of the effects of incumbency status upon public expenditure in the education and health sectors, we tested our data for effects of concentration of political

3. See Chapter 1 and Hyden (2013).

power on resource allocation. We found that districts with Ministers, who are appointed by the head of the incumbent party, enjoy greater distribution of public resources. As in the case of budget speech participation, the significant positive correlation between political power and public expenditure is only found when the CHT districts are controlled for. Thus, the findings suggest that political power intervenes into the proper representation of citizens by their constituents. This not only questions the functional aspects of the existing public accountability system, but also reflects the problem of politicisation of the civil bureaucracy who would implement programmes.

6.2.2 Education and health governance

In the education sector, three divisional headquarters, Dhaka, Rajshahi and Khulna, are among the top 10 district performers. Thus we may infer that geographic location plays an important role in governance outcomes, as districts nearby Dhaka – Munshiganj, Tangail, & Narsingdi – and Khulna – JESSORE – are also the top 10 performing districts. Also, five of the bottom 10 districts for the education sector have been found to be nearby in a cluster: Sunamganj, Moulvibazar and Habiganj with Kishoreganj and Habiganj adjacent to them. As evident, Dhaka is the best performing division in the education sector with Sylhet as the worst performing one (see map 6.1).

In the health sector, no divisional headquarters fall among the high performers (top 10 districts) when outpatient delivery is taken into account. However, Khulna, which is a divisional headquarter, belongs among the bottom 10 performers. Similarly, clusters are also observed among the districts performing in the health sector. Four districts – Munshiganj, Narayanganj, Manikganj and Gazipur – in the Dhaka division belong to the top 10 performing districts. Three districts of the CHT region belong to the bottom 10 performers, along with two districts – Sunamganj and Habiganj – in the Sylhet division. Nevertheless, Moulvibazar, also in the Sylhet division, belongs to the top 10. Dhaka is the best performing division with Barisal the worst one (see map 6.1).

6.2.3 Divergence from general trends

In both the education and health sectors, the top performers are the Joypurhat and Munshiganj districts. Munshiganj, falling in the division of Dhaka, can be expected to perform well due to its proximity to the capital. A cluster of top performers, both in the education and health sectors, is evident across the nearby districts of Dhaka, within the Dhaka division. Although Munshiganj is prone to flooding and erosion as it is situated nearby the Padma River, it has a historical tradition of educational excellence that can account for its performance. Bikrampur, which is south of Dhaka and falls in the Munshiganj district, is the oldest known capital of Bengal.

The Joypurhat district of the Rajshahi division (in the North-West region) has developed well within the last decade, partly due to a more efficient operation of the Jamuna bridge. As such much speedier transport facilities to and from the region are now available. Moreover, Joypurhat's performance may also be attributable to the construction of national and regional highways enhancing the use of the Jamuna bridge.

The progress of the "west of rivers" is further evident when we look at the top and bottom performers situated around the border. The top performers lay on the western border and four – Chuadanga, Jhenaidah, Jessore and Satkhira – out of the six border districts of Khulna are top districts. The bottom performers around the eastern border include districts from the CHT region and Cox's Bazar. Cox's Bazar is a tourist region that is secluded geographically. Geographical seclusion and remoteness can act as a hurdle towards development. Although the CHT is also situated in a remote and hilly region, the history of civil conflict plays an important role. Human rights issues have been pervasive in the region and ethnic groups have fought for autonomy over the years. This has resulted in social and to a certain extent political exclusion. The issues of unrest and exclusion may be considered to play a decisive role for the constituents to be represented well. Thus, geography and remoteness may not be the only contributing factors to the low performance of the districts in the CHT region.


In addition, three districts – Sunamganj, Habiganj and Moulvibazar – in the Sylhet division and the nearby Brahmanbaria district by the eastern border are bottom performers. It is a common perception that the districts in Sylhet are economically better off as majority of the tea plantations in Bangladesh are situated in the area. Also, Sylhet is a region that is associated with overseas earning. However, existence of flood plains and haors (wetland ecosystems) may contribute to the low performance in districts in the Sylhet and nearby regions.

Thus, geographical arrangement and positioning may not be the only contextual factors that contribute to the performance of the districts in the health and education sectors. However, it can be said that they can play an instrumental role in determining how well a district is to perform. Such arrangement affecting a district may be Bhola, which falls at the bottom when ranked in both the education and health sectors.

Map 6.1

BANGLADESH

Top and bottom performers in
health & education sectors



6.2.4 Variation in development expenditure

Our research findings show that incumbency status directly translates into the Government's 'development expenditure' category. However, the development expenditures in the fiscal year 2006 and 2011 show some similar trends, showing that there are important exceptions to the generalised relationship (see map 6.2). The Sundarban areas in the Barisal and Khulna divisions received a relatively high proportion of development resources during the periods when both the AL and BNP political parties were in power. At the same time, the CHT region also received a large share of national resources.


According to the Sixth Five Year Plan, accounting for regional disparities has contributed to development outcomes. A case in point is that the incidence of poverty has decreased at a high rate since 2005 in the "west of rivers" districts, which include the Barisal and Khulna divisions. The report (GoB 2011) has considered public policy as one of the contributing factors in achieving these positive development results. The districts of Jhalokati and Bhola, of Barisal division, have received high amounts of development expenditure during periods when both the political parties were in power. Thus, it is possible for public expenditure to be directed to the same areas irrespective of incumbency.

In contrast, the case of Gaibandha illustrates a picture where a district may receive low proportion of funds during both the periods. Gaibandha is a char area which in the year 2011 was the 18th most densely populated district (Islam and Khan 2012). Given its precarious socio-economic and geographic situation one may expect such a region to receive a greater proportion of the public expenditure.

The major outliers that show a drastic reversal in public expenditure (FY06 and FY11) include Narsingdi, Gazipur and Cox's Bazar. All of these districts fall among the top 10 in receiving development expenditure in FY06, and ranks in the bottom 10 in FY11. However, only Cox's Bazar can be considered as the only BNP stronghold among the three mentioned districts.

Although political incumbency has been found to affect development expenditure, it is possible for external pressure to contribute to development efforts that can offset incumbency bias. For example, the UN has frequently intervened in the governance of Hill-Tracts region over the years and that one of the major successes of the UNDP in Bangladesh include efforts in the CHT region (IGS 2012), channelling higher proportions of development expenditure may be a result of donor interest. Where informal institutions and party politics can sometimes hamper public accountability, donor concerns can provide sufficient motivations that can allow for addressing the people that require greater attention.

Map 6.2



6.3 Reflection on method

Given the current report offers governance indicators that allow us to capture the variation in the state of governance geographically across Bangladesh, it is essential to understand why such venture is perceived to be crucial in the first place. Why do we need indicators to measure governance? Measuring governance can be useful in setting 'standards for improvement and achievement as well as indicate where funds could best be of use and where policy might prove most effective' (Besancon 2003).⁴ It is also noted that a key rationale underlying the emergence of governance indicators, as very well stated by OECD, is 'based on the maxim that you can only manage those you can measure, the decision makers seek to quantify the quality of governance' (OECD 2006). Comparative indicators can also serve as a 'shaming' mechanism to reduce corruption and improve performance. In a cross-country setting, institutions, such as World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International etc, have produced their own indicators measuring multiple dimensions of governance. Nonetheless, computing these cross-country indicators is not undemanding.

The research effort of SOG 2012 has generated significant rewards in terms of empirical findings, discussed in the previous section. This achievement is an outcome of collaborative research that draws on expertise across the traditional disciplines of economics, public health and education, political science, sociology and the more recent multi-disciplinary study of international development. We are indeed grateful for the cooperation of the government Ministries in Bangladesh that have granted us access to their databases. Such unprecedented access has enabled IGS to investigate themes of great public interest using data which belongs in the public domain, and allowed us fulfil our role as a 'think-tank' and an agent of public transparency.

Moreover, given the general uniformity of data provided, we have been able to use standardised methods of statistical exploration, such that are familiar to social scientists in any field. This allows for 'peers' to adequately criticise our findings by reviewing of our methodology. We invite such critique in the hopes of refining and improving methodological (and conceptual) clarity for future studies.

As the contemporary study of 'governance' in the context of international development is a broad and relatively recent academic phenomena; methodologically, ours is a work in progress. Given the state of our progress, and the state of the cumulative research effort into governance in Bangladesh, we aim not to present specific governance targets and recommendations, but limit ourselves to proposing governance policy in the general direction of reform consistent with the ethos of our democratic society. The keen reader will have noticed that in the education and health chapters (chapters 3 and 4) our researchers intentionally consider the 'governance process'

4. It can be also argued that governance indicators are designed to 'provide sharp and clear result to the public' by reducing complexity of looking into every single detail.

as opposed to merely looking at output or outcomes. In other words, we consider governance to appropriately feature a discussion of means, rather than merely looking at ends. This, we believe is consistent with a) the democratic governance mindset in contemporary Bangladesh, and b) the maxim that ends do not always justify the means of public policy.

Conceptual definition is the point of departure for any social research design that proceeds in the traditional research-question & hypothesis-construction format. Having already stated that 'governance' is a broadly understood concept (and thus subject to revision in relation to time and place) we may pause here to reflect on the appropriateness of our own concept of governance. IGS currently proceeds with the following working definition of governance: "the sum total of the institutions and processes by which society orders and conducts its collective or common affairs" (IGS 2006).

The reader will notice that the working definition of IGS is rather broad. For instance, the concept does not differentiate between authoritarian and democratic forms of governance. Moreover "the sum-total of the institutions and processes" is a form of abstraction stated as such a high logical level that, conceptually, no institutions or processes are excluded. In other words, the concept provides little indication of priorities within the general research agenda. The part of the definition which considers "collective or common affairs" does translate into a slight 'narrowing' of the concept. In operational terms, we can here take the statement to '[conduct] common affairs' to mean parliamentary activity, for example, without reaching too far beyond a logic that is intuitive. However, as already stated, given that the concept does not differentiate between authoritarian and democratic forms of governance the "conduct of collective affairs" still invites a fair amount of ambiguity.

For the less methodologically inclined reader, this discussion may seem trivial. However, upon reflection of our combined research efforts the reader can be assured that it is fact relevant to any collaborative research. Our experience from working with statistical exploration of data suggests that conceptual clarity (or the lack thereof) directly affects our research design as well as our findings and inferences. A lack of conceptual clarity accounts for, at least partially⁵, the somewhat different approaches to creating governance indicators across the themes of parliamentary procedure, educational and health governance and what we term the concentration of power in Bangladesh. While this may not be considered an impediment for reading the chapters individually, it does complicate the scope for comparisons across the sectors and institutions of interest.

In sum, an important methodological reflection of SOG 2012 is the idea that in order to continue to work with statistical comparative analysis in Bangladesh, we need to refine our concept further.

5. The other part which explains differences in strategies should be understood in relation to the lack of a uniform reporting standard within available data-sets provided by the government Ministries.

A functional requirement of such a refined concept is that a) the operationalisation of our research (from concept to indicator) shall appear intuitive to the reader and b) it should be sufficiently 'narrow' to allow for inter-theme comparisons and c) that the concept should be intelligible to the layman. In the pursuit of such an eventual conceptual revision, the following section of the concluding chapter will provide an outline of the contemporary governance discourse as it is being portrayed in both professional and academic circles of 'development' and 'governance' in Bangladesh.

6.4 Conceptualising future IGS research

Having considered the importance of conceptual clarity for the type of collaborative research that IGS conducts, this section aims to outline more clearly, the most important elements of the current governance discourse in relation to theory and practice. It is hoped that this conceptual discussion will lead to conceptual refinement of IGS research strategies and development of reliable governance indicators in the following editions of the SOG series.

While considering a localised concept of governance is important (such that is codified in the Constitution) we also realise the importance of globalised ideas in the polity of Bangladesh and, moreover, the idea that in the future, the constitution is likely to be amended to reflect contemporary ideas, as it has been in the past. Thus, the importance of donors in Bangladesh should not be underestimated. Our most previous SOG report outlined the influence that international donors bring to the discussion of governance in Bangladesh. Presumably, they are able to do so, in spite of diminishing financial commitments, because their interventions in the past have yielded much public benefit. As a result, donors are generally considered 'partners' in development and appear to convey a rather high degree of legitimacy vis-à-vis the citizenry and the state. Moreover, in a situation where the state has often appeared as a barrier to development progress, donors have often been left to lead the reform agenda (IGS 2012).

In the previous section, we saw how the interest of donors in Bangladesh can help to explain regional variation in development expenditure. Specifically, we considered the World Bank's expressed interests in addressing regional disparities as stated in the PRSP of 2011 (GoB 2011). UNDPs specific interest in the development of the Chittagong Hill Tracts region is an example of the donor community's effort to address inadequacies of the political system in Bangladesh, which has historically resulted in a form of neglect of minority populations.

In a sense, a central mission of donors in Bangladesh is precisely this; to offset the deficiencies in public accountability produced by the maturing but still dysfunctional political system (which to a large extent determines outcomes in the public as well as private sectors of the economy), as discussed in *Chapter 1*. While the meaning and understanding of 'development' has undergone significant revision since the decolonisation era (Lewis 2012; Van Schendel 2009), the idea that

donors to Bangladesh ought to work towards offsetting the inefficiencies of the central state has remained largely unchanged. However, the manner that this greater objective is approached has indeed changed, as the priorities within the greater idea of ‘development’ have changed.

6.4.1 The globalisation of ideas surrounding development & governance

The meaning of ‘development’, and the role of the state in the greater development paradigm can be said to have moved from a pre-occupation with infrastructural development of the 1960s, to state-led industrialisation combined with agrarian land reform of the 1970s and, to an increased focus on private markets and liberalisation of state-run enterprises as well as the decentralisation of state-power in and the beginnings of local non-government actors in public service during the 1980s, to an increased focus on private market-led growth, peoples empowerment and democratisation through social movements in the 1990s.

Indeed, ‘development’ today reflects the globalization of ideas as legitimised at the democratic forum of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods financial institutions, which operate under UN charters. In a significant sense, global financing for international development and reform ‘conditionalities’ attached to multi-lateral aid reflects much more than real-politics and preference for the liberal / socialist dichotomy that characterised development thinking during the cold-war era (oil, cold war, geopolitical security), of the early years of decolonisation. For better and worse, today the idea of ‘development’ is increasingly becoming a product of a form of global academic-intergovernmental development complex, in which theories of development and growth are created and trialled in on an increasingly globalised and uniform scale.

So whereas Francis Fukuyama related the end of the cold war to what he called “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), the United Nations representatives and multi-lateral donor agencies in developing countries are unlikely to use the outcome of real-politics⁶ as the basis for development theory. Much more commonly is the use of scientific evidence (‘empiricism’) as the basis for fundamental development strategy. Seymour Martin Lipset’s ‘modernization thesis’ (Lipset 1960) represents a grand theory of development and democracy that can be said to lay at the foundation for the strategy of development that characterised the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Lipset’s view was that democracy is a product of economic growth, in the sense that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960: 75). Lipset can here be distinguished from Marx’s view in that Marx predicted that democracy was but an intermittent stage towards communism, while Lipset stated that economic development will sustain democracy.

6. The idea that at the global level, law does not necessarily factor into international policy. Rather, interests of strong nations, empires etc is what actually determines global geo-political outcomes. In the study of statesmanship and governance in the classical literature, ‘real-politics’ is most closely associated with the scholarship of Niccolò Machiavelli (Machiavelli 1955).

To some extent, Lipset's and Marx's⁷ view of development as sequential and teleological still remain as dormant presuppositions within public policy today⁸. However, since 1990, a shift in development thinking, away from Lipset's modernisation thesis can be said to be underway, suggesting that governance, and indeed democratic governance, must at some level be imagined to form the foundation for growth and development. From a philosophical rather than empirical perspective, the focus on governance as opposed to mere growth, can also be said to represent the re-discovery of the democratic maxim. which holds that policy ends do not necessarily justify the means of achieving those ends (e.g. by abhorrently violent means, authoritarian development in USSR, China, Vietnam, Cambodia required sacrificing freedoms and rights of propertied classes for the benefit of the property-less, with the ultimate effect of establishing a new ruling elite of equal disregard as the old).

Thus, the contemporary meaning of development can be said to embody, much closer, the ideas of people's empowerment and human rights, as opposed to state-led national development and growth, envisioned by technocrats of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. It is in this context, that our contemporary idea of good governance has been rapidly gaining ground across the globe. Whereas good governance was originally a concept advocated among the management disciplines (Hyden 2013), today the concept has been a) widely adopted by the multi-lateral donor agencies as well as the body of the United Nations and b) adapted and 'grown' to incorporate a widespread international consensus regarding adequacy of the Human Rights Doctrine, and the democratic ethos which it represents.

In the previous year's edition of SOG (2010-11) we considered that even though budgetary support to the Bangladeshi state has decreased over the past decades, external donor influence upon public policy has continued to play a crucial role in the public service outlook of the state. In other words the globalisation of ideas (spearheaded by the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions) that relate development to governance are very much present in Bangladesh, as in other developing countries. In fact, within international donor and development literature, Bangladesh is often portrayed as a sort of experimental ground where development strategies are first tried and tested, later to be replicated (e.g. micro-finance) in other developing countries.

6.4.2 Donors and "democratic governance" in practice

For better or worse, the idea that NGOs could be equated with 'civil society actors'⁹ took root as NGOs rallied for the return to democracy in 1991, after a sixteen year spell of authoritarian rule.

- 7. Lipset refers to his own theory as 'apolitical Marxism'.
- 8. For example, consider Geoffrey Sachs 'clinical economics' as being devoid of political economy analysis, Mushtaq Khan's de-prioritisation of democratic governance in favour of growth, and the trend of global funding for micro-credit-type development strategies.
- 9. As understood in de Tocqueville's and later in Putnam's (1993) idea of institutional 'social capital'.

Consequently, the 1990s saw a significant rise in international funding for NGOs (World Bank 2006). The ‘dogma’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001) of participation and ‘participatory research techniques’ idealised in Robert Chambers work (Chambers 1983 & 1997) is another example of how donors had, in the early 1990s begun to democratise their views of the development process.

The introduction of the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in the early 2000s also reflected the donors’ views that stakeholder¹⁰ participation into what was known as Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was now considered an essential component of the national development strategy. In the PRSP of 2005, donors acknowledged the idea that Lipset’s modernisation theory was indeed subject to revision: “There was a clear recognition [in the IPRSP] that while good governance presupposes political consensus on key national issues, economic development presupposes good governance, and in that order” (GoB 2005: 5).

Today, the donors’ programme portfolios in Bangladesh provide further evidence to the fact that ‘good governance’ is increasingly being equated with ‘democratic governance’ as opposed to economic growth and development. Today the World Bank supports the oversight function of the central standing committees of the *Jatya Sangsad*, the USAID supports electoral reform programmes and the DFID supports a multitude of civil society organisations that provide access to justice and representation to citizens in need. The UNDP in Bangladesh represents even more closely this recent trend, and has perhaps the most expansive programme to support local democracy and access to justice in Bangladesh.

6.4.3 Democracy and judicial reform in Bangladesh

As we have seen, the impetus to separate the judiciary from the executive dominance is consistent with the idea of a tripartite balance of power across the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government (see *Chapter 1*). Judicial autonomy is considered crucial, since without it, the incumbent party in power emerges as prosecutor as well as judge and juror. At risk of stating the obvious, from a perspective of justice, such a proposition is intolerable and cannot be reconciled with the idea of democratic governance without great difficulty. While the judiciary has been formally separated from executive dominance, the process is perhaps best viewed as ‘work in progress’.

As discussed in *Chapter 1*, the idea of a tripartite balance of power was conceived in the enlightenment period as means to overcome absolutist tendencies of church and state, where the monarchical administration acted, in effect, as both judge and juror of its subjects. Across nations of Europe, democracy was subsequently conceived as a more just form of government. But the path to democracy was not without risks and the idea that an electoral majority (of common people) could under a majority rule system, in effect emerge as tyrannical majorities emerged as a

10. Previously considered as beneficiaries of the development, the ‘poor’.

threat to the existing order. In order to prevent the potential excesses of the democratic revolution, enlightenment philosophers argued that the judiciary was indeed a cornerstone of the tripartite balance.

Alexander Hamilton, a central figure in the American Enlightenment argued, in his *Federalist Papers*, that since the judiciary is neither endowed with the ‘powers of the purse’ (taxation) nor has any authority over the police forces, then “no danger will ever come from that quarter” (Hamilton 1788). His famous statement underscores the idea that the good governance project is one that centres on reigning in the powers of the executive branch, but not necessarily the other two branches, which are in effect disconnected from the bureaucracy and therefore has no power to implement partisan or elitist policies. Thus, our concern here are strategies by which parliament and judiciary ‘checks’ and ‘balances’ executive power for the public good. It is in this context that the judiciary in Bangladesh is endowed with the powers to ‘review’ and nullify bills of law as ‘unconstitutional’, where by implication they violate fundamental rights of citizens.

Aside from the ‘power of review’, the judiciary, in practice, functions as a central agent of public accountability by holding citizens accountable to each other and to the law. The day-to-day functioning of the judiciary is therefore also central to the overall project of good governance and maintaining public accountability. In the following section, we thus aim to provide a brief empirical exploration of this aspect of the judicial governance in Bangladesh. To what extent, we ask, is the administration of the judicial courts a problem for the aim of good governance in Bangladesh? Why are the courts in Bangladesh often described as inefficient and corrupt?

6.4.4 Preliminary research on judicial performance

Justice refers to access to rights and fairness in all spheres: political, civil and economic. An efficient administration of the judicial courts becomes essential for both economic and human development. Proper and prompt functioning of the justice system can allow the citizens to settle their disputes and lead to economic efficiency, which contributes to growth. According to Anderson (2003), the margins of error for the poor are smaller than businesses when it comes to litigation. They are at risk of destitution as the most fundamental aspects of their livelihoods are affected and businesses only function at levels of profit and loss.

It has been elucidated that the development agenda, both nationally and internationally, has shifted towards a more democratic form of governance where needs of the poor and the marginalised become integral to the process. An independent and impartial judicial system becomes essential to not only hold the governed accountable for their actions, but also hold the ones who hold the duty to govern, politicians and the public administration, in checks and balances. However, Article 95 of Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh provides the

President with the authority to appoint the Chief Justice and the Judges and Bangladesh has a culture of appointing party affiliated judges as public prosecutors (AHRC 2009).

Political influence, coupled with low salary provides as a disincentive for judges to promptly adjudicate and perform their duties. The minimum salary of lower court judges stands at about Tk. 11,400, which is low compared to educated professionals in the private sector. Administrative inefficiencies, stemming from such problems, has led to large number of backlog of cases. It has been reported in 2003 (Transparency International 2007) that there are 968,305 pending cases. A (large number of) backlog of cases or court congestion does not only prohibit the citizens from accessing justice, it can also add to further delay of cases with an immense workload. According to Transparency International (2007), the ratio of judges per 100,000 people is 0.6, which translates that one judge serves approximately 163,934 people.

The following section provides an overview and trend of the judiciary at the lower courts (district-level) in Bangladesh. The indicator that has been used to provide a spatial representation shows the disposal rates of cases per year at the criminal and the civil courts of Bangladesh. However, a better representation of court congestion/backlog and efficiency could be provided with duration of cases and number of cases per judge. Unfortunately, such analyses could not be made as it was not possible to gather the relevant data.

Trends in criminal courts

The disposal rate for criminal cases has remained very consistent over the past three years in Bangladesh. The national average for criminal cases was 43.50 percent in 2012 followed by 42.66 percent and 43.28 percent in 2011 and 2010, respectively. In 2012, among the high performing districts Narsingdi performed well in case disposal with a 65.17 percent disposal rate, followed by Satkhira (64.01 percent), Bhola (62.72 percent), Manikganj (59.44 percent) and Jhenaidah (59.37 percent). It is interesting to note here that out of 64 districts 35 ranked above the national average in both the year 2012 and 2011, whereas 32 ranked higher than the national average in 2010.

The worst performing districts in case disposal in 2012 was Sherpur with only 13.11 percent disposal rate. Other low performers include Bandarban (23.16 percent), Rangamati (23.30 percent), Shariatpur (24.13 percent) and Joypurhat (29.52 percent), which ranked at the bottom in case disposal in 2012. A crucial policy pointer from this analysis is that the case disposal rates in the Hill districts (Bandarban, Rangamati and Khagrachari) are consistently lower than the national average and they ranked in the lowest order in 2012.

From a divisional¹¹ viewpoint, Khulna's criminal case disposal rate was comparatively better during the last three years as Magura, Jhenaidah and Kushtia performed well consistently. Following

11. The 64 districts of Bangladesh belong to 7 geographical and administrative 'Divisions'.

Khulna, some of the districts from Dhaka and Rajshahi divisions performed well in criminal case disposal. In contrast Chittagong divisional performance was the lowest in the year 2012 and 2011 followed by Dhaka, Rangpur and Sylhet divisions.

Trends in civil courts

Unlike the performance of criminal cases in subordinate courts of Bangladesh, the performance of civil litigation showed a very inconsistent trend during the last three years. The average disposal rate for civil suits in the subordinate courts of Bangladesh was 22.03 percent in 2010. Quite interestingly the national average plummeted to 7.09 percent and 8.23 percent in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Although we contacted the Registrar of Supreme Court of Bangladesh for the explanation of this sudden decline in disposal efficiency, we didn't get any satisfactory explanation.

Rangpur division performed well in civil suits disposal with the exception of Dinajpur during the last three years (2010, 2011, and 2012). Feni district consistently performed well in dealing with civil suits. The hilly districts of Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban ranked among the highest 10 performers in 2011 and 2012, while their performance was at the bottom 10 in 2010.

Chittagong, Cox's Bazar, Jhenaidah and Barisal ranked at the bottom 10 during the last three years. By analysing the data, we did not find any comprehensive correlation between why some districts are performing well in a certain year while some are not. But it is quite clear that the case-judge ratio is a significant factor for disposal of cases in the subordinate courts of Bangladesh. It has been found in our study that in most districts a single judge is dealing with too many cases; some as high as 4000 cases per year. The Law Commission of Bangladesh recommended that a judge should not deal with more than 1000 cases per year, which is also echoed in the words of Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs Barrister Shafique Ahmed (The Daily Star 2012). In reality, most of our judges are dealing with far more than 1000 cases.

6.5 Concluding remarks

In 2013, IGS is pleased to present our flagship research report we call "The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2012" (SOG 2012). We feel that, through favourable circumstances such as the recent availability of government assembled data-sets combined with expertise across the broad field of governance studies, we have been able to produce a report that adds real value to the discussion of governance in Bangladesh. As stated in the Introduction we hope that with our style and method of reporting, our research will appeal to local and international policymakers, academics and citizens interested in governance reform. A district-wise statistical exploration of governance in Bangladesh has not, as far we know, previously been attempted by other research organisations

in Bangladesh, on this scale and across the relevant themes of parliamentary representation, education and health sectors as well as the theme of power concentration in the country.

We wish to encourage critics to engage with us in academic debate, to challenge us on the accuracy of our findings and the appropriateness of our methods. We believe that such debate is crucial to fulfilling our role as a research organization, a think tank, and an agent of public transparency.

As already stated, we wish to provide recommendations that represent reform towards the *means* of achieving good governance, as opposed to clearly defined ends. Rather we aim, optimistically, to the future where it is imagined that the debate of good governance may translate to the improvement of process such that policy *ends* would be identified by the citizens of Bangladesh; the sovereign electorate.

In the district-wise comparative context, we would thus like to recommend the further consideration of the policy and research community to explore the underlying causes for good and bad performance of education and health governance in the districts. For example, what can we learn in terms of modelling best practices according to the cases of Joypurhat and Munshiganj – that both excelled in education and health-wise governance performance. Equally, what can we learn from the cases of worst performance, as seen in Sunamganj, Moulvibazar and Bhola? As for our own approach to better answering such questions, which we were not able to answer by means of statistical data analysis; we aim to enhance our explanatory power in the next years' edition of the SOG by combining quantitative and qualitative inquiry into the respective themes of interest.

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Annexure

Annex 1: Tables for chapter 3

Table 1: District ranks in terms of EPI

Rank	EPI _{poverty sensitive}	EPI	EPI _{poor}	EPI _{poorest}	EPI _{vulnerable}
1	Jessore	Jessore	Khulna	Jhalokati	Khulna
2	Khulna	Panchagarh	Rajshahi	Jessore	Jessore
3	Munshiganj	Munshiganj	Jessore	Panchagarh	Rajshahi
4	Patuakhali	Natore	Dhaka	Feni	Panchagarh
5	Panchagarh	Khulna	Bogra	Pirojpur	Munshiganj
6	Tangail	Satkhira	Panchagarh	Khulna	Satkhira
7	Jhalokati	Magura	Tangail	Munshiganj	Jhalokati
8	Satkhira	Narail	Munshiganj	Satkhira	Joypurhat
9	Jhenaidah	Jhalokati	Satkhira	Magura	Pirojpur
10	Natore	Feni	Joypurhat	Narail	Dhaka
11	Barisal	Patuakhali	Rajbari	Natore	Magura
12	Narail	Jhenaidah	Jhenaidah	Barisal	Narail
13	Feni	Tangail	Narail	Bagerhat	Feni
14	Pirojpur	Bogra	Natore	Rajshahi	Tangail
15	Magura	Pirojpur	Magura	Chandpur	Rajbari
16	Chandpur	Barisal	Narsingdi	Joypurhat	Natore
17	Madaripur	Rajshahi	Gazipur	Barguna	Jhenaidah
18	Rajshahi	Chandpur	Meherpur	Jhenaidah	Bogra
19	Bogra	Gopalganj	Thakurgaon	Patuakhali	Barisal
20	Sherpur	Joypurhat	Gopalganj	Tangail	Thakurgaon

Rank	EPI _{governance}	EPI	EPI _{open}	EPI _{ruleoflaw}	EPI _{voiceandability}
21	Gopalganj	Bagerhat	Chittagong	Gopalganj	Meherpur
22	Gazipur	Madaripur	Patuakhali	Dinajpur	Chittagong
23	Bagerhat	Laksmipur	Pirojpur	Rajbari	Chandpur
24	Dinajpur	Pabna	Feni	Manikganj	Gopalganj
25	Manikganj	Manikganj	Jhalokati	Bogra	Dinajpur
26	Narsingdi	Rajbari	Barisal	Madaripur	Gazipur
27	Rajbari	Narsingdi	Manikganj	Meherpur	Manikganj
28	Laksmipur	Gazipur	Chandpur	Thakurgaon	Bagerhat
29	Rangamati	Faridpur	Pabna	Gazipur	Barguna
30	C Nawabganj	Sherpur	Dinajpur	Chittagong	Patuakhali
31	Barguna	Rangamati	Madaripur	Faridpur	Narsingdi
32	Joypurhat	Dinajpur	Rangpur	Rangamati	Madaripur
33	Naogaon	Meherpur	Laksmipur	Pabna	Khagrachari
34	Pabna	Barguna	Chuadanga	Narsingdi	Comilla
35	Jamalpur	C Nawabganj	Comilla	Khagrachari	Pabna
36	Faridpur	Thakurgaon	Faridpur	Comilla	Faridpur
37	Meherpur	Chittagong	Khagrachari	Laksmipur	Nilphamari
38	Bhola	Comilla	Bagerhat	Sherpur	Rangpur
39	Chuadanga	Rangpur	Sherpur	Naogaon	Naogaon
40	Kushtia	Khagrachari	C Nawabganj	Dhaka	Chuadanga
41	Khagrachari	Noakhali	Kushtia	C Nawabganj	Rangamati
42	Chittagong	Mymensingh	Nilphamari	Nilphamari	Kushtia
43	Dhaka	Netrokona	Mymensingh	Rangpur	Laksmipur
44	Thakurgaon	Chuadanga	Naogaon	Noakhali	Sylhet
45	Kurigram	Naogaon	Rangamati	Chuadanga	Lalmonirhat
46	Comilla	Dhaka	Netrokona	Mymensingh	Mymensingh
47	Mymensingh	Nilphamari	Barguna	Narayanganj	Sherpur
48	Noakhali	Narayanganj	Sirajganj	Kurigram	C Nawabganj
49	Netrokona	Kurigram	Noakhali	Netrokona	Narayanganj
50	Lalmonirhat	Bandarban	Kurigram	Kushtia	Kurigram
51	Rangpur	Jamalpur	Sylhet	Kishoreganj	Noakhali
52	Gaibandha	Kishoreganj	Lalmonirhat	Shariatpur	Kishoreganj
53	Sirajganj	Brahmanbaria	Narayanganj	Jamalpur	Shariatpur
54	Narayanganj	Kushtia	Bandarban	Sylhet	Sirajganj
55	Shariatpur	Bhola	Jamalpur	Lalmonirhat	Netrokona
56	Bandarban	Shariatpur	Kishoreganj	Brahmanbaria	Jamalpur

Rank	EPI _{gender sensitive}	EPI	EPI _{green}	EPI _{locally}	EPI _{technological}
57	Nilphamari	Cox's Bazar	Cox's Bazar	Bandarban	Moulvibazar
58	Kishoreganj	Sylhet	Shariatpur	Bhola	Brahmanbaria
59	Brahmanbaria	Sirajganj	Brahmanbaria	Sirajganj	Cox's Bazar
60	Moulvibazar	Lalmonirhat	Moulvibazar	Cox's Bazar	Bandarban
61	Sunamganj	Gaibandha	Habiganj	Gaibandha	Habiganj
62	Habiganj	Moulvibazar	Gaibandha	Moulvibazar	Gaibandha
63	Sylhet	Habiganj	Bhola	Habiganj	Bhola
64	Cox's Bazar	Sunamganj	Sunamganj	Sunamganj	Sunamganj

Table 2: District ranks in terms of SGI

Rank	% SMC members trained	Female headed SMC	Single-shift	SGI	SGI-parsimonious
1	Nilphamari	Dhaka	Barguna	Dhaka	Dhaka
2	Thakurgaon	Narayanganj	Bogra	Joypurhat	Nilphamari
3	Panchagarh	Gazipur	Joypurhat	Narayanganj	Narayanganj
4	Gopalganj	Munshiganj	Dhaka	Chittagong	Chittagong
5	Shariatpur	Chittagong	Kurigram	Manikganj	Joypurhat
6	Manikganj	Narsingdi	Narsingdi	Narsingdi	Munshiganj
7	Sherpur	Joypurhat	Khulna	Nilphamari	Gopalganj
8	Jessore	Comilla	Pabna	Bogra	Manikganj
9	Joypurhat	Faridpur	Rajshahi	Pabna	Sherpur
10	Khagrachari	Manikganj	Naogaon	Khulna	Gazipur
11	Moulvibazar	Sherpur	Jhalokati	Munshiganj	Faridpur
12	Bhola	Barisal	Chittagong	Barguna	Moulvibazar
13	Pabna	Pirojpur	Manikganj	Gazipur	Narsingdi
14	Jamalpur	Gopalganj	Chuadanga	Kurigram	Jamalpur
15	Rangpur	Mymensingh	Gaibandha	Chandpur	Habiganj
16	Rangamati	Chandpur	Chandpur	Sherpur	Madaripur
17	Habiganj	Madaripur	Narayanganj	Faridpur	Rangpur
18	Kungram	Brahmanbaria	Bandarban	Rajshahi	Pabna
19	Meherpur	Feni	Lalmonirhat	Narail	Mymensingh
20	Lalmonirhat	Moulvibazar	Cox's Bazar	Jhalokati	Narail
21	Khulna	Habiganj	Tangail	Naogaon	Shariatpur
22	Chittagong	Sylhet	Meherpur	Gaibandha	Brahmanbaria
23	Narail	Jamalpur	Pirojpur	Jessore	Khulna

Rank	% SMC members trained	Female headed SMC	Single-shift	SGI	SGI-parsimonious
24	Patuakhali	Narail	Narail	Moulvibazar	Jessore
25	Faridpur	Jhalokati	C Nawabganj	Pirojpur	Comilla
26	Cox's Bazar	Magura	Natore	Gopalganj	Barisal
27	Dinajpur	Tangail	Satkhira	Tangail	Chandpur
28	Kishoreganj	Khulna	Gazipur	Lalmonirhat	Thakurgaon
29	Madaripur	Laksmipur	Jhenaidah	Barisal	Sylhet
30	Sirajganj	Rajbari	Munshiganj	Chuadanga	Kishoreganj
31	Narayanganj	Gaibandha	Patuakhali	Meherpur	Panchagarh
32	Bagerhat	Rangpur	Jessore	Jamalpur	Feni
33	Brahmanbaria	Bogra	Faridpur	Madaripur	Bagerhat
34	Naogaon	Pabna	Sirajganj	Shariatpur	Pirojpur
35	Mymensingh	Kishoreganj	Magura	Comilla	Laksmipur
36	Satkhira	Noakhali	Barisal	Rangpur	Rajbari
37	Sylhet	Bagerhat	Bhola	Natore	Gaibandha
38	Dhaka	Rajshahi	Khagrachari	Patuakhali	Khagrachari
39	Netrokona	Chuadanga	Sherpur	Magura	Bogra
40	Chandpur	Natore	Rajbari	Khagrachari	Tangail
41	Munshiganj	Jessore	Comilla	Rajbari	Lalmonirhat
42	Barisal	Kushtia	Shariatpur	Panchagarh	Patuakhali
43	Natore	Shariatpur	Madaripur	Sirajganj	Meherpur
44	C Nawabganj	Jhenaidah	Rangamati	Bagerhat	Rajshahi
45	Laksmipur	Netrokona	Moulvibazar	Satkhira	Magura
46	Barguna	Naogaon	Panchagarh	Cox's Bazar	Natore
47	Gaibandha	Patuakhali	Jamalpur	C Nawabganj	Dinajpur
48	Rajshahi	Dinajpur	Rangpur	Thakurgaon	Kurigram
49	Bogra	Thakurgaon	Kushtia	Feni	Jhalokati
50	Rajbari	Lalmonirhat	Bagerhat	Jhenaidah	Chuadanga
51	Bandarban	Meherpur	Nilphamari	Habiganj	Naogaon
52	Sunamganj	Sirajganj	Laksmipur	Laksmipur	Netrokona
53	Feni	Khagrachari	Feni	Kishoreganj	Sirajganj
54	Chuadanga	Barguna	Gopalganj	Brahmanbaria	Noakhali
55	Tangail	Panchagarh	Kishoreganj	Mymensingh	Kushtia
56	Comilla	Sunamganj	Thakurgaon	Bandarban	Bhola
57	Magura	Kurigram	Dinajpur	Bhola	Barguna
58	Gazipur	C Nawabganj	Noakhali	Rangamati	Satkhira

Rank	% SMC members trained	Female headed SMC	Single-shift	SGI	SGI-parsimonious
59	Narsingdi	Nilphamari	Brahmanbaria	Sylhet	Rangamati
60	Jhenaidah	Satkhira	Netrokona	Kushtia	Sunamganj
61	Pirojpur	Bandarban	Mymensingh	Dinajpur	Jhenaidah
62	Jhalokati	Bhola	Habiganj	Noakhali	C Nawabganj
63	Kushtia	Rangamati	Sylhet	Netrokona	Cox's Bazar
64	Noakhali	Cox's Bazar	Sunamganj	Sunamganj	Bandarban

Table 3: District ranks in terms of PSQL

Rank	Have separate toilet for girl's	Access to drinking water	Student classroom ratio	Student teacher ratio	PSQL index
1	Chuadanga	Thakurgaon	Rangamati	Jhalokati	Jhalokati
2	Shariatpur	Panchagarh	Jhalokati	Rangamati	Joypurhat
3	C Nawabganj	Lalmonirhat	Bandarban	Pirojpur	Dinajpur
4	Rajshahi	Nilphamari	Khagrachari	Bagerhat	Thakurgaon
5	Jhenaidah	Kurigram	Pirojpur	Barguna	Panchagarh
6	Jessore	Rangpur	Bagerhat	Bandarban	Naogaon
7	Moulvibazar	Jamalpur	Barguna	Khulna	Jhenaidah
8	Dhaka	Joypurhat	Khulna	Dinajpur	Barisal
9	Barisal	Jhenaidah	Joypurhat	Naogaon	Jessore
10	Sirajganj	Dinajpur	Dinajpur	Patuakhali	Pirojpur
11	Joypurhat	Tangail	Naogaon	Thakurgaon	Barguna
12	Munshiganj	Dhaka	Thakurgaon	Joypurhat	Khagrachari
13	Cox's Bazar	Sirajganj	Gopalganj	Khagrachari	Narail
14	Panchagarh	Rajbari	Bogra	Barisal	Bogra
15	Magura	Shariatpur	Narail	Narail	Rangamati
16	Meherpur	Chuadanga	Patuakhali	Bogra	Khulna
17	Dinajpur	Kushtia	Satkhira	Jessore	Rajshahi
18	Bhola	Gaibandha	Jessore	Satkhira	Patuakhali
19	Narail	Bogra	Panchagarh	Panchagarh	Moulvibazar
20	Natore	Narsingdi	Barisal	Gopalganj	Shariatpur
21	Narsingdi	Munshiganj	Rajshahi	Jhenaidah	Magura
22	Noakhali	Feni	Feni	Rajshahi	Munshiganj
23	Naogaon	Meherpur	Sunamganj	Feni	Sirajganj
24	Pabna	Gazipur	Natore	Gazipur	Natore
25	Gaibandha	Sherpur	Jhenaidah	Magura	Feni
26	Jamalpur	Moulvibazar	Moulvibazar	Natore	Bagerhat

Rank	Have separate toilet for girl's	Access to drinking water	Student-classroom ratio	Student-teacher ratio	PSQL index
27	Faridpur	Barisal	Gazipur	Munshiganj	Gazipur
28	Satkhira	Naogaon	Magura	Rangpur	Chuadanga
29	Thakurgaon	Chittagong	Chittagong	Sirajganj	Bandarban
30	Khulna	Jessore	Chandpur	Manikganj	Rangpur
31	Lalmonirhat	Pabna	Munshiganj	Moulvibazar	Meherpur
32	Chittagong	Natore	Manikganj	Meherpur	Satkhira
33	Rajbari	C Nawabganj	Laksmipur	Tangail	Dhaka
34	Rangpur	Habiganj	Dhaka	Chittagong	C Nawabganj
35	Mymensingh	Narayanganj	Madaripur	Chandpur	Lalmonirhat
36	Manikganj	Magura	Sirajganj	Kurigram	Gopalganj
37	Khagrachari	Cox's Bazar	Kushtia	C Nawabganj	Chittagong
38	Narayanganj	Laksmipur	Habiganj	Pabna	Manikganj
39	Kishoreganj	Sylhet	Chuadanga	Madaripur	Kurigram
40	Gazipur	Rajshahi	Sylhet	Sunamganj	Pabna
41	Madaripur	Patuakhali	Tangail	Shariatpur	Tangail
42	Habiganj	Manikganj	Pabna	Gaibandha	Nilphamari
43	Nilphamari	Faridpur	Lalmonirhat	Laksmipur	Gaibandha
44	Patuakhali	Noakhali	Rangpur	Dhaka	Habiganj
45	Kushtia	Jhalokati	Kurigram	Nilphamari	Kushtia
46	Jhalokati	Chandpur	Meherpur	Lalmonirhat	Chandpur
47	Sylhet	Khagrachari	C Nawabganj	Habiganj	Laksmipur
48	Sherpur	Kishoreganj	Nilphamari	Kushtia	Faridpur
49	Feni	Madaripur	Comilla	Noakhali	Sunamganj
50	Kurigram	Brahmanbaria	Shariatpur	Comilla	Madaripur
51	Laksmipur	Bhola	Faridpur	Sherpur	Narsingdi
52	Barguna	Barguna	Noakhali	Chuadanga	Noakhali
53	Comilla	Mymensingh	Gaibandha	Faridpur	Sherpur
54	Pirojpur	Narail	Netrokona	Bhola	Jamalpur
55	Bogra	Sunamganj	Kishoreganj	Netrokona	Sylhet
56	Brahmanbaria	Netrokona	Sherpur	Narsingdi	Bhola
57	Tangail	Pirojpur	Narsingdi	Rajbari	Rajbari
58	Bandarban	Comilla	Jamalpur	Sylhet	Comilla
59	Bagerhat	Khulna	Bhola	Kishoreganj	Kishoreganj
60	Rangamati	Gopalganj	Narayanganj	Jamalpur	Netrokona
61	Netrokona	Satkhira	Rajbari	Narayanganj	Narayanganj
62	Chandpur	Bagerhat	Brahmanbaria	Mymensingh	Mymensingh
63	Sunamganj	Bandarban	Cox's Bazar	Brahmanbaria	Cox's Bazar
64	Gopalganj	Rangamati	Mymensingh	Cox's Bazar	Brahmanbaria

Annex 2: Tables & figures for chapter 5

Table 1a: District Ranking in terms of Development Expenditure per Capita 2012*

SL No.	Name of the District	Per Capita Development Expenditure 2011-12	Per Capita 2011-12 (0-1 scale)
1	Rangamati	3087	1.000
2	Bandarban	2151	0.674
3	Gopalganj	1762	0.538
4	Bhola	1116	0.313
5	Khagrachari	1050	0.290
6	Shariatpur	995	0.271
7	Madaripur	964	0.260
8	Jhalokati	821	0.210
9	Pirojpur	816	0.208
10	Faridpur	778	0.195
11	Barguna	776	0.194
12	Rajshahi	759	0.188
13	Khulna	756	0.187
14	Patuakhali	713	0.172
15	Barisal	668	0.156
16	Bagerhat	644	0.148
17	Pabna	636	0.145
18	Chittagong	600	0.133
19	Panchagarh	599	0.133
20	Rajbari	582	0.126
21	Dinajpur	551	0.116
22	Sherpur	542	0.113
23	Rangpur	532	0.109

Sl. No.	Name of the District	Per Capita Development Expenditure 2011-12	Per Capita 2011-12 (0-1 scale)
24	Brahmanbaria	531	0.109
25	Kishoreganj	529	0.108
26	Kurigram	524	0.106
27	Munshiganj	509	0.101
28	Jamalpur	504	0.099
29	Manikganj	499	0.097
30	Jhenaidah	495	0.096
31	Netrokona	491	0.095
32	Naogaon	490	0.095
33	Narail	487	0.093
34	Sylhet	481	0.091
35	Lalmonirhat	466	0.086
36	Thakurgaon	465	0.086
37	Moulvibazar	452	0.081
38	Sunamganj	450	0.081
39	Tangail	449	0.080
40	Sirajganj	444	0.079
41	Noakhali	441	0.077
42	Chandpur	438	0.077
43	Laksmipur	438	0.076
44	Bogra	436	0.076
45	Chapai Nawabganj	429	0.073
46	Satkhira	422	0.071
47	Magura	421	0.070
48	Mymensingh	410	0.067
49	Natore	407	0.066
50	Comilla	405	0.065
51	Jessore	403	0.064
52	Kushtia	400	0.063
53	Chuadanga	388	0.059
54	Feni	375	0.054
55	Gaibandha	369	0.052
56	Narsingdi	358	0.049
57	Meherpur	352	0.047
58	Joypurhat	324	0.037
59	Habiganj	312	0.033
60	Nilphamari	310	0.032
61	Gazipur	291	0.025
62	Cox's Bazar	263	0.015
63	Narayanganj	219	0.000

*These expenditure excludes the major infrastructure projects that touch multiple districts

Table 1b: District Ranking in terms of Development Expenditure per Capita 2006*

SL No.	Name of the district	Per Capita Development Expenditure 2005-06	Per Capita 2005-06 (0-1 scale)
1	Rangamati	9885	1.000
2	Bandarban	4506	0.417
3	Sylhet	3588	0.317
4	Jhalokati	3170	0.272
5	Khagrachari	2960	0.249
6	Munshiganj	2619	0.212
7	Comilla	2419	0.191
8	Narsingdi	2421	0.191
9	Gazipur	2362	0.184
10	Laksmipur	2283	0.176
11	Cox's Bazar	2274	0.174
12	Bogra	2215	0.169
13	Bhola	2086	0.155
14	Moulvibazar	2082	0.154
15	Dhaka	2035	0.150
16	Rajshahi	1968	0.142
17	Meherpur	1932	0.138
18	Pirojpur	1894	0.133
19	Chittagong	1869	0.131
20	Narayanganj	1864	0.130
21	Feni	1782	0.121
22	Khulna	1755	0.119
23	Bansal	1746	0.118
24	Manikganj	1738	0.117
25	Bagerhat	1712	0.114
26	Barguna	1694	0.112
27	Natore	1646	0.107
28	Patuakhali	1634	0.105
29	Faridpur	1618	0.104
30	Jhenaidah	1601	0.102
31	Dinajpur	1594	0.101
32	Chandpur	1543	0.095

SL. No.	Name of the district	Per Capita Development Expenditure 2005-06	Per Capita 2005-06 (0-1 scale)
33	Shariatpur	1509	0.092
34	Gopalganj	1466	0.088
35	Panchagarh	1448	0.086
36	Habiganj	1398	0.080
37	Kurigram	1334	0.073
38	Sunamganj	1299	0.069
39	Jamalpur	1254	0.064
40	Narail	1246	0.064
41	Kushtia	1235	0.063
42	Netrokona	1229	0.062
43	Brahmanbaria	1221	0.061
44	Madaripur	1220	0.061
45	Tangail	1187	0.057
46	Magura	1175	0.056
47	Naogaon	1172	0.055
48	Sirajganj	1137	0.052
49	Noakhali	1128	0.051
50	Lalmonirhat	1063	0.043
51	Rajbari	1046	0.042
52	Sherpur	1050	0.042
53	Jessore	1041	0.041
54	Joypurhat	1012	0.038
55	Chapai Nawabganj	972	0.034
56	Pabna	899	0.026
57	Kishoreganj	893	0.025
58	Satkhira	873	0.023
59	Mymensingh	832	0.018
60	Rangpur	815	0.017
61	Nilphamari	775	0.013
62	Chuadanga	720	0.007
63	Thakurgaon	716	0.007
64	Gaibandha	660	0.000

*These expenditure excludes the major infrastructure projects that touch multiple districts

Figure 5.1a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012






Figure 5.1b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012



**Figure 5.6a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2006
(Border Districts Excluded)**



**Figure 5.6b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012
(Border Districts Excluded)**




Figure 5.3a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2006
(Rangamati, Bandarban, Khagrachari, Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet, Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal)







Figure 5.3b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012
(Rangamati, Bandarban, Khagrachari, Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet, Raishahi, Khulna, Barisal)




**Figure 5.4a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2006
{Eastern Districts Excluded}**




**Figure 5.4b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012
(Eastern Districts Excluded)**




**Figure 5.5a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2006
(Western Districts Excluded)**




**Figure 5.5b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012
(Western Districts Excluded)**




**Figure 5.6a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2006
(Border Districts Excluded)**



**Figure 5.6b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012
(Border Districts Excluded)**



**Figure 5.7a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2006
(Non Border Districts Excluded)**



**Figure 5.7b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012
(Non Border Districts Excluded)**




Figure 5.8a: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2006
 (Districts with Ministers in both regimes excluded; Bandarban, Rangamati & Khagrachari excluded)







Figure 5.8b: Concentration of Power and Development Expenditure per Capita 2012
 (Districts with Ministers in both regimes excluded; Bandarban, Rangamati & Khagrachari excluded)




Annex 3: Maps






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
Percentage of diagnostic equipment functioning






BANGLADESH

Number of outdoor patients served




Legend




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datasource: GoB, DGHS, 2011
cartography: Arafat 2013



BANGLADESH

Concentration of political power, 2006



The Institute of Governance Studies, established in 2005, is an institute of BRAC University, a private institution of higher education in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The University, established in 2001, has a goal to provide a high quality, broad-based education with a focus on professional development to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary for leading the country in its quest for development.

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The Report gives very interesting insight into the whole arena of governance in state mechanisms particularly focusing on the functioning of the Parliament and development sectors like health and education. Bangladesh is now passing through a transition period when the efficiency and effectiveness of state mechanisms are under heavy public scrutiny. The question of bringing in peoples voices in the Parliament through public representatives has become a crucial factor as the elected representatives are either not interested or do not have the capacity to challenge the existing norms of partisan politics that often jeopardise good governance in public sectors like education and health. The in-depth analysis has rightly identified pertinent issues like gender disparity in electing female legislators which speak of Bangladesh's need for going miles and miles for ensuring gender justice in governance. It's a job well done and very timely. Human rights campaigners like us will no doubt benefit immensely from the Report.

Rasheda K. Choudhury
Executive Director
Campaign for Popular Education (CAPME)

This multi-disciplinary volume, produced annually since 2006 by the Institute of Governance Studies, provides invaluable insights into the state of governance in Bangladesh. The themes of the 2012 Report could not be more relevant for our times, spanning issues from centralised power and quality of voice in parliament, to service delivery in the education and health sectors. The Report looks closely at the steering capacity of the public in ensuring public institutions such as parliament and government make policy decisions that reflect public priorities and concerns. It analyses how the quality of this relationship between citizens and elected institutions is translated into meeting the needs and priorities of the public in two key service delivery sectors. Rich in primary, social and economic data and analysis, *the State of Governance in Bangladesh* report continues to raise important public policy issues that are at the heart of Bangladesh's key development challenges.

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